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Abstract  
Results-based financing (RBF) has been receiving increasing attention in recent 
decades. RBF involves a transfer of funds based on the attainment and verification of 
predetermined outcomes. Afghanistan has implemented RBF in the form of 
performance-based contracting (PBC) since 2003 and performance-based financing 
(PBF) between 2010 and 2015. The PBC experience was successful in delivering 
maternal and child health services. However, the PBF programme had minimal effect 
on the delivery of maternal and child health services. Using a political economy lens, 
this thesis answers the question of what factors shaped and affected the PBC and 
PBF programmes and their outcomes in Afghanistan. It also examines the cost-
effectiveness of the PBF programme relative to standard practice. This thesis 
provides support for the assertion that both political economy factors and value for 
money are critical in the design, adoption and implementation of RBF programmes. 
RBF enforces different arrangements for the distribution of resources and provides 
opportunities or threats for actors through changing their functions and modifying 
institutional processes. Subsequently, a new economic and political situation comes 
into existence. Economic evaluation compares the costs and consequences of 
alternative courses of action recommending which health care investments are most 
efficient, guiding resource allocation in health. Therefore, careful consideration and 
caution is required when adopting and implementing RBF programmes. Policymakers 
and researchers should increasingly focus on the political economy aspect of RBF 
programmes in conjunction with economic evaluations, particularly in the context of 
fragile and conflict-affected setting to ensure that the technical outcomes of economic 
evaluations are suitably received in the context of highly political situations. If RBF 
programmes are designed around a full understanding of political economy and value 
for money, RBF can potentially be a powerful tool to achieve better outcomes.  
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 Introduction 
One health programme that has been receiving increasing attention in recent decades 
is results-based financing (RBF) (Shroff, Bigdeli, and Meessen 2017). RBF involves 
a transfer of funds based on the attainment and verification of predetermined 
outcomes (Eldridge and Palmer 2009). RBF can be integrated within contracts for 
service delivery (performance-based contracting) or through the incentivisation of 
healthcare providers (performance-based financing).  
RBF is given different names. The most common names used interchangeably are 
results-based financing, performance-based financing (Soeters, Havineza, and 
Peerenboom 2006; Eldridge and Palmer 2009; Rusa et al. 2009) and pay for 
performance (P4P) (Eichler and De 2008; Eichler, Levine, and Group 2009). In this 
thesis, we use the term of RBF for all types of supply-side financing,  including 
performance-based contracting (PBC) and performance-based financing (PBF).  
The introduction of RBF is supposed to generate a competitive environment which 
will motivate healthcare organisations to exhibit enhanced efficiency, high-quality 
services and improved results (Mills et al. 2002; Bustreo, Harding, and Axelsson 
2003; Palmer et al. 2006; The Health Foundation 2011). RBF is expected to change 
governance arrangements, strengthening relationships between levels of the health 
system, and improving regulation of the health sector and health financing (Palmer 
2000; Khalil 2013; Kadaï et al. 2006; Loevinsohn and Harding 2004, 2005). While in 
low-income settings, countries are struggling to maximize the impact of limited 
resources, RBF is considered to offer novel solutions to this problem (Loevinsohn and 
Harding 2005). By connecting financing to outcomes, RBF is seen as a mechanism 
for improving the effectiveness and efficiency of service delivery (Gertler, Giovagnoli, 
and Martinez 2014). 
Meanwhile, political factors are influential in the selection and implementation of 
policies in the health sector (Hsiao 2007). Politics has consistently been a cohesive 
aspect of human discourse in all areas incorporating health throughout history (Oliver 
2006). Politics is associated with the distribution of power and resources and how 
government and or community are managed to obtain a desirable outcome. It is about 
interactions between actors (individuals, groups, organisations) that allow particular 
actors to have influence and control over others (Fitzgerald 2013). In other words, 
politics is about “who gets what, when, how” (Lasswell 1936). Since Virchow’s theory 
that medicine is a critical aspect of political science (Benaroyo, Mtiller, and Froriep 
1998), there has been an increased focus on the political elements of health (Franco, 
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Álvarez-dardet, and Ruiz 2004). The World Health Report published in 2005 offers an 
important reference to the political economy of health. In the report, it is stipulated 
that health has a political nature because of the inequalities that exist in terms of the 
distribution of health within societies, the significance of health in the context of 
citizenship and human rights, and the link between the social determinants of health 
and political determination (Bambra, Fox, and Scott-Samuel 2005). The social 
determinants of health is defined as the interconnected social, political and economic 
forces that produce the setting in which people live and do activities (National 
Collaborating Centre for Determinants of Health 2014). In other words, living 
conditions and health are impacted by social, political and economic determinants 
(CSDH 2008). In addition, because health has economic and social consequences, it 
is fundamentally important for a country’s political legitimacy (Kickbusch 2015). Given 
the relationship between politics and health, health programmes need to acknowledge 
that politics is a critical element that determines a programme’s ability to bring about 
change (Moncrieffe and Luttrell 2005). 
The available evidence suggests that political economy is relevant to the design and 
implementation of RBF programmes. While RBF can influence  the behaviour of 
healthcare professionals, it can  also affect the behaviour of other relevant actors and 
their relationships between each other (Jacobs et al. 2012). Due to its innovative 
nature, RBF enforces distinct arrangements for the sharing of resources; and 
represents a risk or opportunity to actors as a result of changes to their roles and 
responsibilities and the modification of organisational processes (Sparkes et al. 
2019). Consequently, a new political and economic environment comes into 
existence. Nevertheless, minimal information is available regarding the political 
processes and interactions associated with RBF in addition to the factors that 
influence the choice and application of such policies. To date, only a limited number 
of political economy analyses (PEA) have been conducted on RBF programmes in 
low-income settings and fragile and conflict-affect states (FCASs) (Bertone et al. 
2014; Bertone and Witter 2015; Chimhutu et al. 2015; Bertone, Falisse, et al. 2018; 
Bertone, Wurie, et al. 2018; Witter, Chirwa, et al. 2019). We will discuss these studies 
in the literature review part of this thesis. Political economy analysis locates a policy 
in terms of the understanding of interactions between economic and political actors; 
the manner in which power and resources are distributed between forces; as well as 
the processes that shape, maintain and alter such interactions over time (Mcloughlin 
2014).  
Furthermore, the available evidence suggests that economic evaluation is relevant to 
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RBF programmes. Economic evaluations play an important role in the appraisal of 
health care programmes (Cunningham 2000). Economic evaluation compares the 
costs and consequences of alternative courses of action recommending which health 
care investments are most efficient, guiding resource allocation in health (Griffiths, 
Legood, and Pitt 2016). A growing number of studies have examined the costs and 
outcomes of RBF programmes; however, most of these studies were carried out in 
high-income countries. Only two economic evaluations focused on low-income 
countries (LMICs) (Zeng et al. 2018; Borghi et al. 2015). No study focused on fragile 
and conflict-affected states (FCASs). Furthermore, available studies tend to have 
methodological limitations meaning that evidence is inconclusive as to whether or not 
the outcomes are worth the costs (Emmert et al. 2012; Meacock, Kristensen, and 
Sutton 2014; Turcotte-Tremblay et al. 2016). We will discuss these studies in the 
literature review part of this thesis.  
Since 2003, the Basic Package of Health Services (BPHS) has been implemented in 
Afghanistan via a performance-based contracting (PBC) programme defined as 
“contract out”. This PBC has been considered an effective strategy for the rapid scale-
up of maternal and child health (MCH) programmes across the country (Alfonso et al. 
2015; Newbrander et al. 2014; Edward et al. 2011; Kim et al. 2016; Peters et al. 2007). 
The country additionally executed performance-based financing (PBF) programme 
associated with BPHS from 2010 to 2015 (Ministry of Public Health & KIT Royal 
Tropical Institute 2015).  
Although various studies have been conducted on the PBC and PBF implemented in 
Afghanistan (Newbrander et al. 2014; Waldman and Newbrander 2014; Edward et al. 
2011; Loevinsohn and Sayed 2008; Ameli and Newbrander 2008; Arur et al. 2010; 
Engineer et al. 2016; Tawfiq, Desai, and Hyslop 2018), the cost-effectiveness as well 
as the political economy factors that affected the performance of the programmes 
within Afghanistan, remain poorly understood. Understanding whether PBF 
represents value for money and the extent to which political economy factors affected 
the programme would be useful for the country and, in a more general sense, for 
comparative research of healthcare financing systems in FCASs.  
The current thesis uses political economy analyses to identify factors affecting the 
performance of PBC and the design and implementation of the PBF programme in 
Afghanistan. It also examines the cost-effectiveness of PBF in relation to the BPHS 
in Afghanistan. Additionally, it serves as a potential example for developing political 
economy analysis in conjunction with cost-effectiveness analysis. It presents a 
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research model for a setting in which health is political, and the outcome of cost-
effectiveness analysis in isolation is limited in its capacity to influence decision-making 
actors. 
Chapters 1 and 2 define RBF and its implementation globally along with an overview 
of the literature incorporating a systematic review of RBF economic evaluations. 
Chapter 3 details the objectives of the study, along with the methodology adopted. 
Chapter 4 presents two case studies related to PBC and PBF in Afghanistan using 
political economy lens, and a cost-effectiveness analysis of performance-based 
financing programme in Afghanistan. Lastly, chapter 5 interprets the study findings in 
light of existing literature, expounds on the forms and relationships uncovered by each 
key outcome, delineates the importance of the thesis findings, highlights the thesis 
methodological contribution, recognizes the limitations of the thesis, and finally offers 
a conclusion along with policy recommendations.   
 
 Country Profile 
1.2.1 Geography  
The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, commonly known as Afghanistan, with a size of 
652,864 square Kilometre (National Statitics and Information Authority 2018) is a 
landlocked country in South-Central Asia. The country neighbours with Turkmenistan, 
Uzbekistan and Tajikistan in the north, Iran in the west, China in the northeast and 
Pakistan in the south and east (Figure 1) (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2019).  
A large proportion of the country is covered by mountains while the south-west 
consists of deserts. The highest point of the country is at 7,500 metres, and the lowest 
is at 360 metres above the sea level. The country has an average temperature of +35 
Celsius degree in summers and -15 Celsius degree in winters (Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs 2019).  
1.2.2 Demographics  
Afghanistan has a total population of 31.5 million of which only 22 per cent is urban 
based (Central Statistics Organization 2019). The remaining 78 per cent of the 
population lives in scattered rural areas. Almost half of the population is under the 
age of fifteen and less than three per cent of the population is over the age of 65.  The 
sex ratio is 105 males to 100 females (Central Statistics Organization 2018). The 
average household size is eight persons (Central Statistics Organization 2017), while 
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almost 50 per cent of the population lives in households with nine or more people and 
44 per cent live in over-crowded housing with more than three persons per room. 
Almost 99 per cent of women and men are married before age 40. Child marriage is 
practiced in the country. Twenty-eight per cent and 4 per cent of women marry before 
age 18 and 15, respectively (National Statitics and Information Authority 2018).  
1.2.3 Governance  
The country is guided by the 2005 constitution in which the political structure of the 
country is formed as a democratic government consisting of executive, legislative, 
and judicial branches and elected president and parliament. (National Statitics and 
Information Authority 2018). Dari (Farsi) and Pashto are the country’s national 
languages (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 2005) while there are a number of smaller 
local languages such as Uzbeki, Turkamani, Balochi, Nooristani, Pashaaye, and 
Pamiri. Over 99 per cent of the country practices Islam (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
2019).  
Figure 1. Afghanistan Map 
 
Source: MaCruzin.com (MapCruzing.com 2008) 
Afghanistan is administratively composed of 34 provinces. Each province is led by a 
governor appointed by the president. Kabul is the capital of Afghanistan, with the 
largest population in the country. It stands out as an essential centre for all types of 
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activities including social, economic and political gravitation. The second largest cities 
are Herat, Mazar, Ningarhar and Kandahar (National Statitics and Information 
Authority 2018).  
1.2.4 Economy  
Afghanistan remains one of the least developed countries in the world with a nominal 
gross domestic product (GDP) of 20,367 billion US dollars and GDP per capita of 565 
US dollars in 2018. GDP growth has been 2.4 per cent in 2016, 2.7 per cent in 2017, 
and 2.4 per cent in 2018. Overall, economic growth has been hampered by insecurity, 
limited private sector in investment, and recent years’ drought (The World Bank 2019).  
1.2.5 Health Care System, Structure and Challenges  
Afghanistan has experienced profound difficulties over the past decades, especially 
since the 1978 invasion by the former Soviet Union which led to political instability, 
pervasive conflict and, at times, outright war. In 1992, the Mujahedeen (groups of 
religiously driven warriors) took power, initiating a new period of civil war and inter-
Mujahedeen conflicts. From 1996 until November 2001, the Taliban emerged as the 
ruling group in the country with limited resources to support health systems 
development (Sondorp 2004). 
In December 2001, a new democratic government was established in Afghanistan. 
The new government inherited extreme disorder in the health sector. The capacity of 
both private and public sectors was relatively constrained, and the future prospects 
were uncertain. The proportion of primary health facilities to the population varied from 
around one per 40,000 in the eastern and central regions of the country to one per 
200,000 in the southern part. This also focused attention on the significant lack of 
healthcare workers and the substandard infrastructure, which in some places was 
completely missing. Healthcare services were predominantly delivered by non-state 
providers (NSPs). Four primary obstacles limited the efforts to establish an effective 
and efficient national health framework: (i) insufficient managerial and service delivery 
capacity in the Ministry of Public Health (MoPH); (ii) absence of physical infrastructure 
and competent staff; (iii) substandard financial and human resources distribution; and 
(iv) lack of coordination and management of NSP activities (Waldman, Strong, and 
Wali 2006). The mortality rate of children under 5 years of age was approximated as 
257 per 1,000 live births, while the maternal mortality ratio was estimated as 1,600 
per 100,000 live births. In Badakhshan province located in the northeast of 
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Afghanistan, characterised by high mountains, the maternal mortality ratio was 6,607 
per 100,000 live births (Loevinsohn and Sayed 2008; Bartlett et al. 2005). The majority 
of babies were delivered in the mother’s home, with approximately 95 per cent of all 
deliveries occurring in this manner. The rate of skilled birth attendance (SBA) was 51 
per cent in urban areas, 12 per cent in provincial towns and 7 per cent in rural areas. 
Approximately 80 per cent of females had no knowledge regarding how their 
pregnancy could be delayed. Less than 10 per cent of females under the age of 49 
were utilising methods for postponing pregnancy. Additionally, 40 per cent of children 
were not vaccinated against tuberculosis (TB), 54 per cent were not vaccinated 
against diphtheria, pertussis and tetanus (DPT), while 24 per cent had not been given 
a measles vaccination (Central Statistics Organization and UNICEF 2003).  
1.2.5.1 Primary Health Care: The Basic Package of Health Services for 
Afghanistan 
The new government started bringing substantial reform to Afghanistan’s health care 
system. Six months after the new government took power, in May 2002, MoPH 
established a Basic Package of Health Services (BPHS) with technical support from 
donors and international organisations. The BPHS was designed to ensure equitable 
access to a core set of health services in remote and underserved populations 
(Ministry of Public Health 2003).   
The BPHS is provided through community health workers at health posts (HPs), and 
through the outpatient care medium at the health sub-centres (HSC), basic health 
centres (BHCs), mobile health teams (MHTs), and comprehensive health centres 
(CHCs), and through outpatient and inpatient care services at district hospitals 
(Ministry of Public Health 2010). Below is the summarisation of the services which are 
available at all facility types (Ministry of Public Health 2010): 
Health Posts (HP): The community health workers (CHWs) provide basic health 
services at the community level by delivering services from their homes. One HP gets 
staffed by a team of one female CHW and one male CHW. HPs are bound to provide 
services to a catchment area of 1,000-1,500 population. By offering limited curative 
care services, CHWs focus on the identification of notable diseases and 
implementation of preventive and promotive measures. 
Health Sub-Centres (HSC): HSCs aim at responding to the health care requirements 
of approximately 3,000-7,000 population range. HSCs offer health education, 
immunisation, antenatal care (ANC), family planning (FP), treatment and follow-up of 
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Tuberculosis (TB) cases, management of diarrhoea and pneumonia, etc. Also, HSCs 
support CHWs and health posts to accelerate health care services. HSCs are staffed 
by one male nurse and one community midwife besides a cleaner and a guard. 
Basic Health Centre (BHC): A BHC covers a population of approximately 15,000-
30,000. The key services provided by BHCs are ANC, delivery, postnatal care (PNC), 
FP, routine immunisation, and integrated childhood illness management, treatment of 
malaria and TB, and identification and referral of mental health patients. A BHC’s 
minimum staffing requirement is a medical doctor or a nurse besides a community 
midwife and two vaccinators. It is also mandated that at least one female health care 
worker becomes part of the BHC staff. 
 Mobile Health Team (MHT): The focus of MHT is to facilitate services in remote 
villages and geographically challenging locations and to ensure the expansion of 
community-based health care services. The services offered by MHTs are usually 
those which BHCs offer. As far as MHT staff is concerned, it usually includes a male 
health provider (doctor or nurse), a female health provider (community midwife or 
nurse), a vaccinator and a driver. 
Comprehensive Health Centre (CHC): By covering a catchment area of approximately 
30,000 – 60,000 population, CHCs play key roles in providing maternal and child 
health services, treatment of communicable disease and managing mental health and 
disability cases. CHCs usually provide basic laboratory services. CHCs staff include 
male and female doctors, male and female nurses, midwives and at least one male 
or female psychosocial counsellor alongside laboratory and pharmacy technicians.  
District Hospital (DH): The services offered by DHs are not only those services 
provided by CHCs but also performing emergency surgery cases under general 
anaesthesia, offering X-rays services and helping mental health and disability cases 
including physiotherapy. District hospitals are staffed with female 
obstetricians/gynaecologists, surgeons, anaesthetists, paediatricians, psychosocial 
counsellors, midwives, laboratory and X-ray technicians, pharmacists, a dentist, a 
dental technician, and physiotherapists (male and female). Usually, a single District 
Hospital covers an approximately 100,000 – 300,000 population. Annexes 1.1 - 1.4 
show the services offered by BPHS and supported by the RBF programmes. 
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1.2.5.2 Health Financing in Afghanistan  
Afghanistan aims to address key health priorities by better allocation of resources to 
healthcare services. Health financing in Afghanistan aims to focus on mobilising 
external and domestic financing for health; promoting aid effectiveness, efficiency and 
equity of public spending; reducing financial risks and barriers to health access for the 
poor; and improving purchasing mechanisms. Public health services are provided free 
of charge in Afghanistan  (Ministry of Public Health 2019).  
According to the National Health Accounts report in 2014, total health expenditure 
(THE) was estimated at 1,992,000,000 US$. Given Afghanistan gross domestic 
product (GDP) was 21 billion US$ in 2014, THE as a percentage of GDP was 9.5 per 
cent. Households expenditures account for 73 per cent of THE, while the government 
financed 5 per cent and development partners 22 per cent (Figure 2). Hospitals incur 
around 40 per cent of THE, followed by outpatient care (26 per cent), medical goods 
(25 per cent), and health administration (9 per cent). In general, per capita 
expenditure on health is around 71 US$ annually (Ministry of Public Health 2017). 
Distressed financing rate (borrowing or selling assets to meet health expenditures) is 
estimated at 47 per cent, and a severely distressed financing rate (inability to meet 
health expenditures) is 9 per cent. Drugs and supplies are the most significant share 
of household expenditure for inpatient and outpatient care, followed by transportation 
cost (Ministry of Public Health and KIT Royal Tropical Institute 2018). 
Figure 2. Annual total health expenditure in Afghanistan 
 
 
73%
22%
5%
Out-of-pocket expenditure Donor Government
Source: National Health Accouts Report 2014
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1.2.5.3 Afghanistan’s Results-Based Financing Programmes   
In 2002, drawing on knowledge and experience from other countries that had suffered 
conflict, specifically Cambodia, the MoPH and its development partners made the 
decision that the delivery of health services should be managed and expanded by 
authorizing NSPs to implement the BPHS. Performance-based contracts (PBCs) 
were given to NSPs (More details in chapter 4). As a result, significant improvements 
have been made since that time. In 2018, SBA and ANC coverage rates were 58.8 
per cent and 63.8 per cent, respectively. Similarly, children vaccination for TB and 
DPTS has increased by 30 percentage points. The mortality rates for infants and 
children under the age of 5 have decreased at 41 deaths per 1,000 live births and 50 
deaths per 1,000 live births, respectively (Ministry of Public Health and KIT Royal 
Tropical Institute 2018). Therefore, this PBC has been considered an effective 
strategy for the rapid scale-up of maternal and child health (MCH) programmes across 
the country (Alfonso et al. 2015; Newbrander et al. 2014; Edward et al. 2011; Kim et 
al. 2016; Peters et al. 2007). 
The country additionally executed a performance-based financing programme 
associated with BPHS from 2010 to 2015. The primary goal of the PBF programme 
was to facilitate the accomplishment of MDG 4 (reduction in child mortality) and MDG 
5 (reduction in maternal mortality) via the implementation of interventions that offer 
performance incentives for healthcare workers with the aim of increasing critical 
maternal and child health outputs, enhancing healthcare service quality and ensuring 
that both patients and communities have increased involvement in and are content 
with the publicly-funded healthcare services they are provided. Healthcare workers 
were given performance-based incentives for delivering MCH services in greater 
quantities with enhanced quality compared to baseline objectives. Reporting of 
service quantities was performed via the health management and information system 
(HMIS), while measurement of service quality was conducted via field monitoring. The 
responsibility for HMIS data verification was delegated to a third party (Ministry of 
Public Health 2010). 
Health facilities were randomly assigned to two groups of treatment and control 
(comparison). Matching of healthcare facilities was based on the type of facility and 
the number of outpatients. In total, 463 healthcare facilities from the 11 provinces 
participated in the PBF programme, where 245 were assigned to the treatment group, 
and the remaining 217 were allocated to the comparison group. 
Following a randomised controlled design, the performance of PBF was assessed by 
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a baseline and an endline household surveys and facility assessments on the bases 
of the Balanced Scorecard (BSC) measurement. The objective of surveying the 
households was to gather data after the implementation of the programme as well as 
a comparison between baseline and endline data regarding health service coverage 
within the community. The sample used for both baseline and endline household 
surveys consisted of a multi-stage probability sample from the nine chosen provinces. 
Two of the provinces were not included in either the baseline or endline surveys as a 
result of insecurity. In the initial sampling stage, stratification of the healthcare facilities 
within the nine provinces was performed based on the type of facility, and the 
necessary amount of matched facilities was obtained by random selection. Matching 
of healthcare facilities was based on the type of facility and the number of outpatients 
that had visited in the past 12 months. In the next stage, the necessary amount of 
villages or clusters was randomly selected from all of the villages located within the 
catchment areas of the healthcare facilities that had been chosen. The third stage 
involved the selection of the necessary number of households within the chosen 
villages by applying a random sampling process (Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School 
of Public Health and Ministry of Public Health, Johns Hopkins University 2010; 
Ministry of Public Health & KIT Royal Tropical Institute 2015). The findings of impact 
evaluation indicated that all health indicators had improved compared to baseline in 
both the intervention and control groups. However, the differences were not 
considered to have statistical significance (Ministry of Public Health & KIT Royal 
Tropical Institute 2015). 
The purpose of the health facility assessment was to evaluate the effects of the PBF 
programme on the performance of the healthcare facilities on the basis of the BSC 
measurement. The analysis incorporated nine provinces of matched-pair healthcare 
facilities randomly chosen during the PBF household survey. Although a statistically 
significant difference was observed in the health facility assessment, it was not 
particularly large and potentially not that meaningful in terms of comprehending the 
differences in performance between the two groups. When specifically analysing the 
healthcare facility performance measures, those facilities in which the intervention 
was implemented exhibited statistically significant increased performance with regard 
to seven of the indicators out of 19 (Ministry of Public Health & KIT Royal Tropical 
Institute 2015). 
Using a political economy lens, this thesis will answer the question of what factors 
shaped and affected the PBC and PBF programmes and their outcomes. It will also 
examine the cost-effectiveness of the PBF programme in Afghanistan.   
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2_ Literature Review  
This chapter begins by defining what is mean by results-based financing (RBF), and 
its theoretical underpinnings. Then, it goes on to a systematic review of RBF 
economic evaluations, followed by the review of literature on the political economy of 
health financing, especially results-based financing programmes.   
 Results-Based Financing  
2.1.1 Definition 
Health financing focuses on three functions: revenue generation, pooling, and 
purchasing (Gottret and Schieber 2006). The World Health Report 2010 emphasises 
the importance not just of generating revenue for health but also on utilising resources 
efficiently (World Health Organization 2010b). The latter has a direct relationship with 
the purchasing function of health financing. Purchasing refers to a set of activities that 
identify the services to purchase, select providers, and choose efficient and effective 
mechanisms to purchase services (Figueras et al. 2005). RBF for health is a form of 
purchasing (Witter et al. 2013).   
RBF is an umbrella term comprising a range of incentive models on both the demand 
and supply sides. RBF links payments or materials to results in order to expand 
outcome of health care services, improve population health, and bring about changes 
in health-related behaviours (Perrot et al. 2010; World Health Organization 2010a; 
Eichler 2006; Oxman et al. 2008; Eichler, Levine, and Group 2009; Eldridge and 
Palmer 2009; Dieleman, Gerretsen, and van der Wilt 2009). RBF is “a cash payment 
or non-monetary transfer made to a national or sub-national government, manager, 
provider, payer or consumer of health services after predefined results have been 
attained and verified. Payment is conditional on measurable actions being 
undertaken.” (Musgrove 2011). RBF was initially promoted as an open approach 
adapted to specific country needs and as a paradigm shift away from traditional input‐
based financing methods (Ireland, Paul, and Dujardin 2011). It is now widely 
acknowledged that RBF is much broader and encompasses a series of reforms that 
can have system‐wide effects (Fritsche et al. 2011). The first objective of RBF is to 
raise the motivation of health workers through incentives and consequently improve 
health systems performance (Shroff, Bigdeli, and Meessen 2017). Secondly, it can be 
used as a strategic purchasing reform (49,50) which offers an answer to the ‘how’ of 
achieving Universal Health Coverage (UHC) and the Sustainable Development Goals 
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(SDGs) (Meessen et al. 2017). Some of the reforms that accompany RBF include 
financial decentralisation and increased autonomy for health facilities to use RBF 
funds (Craig 2017). Other examples are the introduction of specific business and 
quality improvement plans and increased monitoring and verification of the 
remunerated indicators (Pearson, Johnson, and Ellison 2010), training of health care 
workers, involvement of community (Kane et al. 2019), and implementation of patient 
satisfaction surveys (Alonge et al. 2015). 
RBF can involve direct payments to health professionals such as doctors, nurses, and 
community health workers (Ashir, Doctor, and Afenyadu 2013; Gavagan et al. 2010) 
to organisations such as health facilities or medical groups (Lindenauer et al. 2007; 
Curtin et al. 2006) or to government or non-government entities (Basinga et al. 2010). 
Additionally, payers can be government, donors, or insurance programmes 
(Lindenauer et al. 2007; Curtin et al. 2006).  
2.1.2 Theoretical Underpinnings 
2.1.2.1 Principle-Agent Theory 
The concept of RBF is grounded in principal-agent theory for which economists 
describe an agency relationship where the principal or incentive provider engages the 
agent or health care provider to perform on its behalf or to be motivated to act in the 
principal’s interest. The predefined scope of the work and incentive allow both the 
actors to benefit from the relationship and therefore achieve mutual objectives (Rees 
1985). It is argued that in usual contracts, the principal pays agents for a standard set 
of inputs such as salaries, drugs, building, and administration amongst others. The 
agents hardly bear any risk in such arrangements and are paid irrespective of 
whatever result is achieved. Consequently, agents take limited responsibility or no 
responsibility at all in the case of facing failures (Gneezy, Meier, and Rey-Biel 2011). 
Therefore, it is important to link financial incentives to performance. The basic law of 
behaviour perceives that higher incentives lead to a maximum effort; consequently, it 
can assure better performance levels (Gneezy, Meier, and Rey-Biel 2011).  
2.1.2.2 Self-Determination Theory (SDT) 
While principal-agent theory emphasises on external motivation as a prerequisite to 
achieve organisational goals, self-determination theory goes further to uncover rest 
forms of motivation. Intrinsic motivation is defined as doing something which remains 
inherently interesting or enjoyable to perform, whereas extrinsic motivation is 
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described as doing something because it leads to certain additional outcomes (Ryan 
and Deci 2000). Self-determination theory argues that when people are intrinsically 
motivated, the outcome is more positive on their behaviour and their health (Ryan and 
Deci 2000). However, extrinsic motivation can have a negative relationship with 
intrinsic motivation. Based on the self-determination theory, an incentive that 
positively affects extrinsic motivation can weaken intrinsic motivation (Kuvaas et al. 
2017).   
Self-determination theory is considered to have importance in the discussion 
regarding whether RBF programmes should be adopted within the field of health, in 
which healthcare workers are motivated by the need to provide services to the public, 
which might override economic concerns.  
2.1.2.3 Referent Cognitions Theory 
The subject of fairness in work environments is a matter of social justice, and 
numerous researchers in the field of social psychology have investigated these issues 
(Van Den Bos and Van Prooijen 2001). Such theories generally concentrate on 
matters of distributive justice; in other words, they emphasise that outcomes are 
critical in the process of judging fairness, as well as procedural justice that relates to 
the perception of fairness within the decision-making process (Folger 1987). 
According to Referent Cognitions Theory, the manner in which individuals react to 
distributive and procedural justice is predominantly dependent on their counterfactual 
thoughts. This theory hypothesises that in situations where procedural or distributive 
rules are violated, the individual adopts a fundamentally referential thinking approach: 
individuals utilise a frame of reference to assess what occurred, whereby they 
mentally compare the event with an alternative outcome  (Van Den Bos and Van 
Prooijen 2001). As suggested by the theory, in the event that an outcome is perceived 
to be unjust or discriminatory in the workplace, this can lead to righteous indignation 
and dissatisfaction (Cropanzano and Folger 1989). Referent Cognitions Theory has 
significant implications for RBF programmes. For instance, if such a programme only 
provides incentives to a specific category of health professionals, the unequal 
distribution of these incentives can impact the health professionals’ view of fairness 
and justness.   
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2.1.3 RBF Global Experience  
Low-income countries started introducing RBF fairly recently, and the start was 
closely associated with the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) to improve 
maternal and child health (Oxman and Fretheim 2009). Now, RBF is linked with 
Universal Health Coverage (UHC) by the Health Results Innovative Trust Fund 
(HRITF) and International Development Association (IDA) (RBFHealth 2017) in the 
World Bank (RBFHealth 2019). In the past decade, the total budget invested in RBF 
projects in low-income countries is estimated at 1.5 billion US dollars (RBFHealth 
2018). We extracted the list of RBF intervention sites financed by the HRITF and IDA 
and the specifications of the projects in Table 1 from RBFHealth (2018).  
2.1.3.1 Performance-Based Contracting (PBC)  
One of the types of RBF, namely PBC, connects outcomes with performance 
incentives. In this kind of framework, contracts are agreed with organisations based 
on their level of performance. The contracting organisations are expected to achieve 
a certain level of performance on the basis of a pre-determined group of services, 
defined goals and indicators (Loevinsohn 2008).  
In the last two decades, PBC has gained popularity as it is seen as a promising option 
to target vital health care services, link the resources to results, improve efficiency 
and effectiveness, empower communities, and allow the government to practice a 
stewardship role by developing policies and standards, regulating the health sector, 
and improving health financing (Khalil 2013; Kadaï et al. 2006; Loevinsohn and 
Harding 2004; Palmer 2000).  
PBC has enough potential presumably to establish a well-defined collaborative 
partnership between state and non-state providers based on vibrant objectives and 
clear expected outcomes. The element of competition and performance incentives 
encourages non-state providers (NSPs) to demonstrate improved efficiency, quality 
services, and better outcomes (Mills et al. 2002; Bustreo, Harding, and Axelsson 
2003; Loevinsohn and Harding 2005; Palmer et al. 2006; The Health Foundation 
2011). 
A review from PBC approaches in LMICs confirmed the positive effect of the approach 
on improving access to health care services (Liu, Hotchkiss, and Bose 2008). 
However, a meta-analysis of PBC studies from Cambodia and Guatemala contexts 
reported that the approach did not have impact on MCH services and child mortality; 
however, it reduced out-of-pocket expenditure on curative services (Odendaal et al. 
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2018).  
Nonetheless, implementation challenges of PBC in LMICs, where systems are weak, 
and state capacity in contract and financial management is limited, has remained a 
matter of concern for policymakers (Lagarde, Haines, and Palmer 2009; Palmer et al. 
2006). Some studies reported limited capacity in health systems management, 
shortage of health care workers, inadequate drugs and equipment, and poor 
infrastructure have negatively affected PBC implementations in low-income countries 
(Ssengooba, McPake, and Palmer 2012; Matsuoka et al. 2014; Mashasi et al. 2014; 
Fox et al. 2013). Likewise, in some studies, operational challenges of PBC such as 
delays in payments to providers and low capacity of local authorities to manage the 
contracts were reported (Maluka 2018; Maluka et al. 2018). PBC can be affected by 
contextual factors such as national policies, the political environment, donors 
competing priorities, interference of local authorities, and government bureaucratic 
processes (Islam et al. 2018).   
2.1.3.2 Performance-Based Financing (PBF)  
In spite of the rapid expansion of PBF in LMICs, there are mixed results on the effects 
on healthcare services. Some studies found PBF schemes to be effective in improving 
results against set targets (Soeters, Havineza, and Peerenboom 2006; Kane et al. 
2019; Celhay et al. 2015; Janssen et al. 2015; Soeters et al. 2011; Powerll-Jackson, 
Yip, and Han 2015) while there is a number of studies reporting limited effects of PBF 
in achieving the outcomes (Van Herck, De Smedt, Annemans, Remmen, Rosenthal, 
and Sermeus 2010; Witter et al. 2012; Engineer et al. 2016; Ngo, Sherry, and Bauhoff 
2017). 
Cameroon embarked on the implementation of a pilot project in 2012 to improve 
quality of care and coverage of maternal and child services. The evaluation results 
found that PBF led to a significant increase in the utilisation of maternal and child 
services, including immunisation and HIV testing. The programme also improved 
quality of care and decreased out-of-pocket expenditure. The government of 
Cameroon intends to scale up the PBF at the national level by 2021 (Walque et al. 
2017). In Benin, to motivate healthcare workers and to improve the quantity and 
quality of MCH services, a PBF programme was piloted between 2012 and 2017. The 
midline survey report shows that PBF had a positive effect on the performance of 
healthcare workers. In addition, the quality of care improved, and a greater level of 
patient satisfaction was achieved (The World Bank Group 2019). Suthar et al. (Suthar 
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et al. 2017) reviewed the impact of PBF on HIV/AIDS services in four studies from 
Sub-Saharan Africa setting. They found that PBF improved pregnant women testing 
coverage. Lannes and colleagues (Lannes et al. 2016) reported that in Rwanda PBF 
programme affected efficiency positively for most incentivised maternal and child 
health services. 
However, in other settings the effects of PBF programmes were limited. For example, 
reviewing the effects of PBF in health care services in Malawi, Gama et al. (2014) 
reached the conclusion that PBF did not improve quality of care or efficiency of 
services. In the above-mentioned study from Cameroon, no effects were reported on 
antenatal care visits and institutional delivery (Walque et al. 2017). A meta-analysis 
of five PBF studies related to maternal and child health services reported that the 
evidence was too limited to thoroughly examine the assumption of PBF impact on the 
reduction of maternal and child morbidities (Haas, Till, and Everetts 2012). The 
findings were in line with another report that there was limited evidence on the 
effectiveness of PBF programmes on health systems performance and sustainable 
changes in health service delivery in general terms (Oxman et al. 2008). Herck et al. 
(Van Herck, De Smedt, Annemans, Remmen, Rosenthal, Sermeus, et al. 2010) 
conducted a systematic review of 128 PBF studies carried out between 1990 and 
2009. The review reported mixed results on the effects of PBF on clinical 
effectiveness and equity of care (Van Herck, De Smedt, Annemans, Remmen, 
Rosenthal, Sermeus, et al. 2010). Similarly, a review of the effect of PBF on the 
utilisation of services was inconclusive (Flodgren et al. 2011).  
Some studies reported donors’ extensive influence in priority setting and PBF 
implementation designs that could put the programme at risk by undermining the 
notion of local ownership and the future sustainability of the programmes (Walker et 
al. 2010). Paul et al. criticized the overall PBF approach. They call it a donor fad, given 
the unavailability of empirical evidence on the effectiveness and efficiency of the 
programme and the poor local ownership granted to low and middle-income countries 
in the course of design and implementation of PBF programmes (Paul et al. 2018).   
Another study points to the substantial variation in PBF programme design (including 
factors such as the selection of incentive recipients, the cost of such incentives, the 
particular indicators that are targeted, the process of evaluating the indicators), and 
the design is key in determining programme effectiveness (Witter et al. 2012).  
Evidence also identified factors supporting the scale-up of PBF in some settings 
(Shroff, Bigdeli, and Meessen 2017), finding that tackling motivation and weak health 
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indicators were key, together with knowledge transfer from Rwanda. It is also 
important to understand the policy context for the purpose of adapting the content of 
policies; policy content should be optimised to strike a balance between financial 
sustainability and political feasibility, and donors should support government policies 
rather than parallel projects.  
Similarly, Witter et al.  (2019) investigated the impacts of various PBF programmes 
on healthcare purchasing functions within Uganda, Zimbabwe and the Democratic 
Republic of Congo. By utilising accessible secondary evidence and feedback from 
key informants with close connections to the evolution of PBF programmes, they 
evaluated evidence to determine the manner in which PBF programmes impacted 
strategic healthcare purchasing in those settings. They concluded that the 
programmes implemented did not appear to have made changes to facilitate more 
strategic purchasing. The current evidence implies that PBF programmes are still 
often implemented as a complementary element of payment frameworks, but should 
rather move towards institutionalisation and integration within national financing 
arrangements (Witter, Bertone, et al. 2019). 
2.1.3.3 Unintended Consequence of RBF programmes  
Some studies focused on the unintended consequences of PBF programmes. 
Nonetheless, unintended consequences were often not directly measured by 
programmes, and are presented as part of reviews and quantitative assessments 
(Ridde et al. 2018; Kuvaas et al. 2017; Paul et al. 2018; Salehi, Kim, and Hansen 
2017; Paul et al. 2017; Weyer, Bobiak, and Stange 2008; Lee et al. 2010; Karve et al. 
2008; Millett et al. 2007, 2008, 2009; Shen 2003; Tangri et al. 2011; Ireland, Paul, 
and Dujardin 2011; Pearson, Johnson, and Ellison 2010) and qualitative studies 
(Victor, Ida, and Siri 2014; Mcdonald and Roland 2009; Casalino et al. 2007; Kalk, 
Paul, and Grabosch 2010). The major unintended consequences reported are listed 
as follows:  
“Gaming” the System: The introduction of incentives may change providers’ 
behaviours to maximize their ability to gain greater rewards. This may involve 
falsifying reporting documentation, an oversupply of measured services, and neglect 
of non-measured services (Kalk, Paul, and Grabosch 2010).  
Wrong Targets: One of the major challenges in designing PBF programmes is 
identifying the appropriate performance targets to measure for payments. Actors need 
to decide whether targets should be process indicators, intermediate outcomes, or 
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health impact indicators. Then agreement on how high targets should be set and 
ascertaining what is feasible and an appropriate incentive to change provider 
behaviour  (Casalino, Alexander, et al. 2007; Karve et al. 2008; Weyer, Bobiak, and 
Stange 2008).  
Playing to the Test – Distractions: Providers motivated to reach just performance 
targets may be distracted from providing quality care for non-measured clinical 
services, as well as waste the resources to reach target goals for their economic 
benefit. It is argued that PBF might divert resources from the reform agenda; 
consequently, it is more harmful to healthcare services and the systems rather than 
improving health system performance (Casalino, Alexander, et al. 2007; Chen et al. 
2010).  
Cherry-Picking and increased disparities in quality and access to care: Cherry-picking 
involves the selection of patients based on meeting performance targets to increase 
economic benefits. This often leads to the inclusion of healthier patients and exclusion 
of more severely ill patients (Casalino, Alexander, et al. 2007; Chen et al. 2010; Tangri 
et al. 2011).  
In the next subsection, we will review literature related to the political economy of 
health financing, especially RBF and political economy theoretical underpinning, 
followed by a systematic review of RBF economic evaluations.    
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Table 1. List of RBF projects supported by Health Results Innovative Trust Fund (HRITF) and International Development Association (IDA) 
  Location Focus 
Date 
effective 
Financing 
Other 
sources 
Evaluation design Findings  
1 Afghanistan 
Reproductive, maternal 
and child health services  
2010 to 
2015 
HRITF $12 
million 
N/A 
Cluster Randomized 
controlled trial  
No substantial differences in any of the 
MCH coverage indicators between 
intervention and control arms of RCT 
2 Armenia 
To improve MCH 
services at primary and 
secondary levels, and 
prevent, screen and 
manage NCDs 
 09/27/2013 
to 
12/15/2019 
HRITF $1.8 
million and 
IDA $35 
million 
N/A 
Rigorously test a 
mechanism that allows 
patient feedback using 
a computer-assisted 
phone interview  
The conclusion was that the response rate 
was much higher using a CAPI survey. 
Thus, this method will be used for the 
scale-up of the pilot programme  
3 Benin 
Reproductive, maternal 
and child health services  
09/30/2011 
to 
06/30/2017 
HRITF $11 
million and 
IDA $32.8 
M 
N/A Cluster RCT 
Midline survey reports positive effects of the 
RBF bonus treatment on the quality of care 
provided by health workers. 
4 
Burkina 
Faso 
improve the utilization 
and the quality of 
reproductive health 
services in five regions 
10/22/2012 
to 
12/31/2018 
HRITF 
$12.7 
million and 
IDA $29 M 
US$21 
million for 
PBF 
A block-by-region 
cluster randomised 
trial with a pre-post 
comparison group. 
Forthcoming 
5 Burundi 
Reproductive, maternal 
and child health services  
04/08/2013 
to 
06/30/2017 
HRITF $20  
and IDA $25 
million 
Governme
nt, GAVI, 
EU, 
Belgium 
Cluster RCT Forthcoming 
6 Cameroon 
To increase service 
utilization and improve the 
quality with a particular 
focus on MCH and 
communicable diseases. 
2012 to 
12/12/2017 
HRITF $20 
million and 
IDA $45 
million 
N/A 
A prospective 
randomised impact 
evaluation 
Significant increases in coverage (child and 
maternal immunization, family planning, HIV 
testing) and improvements in structural quality of 
care.  Decrease in out-of-pocket payments.  
7 
Central 
African 
Republic 
Reproductive, maternal 
and child health services  
10/28/2012 
to03/31/2018 
HRITF $11.2 
and IDA $17 
million 
$12 million Blocked-by-region RCT Forthcoming 
8 Chad 
 To increase service 
utilization and improve the 
quality of MCH services in 
09/18/2014 
to09/30/2018 
HRITF $5 
million and 
IDA $15.79 
million 
N/A Project Surveys 
The implementation of the Project is impeded by 
the prevailing security situation.  
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twelve districts in five 
regions  
9 DRC  MCH  
05/31/2016 
to12/31/3019 
HRITF $6.5 
M and IDA 
$220   
N/A RCT 
No significant changes in the coverage or quality 
of services.   
10 Djibouti 
To improve the utilization 
and quality of MCH 
services and 
communicable disease 
control programs (i.e., 
HIV/AIDS TB)  
07/27/2015 
to12/31/2018 
HRITF $7 
million and 
IDA $7 
million 
N/A 
A randomised evaluation 
design 
Forthcoming 
11 Ethiopia 
Maternal and child health 
services  
06/17/2013 
to06/30/2018 
HRITF $20 
million and 
IDA $100M 
Multi-donor 
financing 
Demographic Health 
Survey 
Not available  
12 Gambia, The 
To increase the utilization 
of community nutrition and 
primary maternal and child 
health services 
 05/20/2014 
to07/31/2019 
HRITF $5 
million and 
IDA $8.68 
million 
N/A 
The overall approach for 
the evaluation is a 
randomised phased in 2 
x 2 design 
Forthcoming 
13 Ghana 
Maternal and child health 
services and Nutrition 
improvement 
02/12/2015 
to06/30/2020 
HRITF $5 
million and 
IDA $68 M 
N/A 
Multi-site cluster 
randomized control trial 
Forthcoming 
14 Haiti 
To increase access and 
utilisation of maternal and 
child health, nutrition and 
other social services – 
specifically targeting 
pregnant women, children 
under five and vulnerable 
families. 
09/12/2013 
to12/31/2018 
HRITF $20 
million and 
IDA $70 
million 
N/A 
The impact evaluation 
compares performance 
measured in terms of 
health outcome and 
output variables  
RBF increased key services over 3-year period 
by 39%.  For children under 1 year and pregnant 
women, the increases in services were 
statistically significant and large (1.7 to 2.2 times 
the baseline rates).  Incentives proved more 
effective and substantially less expensive than 
training and technical assistance alone. 
15 India 
Increase utilization of 
essential health services 
 10/14/2011 
to 
08/31/2014 
HRITF $0.7 
million and 
IDA $142 
Duke 
University: 
US$0.22 M 
Geographic regression 
discontinuity study 
The impact evaluation showed a significant 
effect on mortality and on reducing financial risk.  
16 Kenya 
To enhance the delivery of 
essential health services 
especially the poor. 
03/24/2014 
to 
06/30/2018 
HRITF $20 
million and 
IDA $41 
million 
N/A Info not available  Forthcoming 
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17 
Kyrgyz 
Republic 
Improve the quality of 
maternal, neonatal and 
paediatric care at rayon 
hospital level 
07/29/2014 
to 
06/30/2017 
HRITF $11 
million and 
IDA $0 
million 
N/A 
Three-arm factorial 
design with 65 secondary 
(rayon) hospitals 
Forthcoming 
18 Lao PDR 
To expand the coverage 
and improvement of the 
quality of MCH focusing on 
poor in rural districts 
10/11/2011 
to 
12/31/2015 
HRITF $2.4 
million and 
IDA $15 
million 
N/A 
Given the small scale of 
the project, an impact 
evaluation was not 
considered 
N/A 
19 Lesotho 
Increase utilisation and 
improve the quality of 
primary healthcare 
services in six districts in 
Lesotho, with a particular 
focus on maternal and 
child health, TB and HIV 
02/14/2014 
to 
07/30/2019 
HRITF $4 
million and 
IDA $12 
million 
$ 4 million 
(Governme
nt) 
Household surveys 
(Baseline and endline) 
Forthcoming 
20 Liberia 
To improve the quality of 
MCH infectious disease 
services in selected 
secondary-level health 
facilities; and to support the 
emergency response 
needed to contain and 
control the Ebola outbreak. 
03/07/2013 
to 
05/30/2018 
HRITF $5 
million and 
IDA $10 
million 
N/A 
A simple before and after 
comparison of outcomes 
and a series of small 
augmented interventions 
at each hospital with 
randomised treatment 
groups and timing. 
Forthcoming 
21 Nigeria 
Increase the delivery and 
use of high impact MCH 
and improve quality of care 
at selected health facilities. 
11/15/2012 
to 
06/30/2018 
HRITF $20 
million and 
IDA $150 M 
US$ 1.7 
million  
 pre-post experimental 
design   
Forthcoming 
22 
Republic of 
Congo 
 To increase both the 
utilisation and the quality of 
MCH in targeted areas. 
01/01/2015 
to 
06/27/2019 
HRITF $10 
million and 
IDA $10 
million 
$100 
million 
(Governme
nt) 
Combination of PBF, 
community-based 
targeting and 
subsidisation of health 
services provided to the 
poor and household visits 
Forthcoming 
 46 
 
23 Rwanda 
reduce extreme poverty at 
community level by 
supporting social protection 
and health policy reforms 
04/27/2009 
to 
06/30/2012 
HRITF $12 
million and 
IDA $18 
million 
N/A 
 Prospective randomised 
design 
Conditional in-kind incentives had a positive 
impact on timely ANC and PNC services. No 
significant effect on SBA. No multiplicative effect 
on outcomes when demand and supply-side 
interventions were combined. 
24 Senegal 
To improve health and 
nutrition outcomes for 
women and children in 
poor regions of Senegal 
11/15/2012 
to 
06/30/2018 
HRITF $20 
million and 
IDA $20 
million 
US$ 2.3 
million 
(USAID) 
Prospective and 
randomised at district 
level for PBF and at 
facility level for demand-
side intervention  
Forthcoming 
25 Sierra Leone 
To increase utilisation of 
MCH services and support 
the emergency response 
needed to contain and 
control the Ebola crisis 
10/11/2013 
to 
10/10/2016 
HRITF $5 
million and 
IDA $13 
million 
US$ 25.7 
million  
Not considered  
According to the WB report, given the scale of 
the PBF scheme, an impact evaluation was not 
possible since there were no control facilities to 
test the counterfactual. 
26 Tajikistan 
To contribute to improving 
the coverage and quality of 
basic primary health care 
services in selected 
districts 
12/11/2013 
to 
12/31/3019 
HRITF $4.8 
million and 
IDA $15 
million 
N/A 
Difference-in-difference 
and experimental 
approaches  
Forthcoming 
27 Zambia 
improve the delivery and 
utilisation of MNCH and 
nutrition services in five 
provinces 
03/31/2015 
to 
06/30/2019 
HRITF $15 
million and 
IDA $52 
million 
N/A 
Experimental study 
design 
The study demonstrates that an  RBF 
programme can  be  successfully  implemented  
to increase  delivery  of  key  health  indicators  
through  “contracting-in” a  capacity-constrained 
public health system.  
28 Zimbabwe 
To increase coverage of 
key MCH in targeted rural 
and urban districts 
09/25/2013 
to 
02/28/2017 
 HRITF $20 
million and 
IDA $0 
million 
N/A 
A quasi-experimental 
evaluation  
Key indicators like delivery by a skilled provider, 
in-facility delivery, and Caesarean Section 
deliveries improved faster in RBF districts than 
in control districts, although there was a general 
increase of these indicators across Zimbabwe. 
In addition, there was a mixed but positive 
message on the quality of care under the RBF 
programme.  
Extracted from RBFHEALTH (2018) 
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 Political Economy Analysis  
Health becomes political in circumstances where a certain category of individuals benefit 
more in comparison to others, where the social determinants of health are based on 
political actions, and where health is a fundamental component of citizenships and 
human rights (Bambra, Fox, and Scott-Samuel 2005). Improvements to health require a 
thorough comprehension of the manner in which politics impact policies and decision-
making processes (Gilson, Orgill, and Shroff 2018). Towards the end of the 20th century, 
Reich observed that policy reforms inherently have political dimensions as they are 
targeted at changing who receives valued goods within society, while Walt contended 
that health policy is focused on who is being influenced by whom in forming policy, as 
well as the manner in which this occurs. Both reached the conclusion that neither 
technical aspects, including economic analysis, nor a well-planned policy are sufficient 
on their own to instigate policy reforms. Instead, calculated and targeted analysis of the 
broader political factors, the actors, processes, and resources that influence such 
reforms is required to assess whether it is feasible in the political sense as well as to 
examine how the change process can be supported (Gilson 2019).  
Health financing policies are fundamentally political on the basis that there are competing 
interests, significant gains and losses can be made, and challenges will inevitably be 
made to the existing situation (Gilson 2019). It frequently necessitates complex 
relationship between various actors with different status, power, and influence both within 
and outside the health sector. In numerous situations, reforms can lead to a contentious 
political environment as they are targeted at changing sensitive distributions, in addition 
to the rights of health service users, or the compensation and working situation of 
healthcare workers (World Health Oraganization 2018).  
Recently, many LMIC governments are attempting to implement health financing policies 
to make progress towards UHC (Sparkes et al. 2019). UHC implies that “all people and 
communities can use the promotive, preventive, curative, rehabilitative and palliative 
health services they need, of sufficient quality to be effective, while also ensuring that 
the use of these services does not expose the users to financial hardship” (World Health 
Organization 2019).  
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Thus, it is important to introduce political economy thinking to the analysis of health 
financing policies in LMICs (Gilson 2019). Political economy analysis (PEA) is a group 
of methodologies that are utilised in analysing political behaviours and institutions 
(Wittman and Weingast 2008). PEA has a specific focus on the context and policy 
processes on one side, and the interactions between actors, with their interests, 
motivations and contestation on the other side. A significant assumption that underpins 
PEA is that institutions, behavioural trends and agents that are influential in the process 
of deciding, designing and implementing policies shape the setting in which reforms 
occur. In other terms, PEA focuses on the interplay between economic and political 
processes, how resources are distributed among groups and individuals, as well the 
processes that form, maintain and change these relations over time  (DFID 2009).  
In recent years, PEA has been integrated into the programmes of various international 
organisations, including the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency 
(SIDA) (Pettit 2013), the United Kingdom Department for International Development 
(DFID) (DFID 2009), the USAID (Menocal et al. 2018), the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) (UNDP 2012), the World Bank (Fritz, Kaiser, and Levy 2009), and 
the World Health Organisation (WHO) (Reich 2019). Additionally, PEA software named 
PolicyMaker is accessible on the Internet that assists researchers with conducting 
stakeholder analysis for the development of political strategy (Reich 2010).  
2.2.1 Theoretical Underpinning of Political Economy Analysis  
A variety of different theories are utilised for analysing political economy. Nevertheless, 
the reality is that they are only distinguished by minor differences and these theories are 
fundamentally similar in analytical terms, providing guidance to users in their 
investigations of the manner in which power is applied, the nature of decision-making 
processes, and the process of implementing incentives and disincentives for particular 
organisations or persons (Edelmann 2009). This subsection will review the common 
analytical core of conceptual and methodological approaches to PEA:  
2.2.1.1 Health Policy Model 
The Health Policy Analysis model (triangle) was originally proposed by Walt and Gilson 
(1994). This model is comprised of four components: context (why the policy is needed), 
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content (the main focus of the policy), process (the manner in which the policy was 
developed and applied) and actors (the key stakeholders who are engaged in and impact 
the process of formulating and implementing the policy). In their model, Walt and Gilson 
focused on explicating the contextual factors that are influential on policy. They perceived 
policy to have a dynamic nature that is continually changing, reformulating the 
relationships among groups and among organisations. They also believed that the policy 
process has significance for facilitating the understanding of how policy is developed as 
well the actors that influence this process. Additionally, they claimed that policy content 
decisions are not purely based on technical concerns, but are also impacted by the 
nature of the existing political environment. Lastly, they highlighted the important roles 
of actors engaged in the policy process, who can influence the policy content, and are 
also influenced by the policy context. The Health Policy Analysis model is illustrated in 
Figure 3.    
Figure 3. Health Policy Analysis Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Walt and Gilson (1994)  
 
This model is adapted for political economy analysis, and it is called ‘Policy Engagement 
Framework’ (PEF) (Buse et al. 2008). The PEF pays less attention to ‘policy content’ and 
more emphasis on the function of actors and their role, perspectives, and positions 
(Nash, Hudson, and Luttrell 2006). The framework takes the position that the dynamics 
between actors, the context in which policy comes into existence, and the process 
through which policy is developed leads to policy change. Our study on political economy 
analysis of PBF in Afghanistan will be guided by this framework.   
Content 
Context 
Process 
Actor
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2.2.1.2 The Policy Cycle Model  
The ‘policy cycle’ was developed by Lasswell (Lasswell 1956) for modelling the policy 
process. The policy cycle is beneficial for analytically subdividing the sector policy reform 
process into separate phases as well as designing support programmes for different 
sectors based on the particular requirements inherent to the reform stages. It should be 
noted that there is a degree of overlap between these stages, and the process is 
essentially infinite. The Policy Cycle Model is shown in Figure 4.  
From the late 1950s onwards, changes have occurred to these stages and the order in 
which they happen, although the fundamental principles are unchanged. In the modern 
era, the analytical foundations of this theory are frequently defined as involving a 
sequence of five stages, namely agenda setting, policy formulation, adoption, 
implementation and evaluation (Jann and Wegrich 2007; Howlett, McConnell, and Perl 
2017): 
- Agenda-setting: Agenda-setting involves the raising of awareness and increasing 
the focus on important matters through different mediums, including meetings, 
conferences, and presentations, among others. The objective is to encourage the 
general public and key actors to prioritise the specific agenda over other matters. 
Hence, a societal issue can be transformed into a political concern, which occurs 
after defining and recognising it as a problem and when the level of interest 
among the public with regard to resolving the issue is sufficiently high. After 
introducing the issue to the political agenda, it then becomes political and will be 
tackled by political decision-makers. 
 
- Policy formulation: The aim of policy formulation is to establish the main 
objectives, priorities and options, to determine the advantages and 
disadvantages of these options, and to identify the associated side effects. At this 
stage, alternative policies are formulated by political decision-makers to find 
solutions to the given problem. 
 
- Policy adoption (decision-making): In this phase, the relevant government entities 
adopt the policies for application in the future.  
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- Policy implementation: In the policy implementation stage, the goals and 
objectives of the policy are converted into actions. This is particularly important 
as it dictates whether such policies can be translated into tangible reforms that 
are anticipated to resolve the highlighted problem.  
 
- Policy evaluation: This stage involves the application of evaluation principles and 
techniques to analyse the content, application or effects of a policy. Put 
differently, policy evaluation aims to determine whether the policy reform has 
effectively resolved the issue or whether it is not possible to find a viable solution, 
meaning that additional political action is required. In the case of the latter, it is 
necessary to redefine the unresolved problem for the purpose of addressing it in 
a new policy cycle.  
 
Figure 4. The Policy Cycle Model 
 
The policy cycle model represents a basic model that can be used for analysing 
complicated and contingent sector reform procedures in developing setting. This model 
facilitates the analysis of particular needs, possibilities and complexities at individual 
states of the sector reform process. It can be highly beneficial for analysing policy to 
determine the status of sector reform, the primary features of the current stage, and what 
is required for preparing the subsequent stage (Edelmann 2009). 
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2.2.1.3 Drivers of Change Model  
The Drivers of Change (DoC) model of the UK Department for International Development 
(DFID) was one of the pioneering efforts to comprehend the political economy conditions 
in a country. The primary question that DoC addresses pertains to how policy and 
institutional reforms are introduced and maintained, or why they are obstructed. The 
objective is to determine the specific factors (change drivers) that can motivate change 
over time. This approach focusses on the dynamic interplay among three groups of 
factors (Warrener 2004; DFID 2005):  
- Structures: Structures are regarded as long-term policy contextual factors. In general, 
they cannot easily be influenced as either a long time is required, or due to the fact 
that they are controlled by external forces. This can include social and economic 
structures, demographic changes, climate change and developments in technology. 
- Institutions: Institutions can either be formal in terms of constitutional regulations and 
law, or informal in terms of social, political and cultural conventions. In environments 
in which the formal institutions such as the rule of law, elections and the division of 
powers are not strongly embedded or applied, the process of doing things is generally 
based on informal conventions.   
- Agents: Agents could be internal actors like legislators, public servants, political 
parties, business organisations, trade unions, among others, whereas external actors 
can include governments of other countries, regional organisations, donors or 
multinational companies (Warrener 2004; DFID 2005).  
2.2.1.4 The Intuitional and Institution Change Model 
This theory was originally proposed by North (North 1990) and aims to provide an 
explanation for significant differences in the performance of economies over extended 
time periods. The institutional change model is shown in Figure 5.   
As suggested by North, institutions decide what people are allowed to do and the specific 
conditions under which they are allowed to do so. As earlier explained, institutions can 
operate formally (laws and regulations) and informally (norms or behavioural codes). 
North claimed that institutional reforms are formed by the interplay among organisations 
and institutions. The prevailing institutional structure determines the organisations that 
are created and the manner in which they develop. Organisations attempt to enact 
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reforms and dissolve institutions based on their requirements. While institutions are 
inflexible in the short term, they become less rigid over time. They generally transform in 
an incremental manner. Incremental changes emerge as a result of the belief of 
entrepreneurial individuals within economic or political organisations that improvements 
could be made if they modify the prevailing institutional structure to a certain extent. The 
differences between organisations and institutions enable the analysis of political 
economy to concentrate on the main aspects of institutions or actors and allows 
organisational analysis to focus on the key aspects of actors (e.g., strategies, resources, 
or awareness of the regulations). The theory also facilitates the understanding and 
application of information, knowledge and perception in the process of reforming public 
policy (North 1990).   
Figure 5. The Institutional Change Model 
 
 
 
2.2.1.5 Theory of Veto Player 
The ‘veto player’ approach was created by Tsebelis (Tsebelis 2003) for analysing, 
classifying and comparing distinct political systems with regard to the likelihood of policy 
change. Tsebelis aimed to enhance the understanding and prediction of the political 
viability of applying political reforms within a specific political system. According to this 
theory, policy reforms can only be effective when the primary actors in the political 
framework consent to changing the existing system. The reason for this is that certain 
political actors must express agreement with the implementation of new policies or 
reforms to extant policies. They are defined as ‘veto players’, since they essentially have 
the power to veto a suggested policy or policy reform. Veto players are either individuals 
or groups of actors whose consent is required for changing the existing situation. 
Tsebelis divided veto players into three different categories: (i) institutional veto players 
whose rights are preserved by the constitution, which could only be changed by the 
Institution Organisation
Institutional 
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passing of new laws; (ii) partisan veto players, who are created from institutional players 
via political machinations (e.g., government coalitions or powerful opponents within the 
Parliament); and (iii) additional veto players (e.g., civil society) who can be observed in 
particularly policy or decision-making environments. Based on the theory, the political 
feasibility of sector reforms can be evaluated rapidly by assessing the amount and 
configuration of veto players in addition to their ideological beliefs and political 
programmes. The theory makes the assumption that veto players prefer specific policies 
and aim to optimise their utility by limiting their acceptance of policy suggestions to those 
that most resemble their preference compared to the existing situation. Resultantly, the 
success of proposed policies can only be achieved in the event that all veto players 
believe that the policy reform will generate change that approaches their specific 
preference (Tsebelis 2003).  
2.2.1.6 The Path Dependency Theory 
At the beginning of the 1980s, the pioneering explicit path dependence concept was 
proposed by Paul David (David 1985). The main concept of Path Dependency Theory is 
that the decisions made in the process of forming an institution, or when developing a 
policy, place certain limitations on future events (Greener 2005). The concept of path 
dependence emphasises that after selecting a path, changing this path is challenging 
due to the institutionalisation and reinforcement of the processes over time. The system 
establishes feedback loops and actors develop an interest in maintaining that particular 
distribution of benefit (Reich 2019). The ability to modify institutional decisions is 
progressively more constrained as not adhering to regulations and conventions 
determined by past decisions produces ‘costs’ related to investments, learning, 
coordination and expectations. For this reason, modifications are normally made to 
extant institutions rather than replacing them entirely even though they are not 
considered optimal, thus leading to institutional inertia (Greener 2005). 
  
 55 
 
2.2.2 Political Economy Analysis of Health Financing 
Though health financing is inherently political, there has been a few application of PEA 
examining health financing reforms. Recently, the special issue of Health Systems & 
Reform (HSR) examined health financing strategies using PEA (Sparkes et al. 2019). 
Some of the articles in HSR utilised the political economy of UHC reform framework 
originally designed by (Campos and Reich 2019), which acknowledges that the 
stakeholder analysis of key actors as well as methodologies for changing the political 
environment incorporating how resources is distributed are the main elements of an 
implemented PEA. The framework guided the studies in six categories of politics: interest 
groups, bureaucrats, budgets, leadership, beneficiaries, and external actors (Sparkes et 
al. 2019). The special issue of HSR explains that health financing reforms are political 
(Gilson 2019) and the plausibility of executing distinct mechanisms for financing 
healthcare is mostly dependent on the political dimensions of the related setting. The 
opposition posed by interest groups (i.e.  civil society), which have particular strength 
due to wide support from public, have a significant effect on health financing reforms 
(Croke et al. 2019). Institutional veto gates are also considered important factors 
influencing health financing policies (Sparkes, Bump, and Recich 2015). Lack of 
coherent policies, parallel and opposing mandates from central government, fragmented 
regulatory framework (Jacobs 2019), poor governance, insufficient data for reviewing 
and assessing implementation progress and limited capacity of human resources in the 
public sector (Hipgrave, Anderson, and Sato 2019) are other factors preventing health 
financing reforms from being designed and implemented effectively. It is important to 
note that health financing reforms can often lead to disagreements and conflicts, 
especially during the legislative stage (Habich 2019). Therefore, strategic preparations 
for change should incorporate the political management of the government and interest 
groups, in addition to the key actors and certainly the wider public, to whom the reforms 
are targeted (Gilson 2019). Building a consensus among a wide range of political actors 
as well as pro-active identification and resolution of conflicts that might emerge during 
the legislative stage are key elements that require attention during the design and 
implementation of health financing reforms (Habich 2019).  
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2.2.2.1 Political Economy Analysis of Results-Based Financing  
We searched online literature to access published literature about political economy 
analysis (PEA) of RBF. We searched Google Scholar, the websites of development 
partners such as WHO, USAID, World Bank, DFID and PBF Community of Practice, 
using the key words “results-based financing” or “performance-based financing” or pay 
for performance” and “political economy” or “political economy analysis”. We also 
reviewed the reference list of the papers which aimed to study the RBF PEA.  There have 
been only a limited number of RBF studies have used political economy analysis. These 
studies examined political economy factors underpinning the adoption and 
implementation of RBF (Bertone, Falisse, et al. 2018; Witter et al. 2019), RBF policy 
processes (Bertone, Wurie, et al. 2018), interaction between structure (historical 
legacies, context, institutions) and agency (agendas, actors, power relationships) 
concerning the implementation of incentive-based policies (Bertone and Witter 2015), 
and interplay between actors in formulating and implementing RBF programmes 
(Chimhutu et al. 2015). The findings of the studies reveal that distinctions in terms of 
actors and contexts could cause changes in practice from RBF policy if the distribution 
of resources among actors are not well balanced (Bertone and Witter 2015). Similarly, if 
RBF policy process is significantly politicised by external actors allowing minimal 
flexibility for local authorities (country) to lead the process, it can cause frustration and 
lack of trust between actors (Chimhutu et al. 2015). Therefore, the approach through 
which the processes of design and implementation are defined should retain flexibility, 
thus providing time for the development of capacity and ownership at the country level 
to establish extended political support and enhanced integration within the health 
framework (Bertone, Wurie, et al. 2018). Adapting a model to fit the specific conditions 
within the country to sustain a systemic approach can engender national ownership 
(Witter et al. 2019).   
To sum up the last two subsections, this review reveals that efforts to introduce health 
financing policies, including the establishment of an RBF programme are fundamentally 
political. However, evidence shows that despite the broad implementation of RBF 
programmes, particularly in FCAS, there has been minimal focus on RBF and PEA. The 
special issue of HSR emphasised on the role of institutions and actors in shaping health 
financing policies. However, the studies in this special issue have limitations in assessing 
the processes and the context that could influence policy decisions. Likewise, the current 
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RBF resources mostly focused on one or two components of political economy factors 
(e.g. adoption and or implementation). PEA can facilitate policy processes in the three 
ways: (i) PEA generates an analysis of the political environment, an estimation of 
resources and the status of political actors, in addition to an evaluation of the political 
feasibility of policy reform; (ii) PEA provides an explanation with regards to the manner 
in which policy processes impact policy reforms as well as how the process can be 
managed politically; and (iii) PEA emphasises the attributes of political economy forces 
during all stages of the policy cycle (setting agendas, designing the policy, adoption, 
implementation and evaluation) (Reich 2019).  
This review shows that successful implementation of health financing programmes calls 
for alignment with political economy factors (e.g. context, actors, processes, distribution 
of resources). In a situation in which health financing programmes are adapted according 
to the local context, and the interactions between actors are well managed in all stages 
of the policy cycle, a health financing programme can meet its objectives successfully.  
To the best of our knowledge, there is only one study concentrated on the political 
economy of RBF in a comprehensive manner from a low-income setting (Witter et al. 
2019). There is no study from FCAS. This justifies the need for a comprehensive 
application of PEA for RBF in low-income settings, especially FCAS.  
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2.3.1 Abstract  
As a method to improvise on the quality and availability of health services, result-based 
financing is becoming more popular. There has been growing attention to the 
effectiveness of this type of programme, but much less attention to its efficiency, or 
whether it represents value for money. Economic evaluation, which involves the 
comparison of costs and consequences of alternative health care programmes is a 
widely used tool guiding investment decisions in health care. We conducted a systematic 
review of economic evaluations of results-based financing in low, middle and high-
income countries. The economic evaluation, as well as results-based financing concept, 
were searched in EMBASE, Medline, Cochrane Library, CINAHL, HEED, Global Health, 
and Econlit. Consultation of various experts on major papers and screening of the 
reference lists were conducted for relevant studies. There were seven studies analysed 
in the review. The previous reviews suggested that weak methodological designs limited 
the conclusiveness of findings from economic evaluations of RBF programmes. Our 
review outcomes suggest that RBF might be a cost-effective option to obtain 
improvements related to a specific disease such as diabetes or kidney diseases. 
However, we need to be precautious when we conclude and generalize the findings of 
the studies as three studies in this review did not use any cost-effectiveness thresholds, 
and two studies applied the WHO suggested cost-effectiveness threshold, which is 
questionable. Further rigorous research on the impact of results-based financing 
interventions related to its cost-effectiveness, particularly in low and middle-income 
countries is required.   
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2.3.2 Background  
Results-based financing (RBF) involves the payment of incentives to institutions and or 
healthcare workers, after measuring and verifying the results, based on predefined 
targets (Musgrove 2011). RBF is drawing attention as a promising approach to improve 
the quality and availability of health care services in low and middle-income countries 
(Carrin and Hanvoravongchai 2002; Van Stolk, Bjornsson, and Goshev 2010; World 
Health Organization 2010; Eldridge and Palmer 2009). RBF is given different names. 
The most common names used interchangeably are RBF, Pay for Performance (P4P) 
and Performance-Based Financing (PBF) (Eichler and De 2008).  
Economic evaluation plays a significant role in the appraisal of health care programmes 
and serves as an input into policy decisions and resource allocation for health 
(Cunningham 2000). The primary aim of economic evaluation is to ensure investments 
represent value for money, or to maximise health outcomes for a given level of resources 
(Griffits, Legood, and Pitt 2016). A full economic evaluation estimates the costs and 
consequences of two or more alternative courses of action (Wonderling, Gruen, and 
Black 2005).  
A growing number of studies have examined the costs and outcomes of RBF 
interventions in a variety of settings. However, most of these studies were carried out in 
high-income countries (Emmert et al. 2012; Meacock, Kristensen, and Sutton 2014; 
Turcotte-Tremblay et al. 2016).  
To date, three systematic reviews have sought to examine the economic evidence 
related to RBF.  From January 2000 to April 2010, Emmert et al. (2012) focused on 
synthesizing information on the cost-effectiveness of RBF interventions by reviewing 
nine papers from high-income countries. Three out of these were considered as full 
economic evaluations (examining costs and outcomes); while, the remaining six 
evaluations were categorized as partial economic evaluations as the studies were unable 
to establish a connection between cost and the effects. Similarly, seven studies, 
published between 2012-2014, were reviewed by Truscott-Tremblay et al. (2016). Six of 
the studies were from a low-income setting and one from a middle-income country. Five 
of the studies could not be termed economic evaluations, while two studies focused only 
on the costs of RBF interventions. Meacock et al. (2014) reviewed fourteen published 
studies including the nine studies reviewed by Emmert et al. Thirteen of the studies 
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focused on high-income countries while only one study was from a middle-income 
setting. Only one of the studies was a complete cost-effectiveness analysis, and it was 
from a high-income country.  
There have been new studies published since the last systematic review. Furthermore, 
previous reviews mainly relied on partial economic evaluations with a specific focus on 
high-income countries.  
The present study aims to synthesize the results of a review of full economic evaluations 
of RBF programmes from high, middle and low-income countries.  
2.3.3 Methodology  
We reviewed studies that were published between April 2014 and December 2019 to 
avoid overlapping the search timeframe of the previous systematic review.   
This review includes all peer-reviewed papers on economic evaluations of results-based 
financing interventions in LMICs. The following electronic databases were searched: 
CINAHL, Cochrane Library, Econlit, EMBASE, and Global Health, and Medline.   
While reviewing the above databases, we used a combination of the following key search 
terms: ((Cost effective* OR cost-effective* OR cost-utility anlys* OR cost utility analys* 
OR economic-effective* OR economic effective* OR cost per death averted OR cost per 
DALY averted OR cost analys* OR cost-minimisation analys* OR cost minimization 
analys* OR cost saving OR efficiency OR economic evaluation) AND (results based 
financ* OR results-based financ* OR performance-based financ* OR performance based 
financ* OR pay for performance OR pay-for-performance)).  
Experts were consulted for key papers, and reference lists were screened for relevant 
studies. We did not set any limitation for geographic coverage while researching; 
however, we restricted the language of the study to English.  
Selection Criteria  
In total, 822 titles and abstracts were screened to verify their relevance against several 
inclusion and exclusion criteria; whilst, setting aside systematic literature reviews for later 
reference. Table 2 showcases the inclusion and exclusion criteria applied to various 
studies included in this review. The goal of this review were studies based on primary 
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economic evaluation published in peer review journals. As a supply-side programme, 
results-based interventions at the provider level (individual, group, or facility) were 
included. Conditional cash transferred to patients without incentives to providers were 
excluded. Comparative, experimental or observational studies using quantitative data 
were included; however, qualitative studies were excluded. At least one structural, 
process, or outcome measure on the effectiveness of the intervention related to the 
quality of care and/or utilisation of services needed to be present. Nonetheless, studies 
with no quantitative measure on quality and or utilisation of services or health outcome 
were excluded.  
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Table 2. Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria 
Inclusion Criteria Exclusion Criteria 
Language 
English Other languages 
Period 
April 2014 to December 2019 Before April 2014 
Geographic Location 
All locations, categorised as Higher Income 
Country (HIC), Middle Income Country (MIC), 
and Low-Income Country (LIC) based on the 
World Bank classifications 
No exclusion criteria specific for 
geographic location 
Publication type 
Peer-reviewed journal articles Reports, Editorials, perspectives, 
comments, letters, conference 
presentations 
Study design 
Experimental or observational assessment of 
outcomes and clear quantitative analysis of 
costs 
Studies that had not explicit economic 
evaluation methodology   
Intervention type 
Pay for performance, results-based financing, 
performance-based financing 
Conditional Cash Transfers without 
incentive given to the provider 
Economic evaluation type 
Economic evaluations (cost-utility analysis, 
cost-effectiveness analysis, cost-benefit 
analysis) 
Qualitative studies, non-economic 
evaluations  
Targeted population 
All  No exclusion 
 Outcomes  
At least one structural, process, or outcome 
measure on effectiveness of intervention 
related to the quality of care and/or utilisation 
of services, or DALY/QALY  
No quantitative measure from a validated 
instrument of the effectiveness of an 
intervention on quality of care and/or 
utilisation of services 
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Appraisal of studies  
We used the following set of measures adapted from Drummond et al. (Drummond et al. 
2015) and combined with those used by Turcotte-Tremblay et al. (Turcotte-Tremblay et 
al. 2016) and to evaluate the quality of each paper:  
1. Were the descriptions of the study perspective and the competing alternatives given? 
2. Was a relation between costs and effects established empirically? 
3. Was the design to examine the effectiveness of RBF explained? 
4. Were costs and effects for each option identified, measured, valued, and variance in 
timing adjusted? 
5. Was uncertainty in the evaluations of costs and effects sufficiently addressed? 
Figure 6 illustrates the flow of our search strategy, screening process, and the evaluation 
of the entire paper. 
Figure 6. Flow chart of search strategy, screening process, and quality review 
 
 
 
 
Included (n=25) 
Key word 1+2 search: 149 CINAHL Plus; 123 Cochrane; 74 EconLit; 325 EMBASE; 35 Global 
Health; 50 MEDLINE; 2 Expert opinion; 64 Reference Check                                                           
(n=822) 
Excluded based on title and 
abstract (n=797) 
Studies included in the final review (n=7) 
Excluded after full-text review 
(n=18) 
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2.3.4 Results  
Twenty-five full-text studies were reviewed. Of those, seven studies were selected for 
inclusion for analysis (Tan et al. 2014; Hsieh et al. 2015, 2017; Pandya et al. 2018; 
Garner et al. 2018; Zeng et al. 2018; Borghi et al. 2015). Five studies (71%) from high-
income countries (HIC) focused on Taiwan (Tan et al. 2014; Hsieh et al. 2015, 2017), 
UK (Pandya et al. 2018), and the USA (Garner et al. 2018); one study (14%) from a lower 
middle-income country (LoMIC) focused on Zambia (Zeng et al. 2018); and one study 
from a low-income country (LIC) focused on Tanzania (Borghi et al. 2015).  
Majority of studies (86%) considered a payer’s perspectives (Garner et al. 2018; Pandya 
et al. 2018; Zeng et al. 2018; Hsieh et al. 2017, 2015; Tan et al. 2014), while only one 
study (14%) carried out an economic evaluation from a societal perspective (Borghi et 
al. 2015).   
Four of the studies (56%) examined costs and outcomes within a primary healthcare 
(Borghi et al. 2015; Zeng et al. 2018; Garner et al. 2018; Pandya et al. 2018); followed 
by two studies (29%) based on hospitals (Hsieh et al. 2015, 2017); one study (14%) was 
based on both, primary healthcare centres as well as hospitals (Tan et al. 2014). 
Furthermore, five of the RBF schemes (71%) specifically targeted a sub-population with 
a particular behaviour or disease (diabetes, kidney, cardiovascular, substance use 
disorders) (Tan et al. 2014; Hsieh et al. 2015, 2017; Pandya et al. 2018; Garner et al. 
2018) and two studies (29%) assessed maternal and child healthcare services (Borghi 
et al. 2015; Zeng et al. 2018).  
The intervention study period was 2-6 years, but four and a half years on average among 
the studies. 
Every study conducted a full economic evaluation in the form of cost-effectiveness 
analysis, where a clear relationship between the RBF costs and effects was established 
(Tan et al. 2014; Borghi et al. 2015; Hsieh et al. 2015, 2017; Zeng et al. 2018; Garner et 
al. 2018; Pandya et al. 2018). Each of the studies looked at competing alternatives in 
different forms. The comparison was conducted between the RBF groups and either 
control groups or the status quo.  
Table 3 provides a description of all the seven studies. 
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Table 3. Brief description of included studies 
Reference 
Study 
Location 
Targeted 
population 
Level of 
intervention 
Patient 
population 
Duration of 
the study 
Type of 
payment 
Study Design 
 
Discount   
 
Study 
Outcome 
 
Sensitivity 
Analysis 
 
Type of Economic 
Analysis 
Tan et al 
(2014) (Tan 
et al. 2014)  
Taiwan 
(HIC) 
Doctors 
Hospital and 
primary care 
Diabetes 2 years Rewards 
Retrospective 
observational 
study 
 
Not used 
 
QALYs 
 
No 
CEA 
Hsieh et al 
(2015)  
(Hsieh et al. 
2015)  
Taiwan 
(HIC) 
Doctors Hospital Diabetes 6 years Rewards 
Retrospective 
observational 
cohort study 
 
0.03 
 
QALYs 
 
No CEA 
Hsieh et al 
(2017) 
(Hsieh et al. 
2017)  
Taiwan 
(HIC) 
Doctors Hospital 
Chronic kidney 
diseases 
6 years Rewards 
Longitudinal 
observational 
matched 
cohort study 
 
0.03 
 
YLs 
 
No CEA 
Pandya et 
al (2018) 
(Pandya et 
al. 2018)  
UK 
(HIC) 
Doctors Primary care 
Cardiovascular 
diseases 
6 years Rewards 
Lifetime 
simulation 
cohort model 
 
0.035 
 
QALYs 
 
Yes CEA 
Garner et al 
(2018) 
(Garner et 
al. 2018)  
USA 
(HIC) 
Therapists Primary care 
Substance use 
disorders 
4 years Rewards 
Randomized 
control 
 
Not used 
 
QALYs 
 
No CEA 
Zeng et al 
(2018) 
(Zeng et al. 
2018)  
Zambia 
(LoMIC) 
Health 
facilities 
Primary care 
Maternal and 
child health 
5 years Rewards 
Randomized 
control 
 
0.03 
 
QALYs 
 
Yes CEA 
Borghi et al 
(2015) 
(Borghi et 
al. 2015) 
Tanzania 
(LIC) 
Health 
facilities 
Primary care 
Maternal and 
Child 
3 years 
Rewards 
 
Controlled 
before-and-
after study 
 
0.03 
 
Facility-
based birth 
 
Yes CEA 
CEA: Cost-Effectiveness Analysis, HIC: High-Income Country, LIC: Low-Income Country, LoMIC: Lower Middle-Income Country, QALYS: Quality Adjusted Life Years, YL: Life Years  
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All the studies (100%) described the source of information and the methods used in 
establishing effectiveness; two studies (29%) used randomised control methods 
(Garner et al. 2018; Zeng et al. 2018); one study (14%) used a controlled before and 
after design (Borghi et al. 2015); two studies (29%) took a retrospective observational 
approach (Tan et al. 2014; Hsieh et al. 2015); one study (14%) used a longitudinal 
observational cohort study (Hsieh et al. 2017); and one study (14%) used a lifetime 
simulation cohort model (Pandya et al. 2018).   
The studies conducted in high-income setting (56%) included the direct costs of 
service utilisation such as the costs of out-patient department (OPD) services, 
hospital admission and drugs in addition to performance payments (Tan et al. 2014; 
Hsieh et al. 2017, 2015; Garner et al. 2018); while one study (14%) included the costs 
of only incentives and drugs (Pandya et al. 2018). One study (14%) from a high-
income setting and two studies (29%) from LMICs estimated not only the direct costs 
of service utilisation and performance payments but also administration costs 
including data verification costs (Zeng et al. 2018; Garner et al. 2018; Borghi et al. 
2015). None of the studies reported on the allocation of administration costs to lower-
level cost centres. Only one study (14%) annuitized the costs (Zeng et al. 2018).  
Five studies (71%) discounted costs and outcomes (Borghi et al. 2015; Hsieh et al. 
2017, 2015; Zeng et al. 2018; Pandya et al. 2018); four studies (57%) used a 3% 
discount rate (Borghi et al. 2015; Hsieh et al. 2017, 2015; Zeng et al. 2018); whilst 
one study (14%) applied a discount rate of 3.5% (Pandya et al. 2018). Other two 
studies (Tan et al. 2014; Garner et al. 2018) did not use a discount rate. All the studies 
(100%) estimated both the additional costs as well as the effects of alternatives (Tan 
et al. 2014; Borghi et al. 2015; Hsieh et al. 2015, 2017; Zeng et al. 2018; Garner et 
al. 2018; Pandya et al. 2018).   
Six studies (86%) used generic outcome measures in the form of incremental costs 
quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) and incremental cost per life years (LYs) to 
compare costs and outcomes (Tan et al. 2014; Hsieh et al. 2015, 2017; Zeng et al. 
2018; Garner et al. 2018; Pandya et al. 2018). Only one study (14%) used an 
intermediate outcome in terms of incremental cost per additional facility-based birth 
(Borghi et al. 2015).  
Sensitivity analysis was applied only by three studies (43%) (Pandya et al. 2018; Zeng 
et al. 2018; Borghi et al. 2015); whilst the other studies (57%) did not consider it (Tan 
et al. 2014; Hsieh et al. 2017, 2015; Garner et al. 2018). Only one study applied a 
probabilistic sensitivity analysis (Pandya et al. 2018). 
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One study (14%) (Tan et al. 2014) adopted 0–50,000 $US per QALY as the CEA 
threshold based on the USA cost-effectiveness threshold standard. One study (14%) 
(Pandya et al. 2018) considered cost-effectiveness thresholds of £13,000 and 
£20,000–£30,000 per QALY based on Claxton et al. (2015) estimation (£13,000 per 
QALY) (Claxton et al. 2015) and the UK National Institute for Health and Care 
Excellence (NICE) recommendation (£20,000–30,000 per QALY). Two studies (29%) 
(Garner et al. 2018; Zeng et al. 2018) followed the recommendation of WHO’s 
Commission on Macroeconomics in Health as the cost per QALY averted less than 
per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) or three-times the per capita GDP 
interventions were considered “very cost-effective” and “cost-effective”, respectively 
(World Health Organization 2001). Two studies (29%) (Hsieh et al. 2017, 2015) 
considered RBF interventions cost-effective if the average incremental costs saved 
per QALY in RBF intervention group was higher than the comparison group, and one 
study (14%) (Borghi et al. 2015) did not have a clear indication on how they 
determined the cost-effectiveness of the intervention. 
Overall, amongst the seven studies identified, five studies (71%) found the RBF 
intervention to be cost-effective (Garner et al. 2018; Zeng et al. 2018; Hsieh et al. 
2017, 2015; Tan et al. 2014); one study (14%) was related to the likelihood of RBF 
cost-effectiveness if the intervention was expanded at the national level (Borghi et al. 
2015); however, there was only one study (14%) reported that the intervention was 
not cost-effective (Pandya et al. 2018). Only one study found the RBF programme in 
a low-income setting to be cost-effective (Zeng et al. 2018). However, the methods 
used in this study was found inadequate by Paul et al. (2020).  
Quite a few studies (75%) found the RBF intervention to be cost-effective at the 
primary health care setting (Borghi et al. 2015; Zeng et al. 2018; Garner et al. 2018). 
Borghi et al. (2015) noted that the RBF programme run in a resource-poor setting 
(Tanzania) could be cost-effective if it was implemented at a national level, as an 
integrated part of the health system. According to Zeng et al. (2018), the RBF 
intervention was cost-effective as many more lives were saved in the RBF group as 
compared to non-RBF groups in a time span of five years in Zambia. The estimates 
of Garner et al. (2018) suggested that a 5 per cent increase in the intervention cost 
resulted in a substantial increase in the competent delivery of treatment procedures 
by therapists in the US, treatment targets and period of abstinence per substance 
used by RBF group patients. However, an estimation from the UK found that the 
incremental cost-effectiveness of Quality Outcome Framework was close to £49,400 
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per QALY, which was below the set cost-effectiveness thresholds in the UK (Pandya 
et al. 2018).  
At the hospital level, the RBF intervention was found to be cost-effective in both 
studies (100%). Considering the management of diabetic patients in Taiwan, Hsieh 
et al.  (Hsieh et al. 2015) noted a 1.2 higher QALYs in RBF group as compared to 
non-RBF groups. Similarly for kidney patients in Taiwan Hsieh et al. (Hsieh et al. 
2017) reported a longer life span was projected in RBF groups (2.8) as compared to 
non-RBF group (2.7); a lower dialysis incidence was noted in RBF groups (0.85) as 
compared to non-RBF groups (0.79).  
Tan et al. (Tan et al. 2014) from the primary health care and hospital level reported 8 
per cent increase in QALYS in RBF intervention group with an additional cost of 422 
$US and an ICER of 5400 $US per QALY gained in diabetes patients in Taiwan. 
2.3.5 Discussion  
Seven full economic evaluations conducted between April 2014 and December 2019 
based on five high-income settings, one lower middle-income country, and one low-
income setting that covered RBF interventions in primary health care as well as 
hospitals were reviewed. All the studies showed positive effects of RBF interventions. 
It helped improve quality, increase utilisation, save costs, and gain QALYs. Within 2 
to 6 years, short-term results were seen; however, one study projected the likely 
future effects of RBF intervention on outcome if the programme was scaled up to a 
national level. Additionally, one study showed the initial investments for the 
intervention group were higher, considering the utilisation and service cost. However, 
the difference in the cost could decrease over time.  
The strengths of the studies can be summarised as follows: Firstly, all the studies 
conducted a full cost-effectiveness analysis in which a clear connection between 
costs and outcomes was established, and a comparison was made between two or 
more alternatives. A well-structured economic evaluation assesses costs and 
outcomes based on two alternatives using incremental analysis of both costs and 
outcome (Gray et al. 2011). Secondly, the costs and outcome data were from reliable 
sources. Analysing cost-effectiveness relies on the estimates pooled from various 
sources; thus, it is important to document the source of evidence (Cartwright 2009). 
Thirdly, the major outcome of the studies was an incremental cost per QALY 
estimates. It is essential to measure the costs and outcomes in suitable units such as 
the number of deaths averted, the number of disability-adjusted life years (DALYs) 
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averted or number of QALYs gained (Drummond et al. 2015). Fourth, some studies 
applied sensitivity analysis. Though economic evaluations allow combining data from 
different sources (Briggs and Gray 1999), the reliability of a study depends on the 
degree of confidence or certainty in parameters. In case, there are uncertainties in 
the parameters, the sensitivity of the result is examined by applying sensitivity 
analysis (Taylor 2009).  
One the other hand, we observed some methodological limitations in a few studies. 
In this review, only two studies used effectiveness data from RCTs, while other 
studies relied on non-RCT designs. RCTs can be considered as a gold standard for 
economic evaluations (Cartwright 2009). Though observational studies are largely 
used in economic evaluations, the potential for bias is high (Boyko 2013). 
Furthermore, only four studies included the administration (overhead) costs using a 
direct cost allocation method. This method is the simplest costing in which the 
administration costs are allocated directly to the final cost centres without having 
interactions among administration cost units. Nevertheless, this method is prone to 
underestimation (Drummond et al. 2015).  
More importantly, three studies did not use a cost-effectiveness analysis threshold 
and relied only on the cost-saving outcome of the studies and two studies relied on 
the WHO suggested cost-effectiveness threshold. The cost-effectiveness threshold is 
a tool to represent the stance of a country or an organisation in investing in health 
interventions to produce an additional QALY (Cleemput et al. 2011). Currently, the 
thresholds of cost-effectiveness analysis is controversial (Cameron, Ubels, and 
Norström 2018). The United Kingdom applies values of £20,000 to £30,000 (Claxton 
et al. 2015), and the United States uses 0-50,000 $US (Neumann, Cohen, and 
Weinstein 2014). The WHO’s Commission on Macroeconomics in Health defines 
cost-effectiveness ratios as cost per DALY averted less than per capita Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) or three-times the per capita GDP interventions in LMICs as 
“very cost-effective” and “cost-effective”, respectively (World Health Organization 
2001). Ochalec et al. (Ochalek, Lomas, and Claxton 2018) argue that the WHO 
method underestimates the impact of costs on health effects. Providing a framework 
to estimate country-level cost per DALY averted thresholds, they recommend that 
LMICs can generate their data or they can use cross-country data to produce country-
level estimates on the degree of health opportunity cost (Ochalek, Lomas, and 
Claxton 2018). Woods et al. estimated cost-effectiveness thresholds for a large 
number of LMICs. They concluded that the WHO recommended estimations have 
been too high. They recommend the cost-effectiveness threshold of 1 – 52 per cent 
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GDP per capita for low and middle-income countries and 18 – 71 per cent for middle 
and high-income countries (Woods et al. 2016).  
Future research should focus on rigorous full economic evaluations, especially in low-
income countries where a large number of RBF programmes have been implemented. 
Besides, given none of the studies conducted a comparative analysis between the 
RBF programmes and other alternative improvement interventions, future studies 
should compare RBF programmes to alternative health systems improvement 
interventions such as improved input management of health facilities, improved 
monitoring and supportive supervision, capacity building of health care workers, and 
interventions to promote health worker trust and intrinsic motivation. 
Although the review has been based on fixed criteria, a few limitations of this review 
could be observation bias, its search strategy, and its publication; in turn, affecting 
RBF programmes related to cost and the quality. Limitation of published evidence 
available about the cost-effectiveness of RBF programmes in LMICs, especially when 
considering large numbers, are disturbing. In spite, the numerous works of literature 
available, termed as grey literature, there is little economic evidence based on the 
effectiveness of these interventions in LMICs.  
2.3.6 Conclusion  
The previous reviews suggested that weak methodological designs limited the 
conclusiveness of findings from economic evaluations of RBF programmes. Our 
review outcomes suggest that RBF might be a cost-effective option to obtain 
improvements related to a specific disease such as diabetes or kidney diseases. 
However, we need to be cautious when we conclude and generalize the findings of 
this review as three studies in this review did not use any cost-effectiveness 
thresholds, and two studies applied the WHO suggested cost-effectiveness threshold, 
which is controversial.  
Further rigorous research on the impact of results-based financing interventions 
related to its cost-effectiveness, particularly in low and middle-income countries is 
required.   
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 OBJECTIVES 
This thesis aims to conduct a political economy analysis and cost-effectiveness 
analysis of results-based financing within the context of BPHS in Afghanistan. The 
mains objectives are as follows:  
1. To assess contextual, institutional and contractual factors influencing the 
performance of PBC programme in Afghanistan.  
2. To examine the political economy factors influencing the adoption, design and 
implementation of the PBF programme in Afghanistan. 
3. To assess whether the implementation of PBF was cost-effective for 
Afghanistan. 
4. To offer policy recommendations. 
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 METHODOLOGY   
This chapter presents the overarching methodology for the thesis. Our proposed 
research methods for each objective are explained in the relevant research papers in 
detail.  
In this section, Table 4 shows the methods used for each objective. Next, the rationale 
for each method is discussed, and then the methods for sampling, data collection and 
analysis are explained.  
Table 4. Objectives, methods and status of research papers 
No Objectives Methods   Techniques  Papers  
1 To assess 
contextual, 
institutional   and 
contractual factors 
influencing the 
performance of 
PBC programme in 
Afghanistan. 
Political 
Economy 
Analysis 
In-depth 
interviews  
Focus group 
discussions  
Document review  
Research Paper 2: Salehi AS, 
Saljuqi T, Akseer N, Rao K, Coe 
Kathryn, Factors influencing 
performance by contracted non-
state providers implementing a 
basic package of health services 
in Afghanistan 
Status: Published in BMC 
International Journal for Equity 
in Health 
Chapter: 4 
2 To examine the 
political economy 
factors influencing 
the adoption, 
design and 
implementation of 
PBF programme in 
Afghanistan. 
Political 
Economy 
Analysis 
Semi-structured 
interviews with 
policymakers, 
health managers 
and healthcare 
workers  
Document review  
Research Paper 3: Salehi AS, 
Blanchet K, Vassal A, Borghi J. 
Political Economy Analysis of 
the Performance-Based 
Financing Programme in 
Afghanistan 
Status: Ready for submitting to a 
journal  
Chapter: 5 
3 To assess whether 
the implementation 
of PBF was cost-
effective for 
Afghanistan. 
Cost-
effectiveness 
analysis  
Cost-effectiveness 
analysis 
compared to the 
standard of care  
Research Paper 4: Salehi AS, 
Borghi J, Blanchet K, Vassal A.  
Cost-Effectiveness of Results-
Based Financing in Health Care: 
A Systematic Review  
Status: Submitted to the Lancet 
Global Health  
Chapter: 6 
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3.2.1 Rationale for study methods 
3.2.1.1 Choice of methods for objective 1 and 2 
We found qualitative research methods to be the most appropriate for studying 
Afghanistan’s PBC and PBF programmes given the exploratory nature of the studies 
and the requirements for examining numerous processes and testing the driving 
forces that have shaped and affected the RBF programmes. Qualitative research can 
generate understanding of factors influencing programme processes and outcomes 
(Liu, Hotchkiss, and Bose 2007).  
Researchers provide numerous definitions to describe what is meant by qualitative 
research. Denzin and Lincoln (Denzin and Lincoln 2000) define qualitative research 
as a tool that exposes the researchers to the real world and allows them to make the 
world visible through material practices. Creswell (Creswell 1998) defines qualitative 
research as “an inquiry process of understanding based on distinct methodological 
traditions of inquiry that explore a social or human problem” (Creswell 1998). 
Qualitative research aims to deeply understand and interpret the social world from the 
perspective of research participants by examining their social situations, viewpoints, 
experiences, and stories; researchers have opportunities for direct interaction with 
research participants; collected data are rich and informative; analysis provides 
detailed information on common themes and shared ideas; and the results intend to 
provide interpretations on the social meaning of the research participants’ views and 
experiences through mapping and descriptions (Snap and Spencer 2003).   
Additionally, given RBF programmes are inherently political as the provision of 
performance-incentives assumes changes not only in overall productivity and 
management at the service delivery level but also on provider behaviour (Magrath 
and Nichter 2012; Oxman and Fretheim 2009), we considered a political economy 
analysis (PEA) approach to guide our data collection, analysis and interpretation. PEA 
allows us to examine situational factors, clarify processes, and highlight roles and 
interactions of actors for greater understanding of the RBF programmes. PEA can 
complement economic evaluation (objective 3) by highlighting the factors that shaped 
the PBF programme and affected PBF outcomes.  
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3.2.1.2 Choice of methods for objective 3 
We used economic evaluation and specifically cost-effectiveness analysis to produce 
evidence on the efficiency of the resources used in Afghanistan by the PBF 
programme.  
Cost-effectiveness analysis can support the decision for how to assign limited 
resources to competing priorities. Sometimes, additional requirements could be 
accommodated by expanding the healthcare budget through levying higher taxes or 
increasing insurance premiums. However, this is not always a feasible solution. In a 
low-income setting such as Afghanistan where the healthcare system is managed by 
a fixed budget, any decision to address additional demands or introduce new 
programmes means interrupting health services elsewhere. Cost-effectiveness 
analysis (CEA) examines whether the outcomes produced by a new programme 
prevail over the losses in health taking place from the dislocation of services 
elsewhere. This is called ‘value for money’ (World Health Organization 2003). The 
primary motive of economic evaluation is whether intervention value validates its cost 
or not (Drummond et al. 2005). In other terms, an economic evaluation is about 
attaining value for money to improve health by employing scarce resources in the 
most efficient way (Griffits, Legood, and Pitt 2016).  
Secondly, the total budget invested in PBF projects in low-income and FCASs is 
estimated at 1.5 billion US$ (RBFHealth 2018) in the past decade. Though this has 
been an enormous investment, there has only been only two studies (Borghi et al. 
2015; Zeng et al. 2018) from low-income countries reporting on the cost-effectiveness 
of PBF intervention so far. To our knowledge, our study would be the first CEA of PBF 
informed by a pragmatic controlled randomised trial in an FCAS to provide insight into 
the understating of value for money in the context of PBF.  
Lastly, this CEA was carried out alongside a PEA qualitative study, which will increase 
the chances of the technical outcome of the CEA being suitably received in the context 
of highly political situations, by better understanding the policy context.  Furthermore, 
policymakers are not only interested in understanding the factors shaping and 
affecting a programme, but also are interested in whether or not the programme is 
cost-effective.  
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3.2.2 Study Design, Data Collection and Analysis for Objectives 1 and 2 
3.2.2.1 Study Design for Objectives 1 and 2 
The study design for Objectives 1 and 2 is based on the case study method. Political 
economy analysis requires to examine a research subject from different perspectives. 
Therefore, the case study method allows us to examine the RBF programmes through 
multiple lenses rather than a single lens, which enables different aspects of the 
programmes to be uncovered and comprehended.  
The aim of a case study is to combine all facets and data regarding the subject being 
studied, thus facilitating the explanation or description of a particular thing from 
various angles. A qualitative case study help study particular problems within the 
constraints of a particular setting, context or organisation (Baxter and Jack 2008).  
They can be utilised in situations where one perspective is unable to thoroughly 
explain the issue being studied and where the understanding should be holistic and 
put into context (Heale and Twycross 2018). 
Distinct terminology for describing different case studies is used. For example, Stake 
(1995) stated that case studies could be categorised as exploratory, descriptive, or 
explanatory. Case studies are also categorised as instrumental, intrinsic, or collective 
(Baxter and Jack 2008). The objective of explanatory case studies is to determine 
answers to ‘why’ or ‘how’ questions. Essentially, they aim to provide an explanation 
for real-life interventions whose complexity is too high for the application of surveys 
or experimental approaches. Descriptive case studies are targeted at describing 
interventions or phenomena as well as the actual contexts in which they happen. The 
aim of exploratory case studies is to determine opinions and to discover answers to 
‘what’ or ‘who’ questions. This kind of case study is utilised to investigate scenarios 
where there is no obvious, individual group of outcomes related to the intervention in 
question (Yin 2003).   
Stake employed the term intrinsic, suggesting that researchers who are interested in 
the case should adopt such an approach when the aim is to improve the 
understanding of that case (Stake 1995). The aim of instrumental studies is to achieve 
more than the comprehension of a specific situation. It facilitates the understanding 
of an issue or assists with refining a theory. The case is frequently examined in great 
detail, its contexts are analysed, its normal activities explained, and it also enables 
the researcher to follow external interests. Stake employed the term ‘collective case 
study’ in situations where multiple cases are investigated. Such case studies have 
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similar characteristics and descriptions to multiple case studies. In multiple case 
studies, various cases are investigated to comprehend the commonalities and 
distinctions between them (Stake 1995). 
3.2.2.2 Conceptual framework for Objectives 1 and 2 
In this thesis, we used a framework developed by Liu et al. (Liu, Hotchkiss, and Bose 
2007) as a foundation and a guide for designing the study, developing data collection 
tools, and analysing data for objective 1. Likewise, we adapted a PEA conceptual 
framework (Buse et al. 2008) to guide our data collection and analysis for objective 2. 
This framework was originally developed by Walt and Gilson (Walt and Gilson 1994) 
and adapted by Buse et al. This framework aims to understand the fundamental 
dynamics that influence policy adaption, design and implementation. The framework 
takes the position that the dynamics between actors, the context in which policy 
comes into existence, and the process through which policy is developed leads to an 
outcome. The framework places greater emphasis on the function of actors and their 
role (Nash, Hudson, and Luttrell 2006). 
These frameworks have been used in other settings (Nash, Hudson, and Luttrell 
2006; Liu, Hotchkiss, and Bose 2007; Kent, Hawkes, and Jones 2008; Buse et al. 
2007, 2008) to evaluate health programmes. While the specifics of the geographical 
and historical situation in Afghanistan are unique, adopting tested and proven 
frameworks contribute to the validity of the findings.   
The two frameworks have numerous common aspects as well as certain distinctions. 
Each of the frameworks captures contextual factors as well as policy cycle processes; 
additionally, both make the assumption that a particular outcome is caused by the 
interaction between the components of the frameworks. Nonetheless, the Liu et al. 
framework (Liu, Hotchkiss, and Bose 2007) focuses less on the role of and interaction 
between actors; conversely, the Buse et al. framework (Buse et al. 2008) strongly 
emphasizes the interplay between actors during policy adoption, formulation and 
implementation. Table 5 displays the commonalities and distinctions between the 
framework proposed by Liu et al. and Buse et al.  
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Table 5. Similarities and differences of PEA frameworks used in this thesis  
 
3.2.2.3 Data collection for Objectives 1 and 2 
Qualitative studies use different methods to collect, as well as analyse and interpret 
data. Data collection methods are divided into two large groups: (i) “generated data” 
methods that produce data by conducting research, and (ii) the methods that focus 
on “naturally occurring data”. Generated data methods are the only means of 
examining certain phenomena such as beliefs, attitudes and motivations. The 
common methods developed to generate data are interviews and focus group 
discussions (Snap and Spencer 2003). Naturally occurring data methods are 
developed to help investigate a phenomenon in its natural setting. These methods 
provide data that represent social behaviours (e.g. study of culture or community) of 
specific social settings. Some examples of natural occurring data methods are 
observations and discourse analysis (Snap and Spencer 2003). Following, we will 
explain the most common data collection methods.  
The most common methods used in qualitative studies are as follows (Pope 2002):   
- Interview: This method is based on a face to face interview with an individual study 
participant either by in-depth or semi-structured interview. In an in-depth interview, 
the researcher explores the opinion and experience of the participant by posing 
open-ended questions. In semi-structured interviews, the questions are led by the 
topic guide with some flexible questions.   
- Focus Group Discussion: Focus group discussions (FGDs) are similar to face-to-
face interviews, but they are organised among a group of more than two people. 
Typically, six to eight participants take part in the discussion. They discuss a 
concerned subject, argue, raise questions, express opinions and provide some 
shared ideas. This method is usually used in health care to discuss materials or a 
particular health problem to develop an interpretative description or formulate a 
hypothesis and action plans to improve quality of care.  
Framework Context Content Process Actors 
Liu et al. 2007 Strong 
emphasis 
Some 
emphasis 
Strong 
emphasis 
Less 
emphasis 
Buse et al. 2008 Strong 
emphasis 
No 
emphasis  
Strong 
emphasis 
Strong 
emphasis 
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- Observations: Observations focus on the interaction and behaviour of people and 
or systems. This method is increasingly used in the study of organisation and 
health care provision.  
- Secondary Sources: Secondary analysis, which refers to the re-use of data that 
was primarily collected for another study, has gain popularity in recent decades. 
The researchers argue that many qualitative datasets have narratives that were 
not analysed in the primary research study. 
In this thesis, we used three main data collection methods, namely document review, 
individual interviews and focus group discussions for objective 1 and document 
review and individual interviews for objective 2. Our document review incorporated 
academic papers, grey literature, reports, official policy documents and minutes of 
meetings. Given RBF programmes intend to focus on the motivation of healthcare 
workers, apart from strengthening health systems, we believe “generated data” 
collection methods are the best approach to examine the experience, thoughts and 
beliefs of study participants.  
Unlike statistical research that uses probability sampling (random sampling), 
qualitative studies follow a non-probability sampling method in which the research 
target population (participants) are selected purposively to represent specific 
characteristics of groups in the sampled population. These characteristics make the 
sampled population qualified to the small scale in-depth research studies (Dworkin 
2012). In purposive sampling, the selection of the research participants is based on 
predefined criteria or purposive (Mason 2002). The characteristics appears from 
social-economic features or a specific background or a particular behaviour. It is 
highly important to make sure that all respective constituencies are included while 
some level of diversity in each of criteria is considered (Snap and Spencer 2003).     
We used a purposive sampling technique in both studies (objective 1 and 2) to ensure 
diversity among our respondents. The sampling plan was stratified according to 
different categories of stakeholders: representatives of the MoPH at both the central 
and provincial levels, development partners, NSPs, and healthcare workers. The 
variety allowed us to explore perceptions and ideas from a diverse group, identifying 
similarities and divergences across the respondent categories. The participants for 
the FGDs were also selected through a purposeful sampling process that sought to 
keep the composition of the FGDs constant across provinces.  
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3.2.2.4 Data analysis for Objectives 1 and 2 
An analysis is an essential part of qualitative research in which analytical categories 
and explanations are provided based on the data collected by the qualitative methods 
(Sofaer 2002). We provide a brief overview of the various qualitative analysis 
methods and then explain the choice of analysis method for our case studies.  
Content Analysis Method: The content analysis technique is beneficial for analysing 
various types of data, including self-reported data in order to enhance the 
understanding of cultural patterns and experiences. Content analysis is defined as 
the process by which verbal or behavioural information is categorised for the purpose 
of classifying, summarising or tabulating the information. To accomplish this, it is 
important that researchers determine their objectives and hypotheses and also 
increase their familiarity with the data so that they can develop an appropriate system 
of coding. After identifying appropriate codes, it is then possible to methodically 
examine the data to discern examples of all the codes. A ‘code’ could be denoted by 
a word or brief phrase that is representative of a theme or concept. When performing 
content analysis, it is important to consult the data numerous times, firstly for 
identifying codes, secondly to refine these codes, and lastly to count instances of the 
codes (Hsieh and Shannon 2005).  
Thematic Analysis Method: Thematic analysis is a different option to content analysis 
in which qualitative data is converted into quantitative data. This approach is 
frequently employed as a qualitative technique to focus on the content of statements 
made by participants, particularly the identification, analysis and reporting of patterns 
(themes) in the data. The analysis could be inductive, where codes emerge from the 
data via open coding, or deductive, in situations where pre-set categories are utilised. 
Themes capture important aspects of the data with regard to the research question 
and denote a certain degree of patterned response or meaning in the dataset (Braun 
and Clarke 2006).   
Discourse Analysis Method: This analysis technique involves naturally occurring 
discourse and all forms of written text. Essentially, discourse analysis studies 
language-in-use. A fundamental notion that underpins these techniques is that the 
function of language extends beyond the communication of content information. From 
the perspective of discourse analysis, discourse is a group of ideas that are reflective 
of the manner in which a specific topic is formed within society. Gee focused more on 
language structure, but also addressed cultural, social and political meaning. Like 
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approaches based on content, the reading and annotating of data are conducted in 
an iterative manner based on the tool being used (Gee 2011).  
Framework Analysis Method: Framework analysis is a technique utilised for analysing 
data in primary qualitative research. This is a more state-of-the-art approach that 
comprises various phases including familiarising with the data, identification of a 
thematic structure, coding, charting, mapping and interpretation. Framework analysis 
is a method based on matrices that involve the formulation of thematic categories that 
enable the coding of data. A key aspect of this approach is that, dissimilar to other 
qualitative techniques, themes or concepts can be determined based on the theory 
that can be designated as coding categories from the beginning and then 
amalgamated with new themes or categories that arise after the data is inductively 
analysed. A tangible advantage of this approach is that any questions or issues 
determined in advance by different actors can be clearly and methodically 
incorporated into the analysis, while still allowing sufficient flexibility for the detection 
and characterisation of issues that arise from the data (Dixon-Woods 2011). 
Grounded Theory (GT) Method: This qualitative data analysis approach commences 
with the analysis of an individual case to develop a theory. Subsequently, further 
cases are analysed to determine if they are capable of contributing to the theory. 
When using GT, researchers create new theories from the available data. GT 
research questions endeavour to ascertain why or how something occurs. Grounded 
theorists attempt to establish explanatory linkages among categories rather than 
providing descriptions of these categories. The processes of collecting and analysing 
data run concurrently, and the research question can transform as the analysis 
develops. Ultimately, GT analysis enables the researcher to describe a theoretical 
model for the given process (Charmaz 2006).  
In this thesis, regarding objectives 1 and 2, we adopted the content analysis approach 
in which key issues, core elements, and shared outcomes are considered.  
As indicated above, our case studies follow specific frameworks. Content analysis is 
a perfect choice for qualitative studies which uses conceptual frameworks. Content 
analysis can predict variables of interest and interactions between variables; thus, 
help assign coding or establish a relationship between the codes (Hsieh and Shannon 
2005). RBF is a complex programme. Therefore, content analysis allows us to follow 
a structured process to remain focused on the subject of research (Mayring 2000).  
Applying Snap and Spencer (2003) guidance, the following steps were employed to 
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analyse the data. First, all transcriptions and notes were carefully reviewed. All key 
topics and concepts were then identified and sorted. Important themes and 
statements were coded using the conceptual framework described previously. Based 
on their relationships, the highlighted data were selected and grouped under specific 
categories. Information on the same opinion was combined, and transcribed quotes 
then used under the relevant classifications. Finally, each classification was studied 
and interpreted carefully. The interpretation was based on the aim and objectives of 
the study and the conceptual framework. Common viewpoints were then described, 
and essential responses elucidated.  
3.2.3 Study Design, Data Collection and Data Analysis for Objective 3 
3.2.3.1 Study perspective  
Perspective is central in determining the necessary costs and outcomes, and it 
highlights the standpoint of researchers when carrying out a cost-effectiveness 
analysis (Neumann 2009; Bilvick Tai, Bae, and Le 2016). A provider perspective 
implies that only the costs incurred by providers (e.g. Ministry of Health, NGOs) are 
considered (Maxwell Ayindenaba et al. 2013). If costs incurred by society members, 
public, private and individual are taken into account in addition to the provider of the 
programme, the study is taking a societal perspective (Hansen and Yeung 2009).  
We implemented this study from a provider perspective (Polimeni et al. 2016), as 
decision-makers such as those in the MoPH, that are faced with allocating resources 
from a fixed annual budget, are interested in those costs that are accrued to the health 
sector. Therefore, the costs incurred on patients, such as transportation costs and 
opportunity costs of patients due to loss of productivity and opportunity costs of 
caretakers (Zilberberg and Shorr 2010; Jönsson 2009) were not included in the study 
due to the perspective of the study.  
3.2.3.2 Conceptual framework for Objective 3 
Given that PBF programme aimed at increasing utlisation of MCH services, a 
framework called “Maternal Health Policy Model” (Guldie et al. 2010) was adapted to 
evaluate the costs and health outcomes of the PBF programme. This framework has 
been used in similar settings including Afghanistan to conduct cost-effectiveness 
analysis of MCH programmes (Guldie et al. 2010; Carvalho, Salehi, and Goldie 2012; 
Carvalho, Goldie, and Salehi 2012). This framework simulates the history of 
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pregnancy such as antenatal care, delivery, abortion, pregnancy-related 
complications, and postnatal care. In this framework, women of child bearing age (15 
to 49 years old) are the target population for this study, why may or may not use 
antenatal care services, deliver the baby or have an abortion, and incur complications 
of pregnancy or not, and use or not use post-natal care.  
3.2.3.3 Approach to Costing  
The cost of a project is defined as “the monetary value of all the resources used as a 
result of the project under consideration” (SAFE International Research Partnership 
2003).  
There are two types of costs, economic costs and financial costs (Evans et al. 2005).  
Financial costs reflect the amount of money paid for specific resources. The central 
concept of economic costs is that of opportunity costs or the value of resources in 
their best alternative use (Gold et al. 1996). For example, if an ultrasound is donated 
to a health facility, the financial cost will be zero while the economic cost will be the 
estimated market value of the ultrasound.  
A cost analysis could include full or incremental costs. The full cost analysis considers 
all costs used in an approach while an incremental cost analysis reflects the additional 
inputs incurred by the approach compared to the alternative option(s) (Mogyorosy and 
Smith 2005). There are some terminologies used commonly in cost analyses:  
• ‘Total cost’ refers to all costs incurred by an approach (Hansen and Yeung 2009);  
• An ‘average cost’ includes the mean cost of the total costs (Hansen and Yeung 
2009);   
• A ‘fixed cost’ is a cost that does not vary in the short term (around one year) 
regardless of the quantity of outputs (Drummond et al. 2005);  
• A ‘variable cost’ is a cost which  varies if the quantity of outputs are changed 
(Drummond et al. 2005);  
• A ‘marginal cost’ accounts for the cost of one more unit of production (Mogyorosy 
and Smith 2005);  
• A ‘unit cost’ takes into consideration the cost of production of a unit of service 
(Creese, Parker, and Who 1994). The latter might also be called an ‘average cost’ 
(Conteh and Walker 2004); 
• A ‘direct cost’ which is directly related to a programme or activity. If the programme 
or activity is stopped, this type of cost is removed (Creese, Parker, and Who 1994); 
and    
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• An ‘indirect cost’ which is not directly related to a programme or activity. If the 
programme or activity is stopped, there are still some costs associated with the 
organisation (Creese, Parker, and Who 1994).    
Cost studies can be carried using a top-down approach and or bottom-up approach. 
In a top-down approach, in order to attain the cost of a health service, the total cost 
is allocated to the service based on allocation factors such as staff time spent on the 
targeted service, transportation millage used for the service and the proportion of 
building usage (Conteh and Walker 2004; Cunnama et al. 2016). The methods used 
in top-down cost analyses are as follows:  
• Direct cost allocation method: This is the simplest costing method. Under this 
method, the overhead costs (e.g. administration unit in an office or a laundry unit 
in a hospital) are allocated directly to final cost centres without having interactions 
among overhead cost units. This method is prone to underestimation (Drummond 
et al. 2005).  
• Step-down cost allocation method: Step-down cost allocation allows assigning the 
resources used to selected cost centres on an allocation basis. The process runs 
from top to the lower levels as far as the final cost centres of interest are obtained 
(Cunnama et al. 2016). The process also includes interaction among the overhead 
units (Drummond et al. 2005). The step-down cost allocation approach is broadly 
used in costing health services and it has  a high potential of comparability across 
settings. This method is also called ‘reciprocal method’ (Debusk and Forsyth 
2011). 
The bottom-up cost approach (micro-costing) is a quite common practice and the 
most feasible method to obtain the unit costs of services (Drummond et al. 2005; 
Cunnama et al. 2016). In this method, detailed costing of activities is conducted to 
estimate the unit costs.  
PBF Programme Cost: In this study, we estimated financial as well as economic costs 
of the PBF programme at central and provincial levels. The cost centres at the central 
and provincial levels included salaries, health management information system 
(HMIS) verification, equipment, building, transport, and administration. The 
administration costs were further divided into monitoring, communication, training, 
workshop, and tax.  At the health facility level, in addition to the above costs, the cost 
centres included the performance incentive cost and drug costs.  
Unit cost of services: To measure the unit costs of PBF supported services, we 
conducted a primary data collection from 25 random sample of health facilities (Table 
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6). The sample size was estimated based on the mean (2.58) and standard deviation 
(1.74) of cost per personnel in 463 PBF BPHS health facilities with an assumption 
that this allows error to be 40 per cent of standard deviation in the health facility 
population. Provided that it was planned to apply a sensitivity analysis around those 
parameters (±30 per cent), the estimated number of health facilities was enough to 
generate sound estimates of parameters for the health facilities. The formula below 
presents the sample size calculation (Hajian-Tilaki 2011):  
Sample size = 
𝑍2∗𝜎2
𝑑2
  
Where: d= 0.4 *𝜎 
z= 1.96 for two-side test 
𝜎 = standard deviation of the continues outcome 
The costs of PBF services were arrived at by adding the costs found in the step-down 
allocation method and a bottom-up cost allocation method. Health facility costs were 
estimated using a bottom-up cost allocation method, including the costs of salaries, 
incentives, equipment, building, drug, and administration.  
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Table 6. The characteristics of study health facilities  
No Health Facilities  Province Number of Staff Type of Health Facility  Geographic Location Population Covered 
1 Ali Abad Balkh 2 Sub-Centre Rural      6,300 
2 Ali Chopan Balkh 4 Basic Health Centre Urban  34,200 
3 Baghche-Sarhang Balkh 12 Comprehensive Health Centre Rural     9,436 
4 Baharak  Takhar  11 Comprehensive Health Centre Urban   44,688 
5 Chahartoot Takhar  6 Basic Health Centre Rural     9,737 
6 Deh Hassan Balkh 6 Basic Health Centre Rural     7,500 
7 Hairatan Balkh 12 Comprehensive Health Centre Semi Urban  29,984  
8 Hazar Bagh Takhar  13 Comprehensive Health Centre Semi Urban  19,635 
9 Kalafgan Takhar  14 Comprehensive Health Centre  Rural  27,286 
10 Kaldar Balkh 6 Basic Health Centre Rural  12,483  
11 Khatayan Takhar  6 Basic Health Centre Rural  27,286  
12 Khwaj Bahawuddin Takhar  14 Comprehensive Health Centre Rural  37,506  
13 Khwaja Ghor Takhar  13 Comprehensive Health Centre Semi Urban  26,047  
14 Kushkak Balkh 6 Basic Health Centre Rural     8,360  
15 Langar Khana  Balkh 11 Comprehensive Health Centre Urban  27,100 
16 Lataband Takhar  6 Comprehensive Health Centre Rural     9,681  
17 Mashi Balkh 6 Basic Health Centre Semi Urban  13,190  
18 Nahri Chaman Takhar  6 Basic Health Centre Semi Urban  35,154  
19 Noor Khoda Balkh 12 Comprehensive Health Centre Urban  57,700 
20 Qolbars Takhar  5 Basic Health Centre Semi Urban  35,889  
21 Qurghan Balkh 16 Comprehensive Health Centre Rural  17,100 
22 Sher Abad Balkh 5 Basic Health Centre Semi Urban  19,586 
23 Tooroq Takhar  6 Basic Health Centre Rural  15,449  
24 Ultajo Balkh 2 Sub-Centre Rural     5,200  
25 Yokh Takhar  6 Basic Health Centre Rural  12,131  
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3.2.3.4 Effectiveness Data  
According to the Afghanistan Mortality Survey 2010, postpartum haemorrhage is the 
leading cause of maternal deaths in Afghanistan, followed by hypertensive disorders 
(19.8 per cent), obstructed labour, and sepsis (Ministry of Public Health, Central 
Statistics Organization, ICF Macro, Indian Institute of Health Management Research 
2010). Further, sepsis/infection, low birthweight, and birth asphyxia are the leading 
causes of newborn deaths in Afghanistan (L. Liu et al. 2012). As most  maternal and 
newborn-related complications can be prevented during pregnancy and delivery time 
(Almutairi 2016; World Health Organization 2015; Lawn et al. 2012; L. Liu et al. 2012), 
we considered pregnancy-related complications and newborn morbidity and deaths 
as the clinical outcomes of pregnancy and delivery in the model in both control and 
treatment groups.  
We obtained utilisation data for both treatment and control groups from the PBF 
impaction evaluation (Ministry of Public Health & KIT Royal Tropical Institute 2015). 
We estimated the absolute effect of PBF intervention on the utilisation of ANC, SBA 
and PNC parameters. We obtained maternal and neonatal mortality and morbidity 
data from Afghanistan Mortality Survey 2010 (Ministry of Public Health, Central 
Statistics Organization, ICF Macro, Indian Institutedd of Health Management 
Research 2010), Afghanistan Demographic Health Survey 2015 (Central Statistics 
Organization 2015), and relevant published literature (Carvalho, Salehi, and Goldie 
2012; Halloran et al. 2009; Bailey et al. 2017; Ugwu, Abedi, and Ugwu 2012; 
Fleischmann-Struzek et al. 2018). In addition, we obtained disability weights for each 
complication from the Global Disease Burden study (World Health Organization 
2004), and the duration of the complications from expert opinion.  
3.2.3.5 Cost-Effectiveness Threshold  
The cost-effectiveness threshold is a cut-off point beyond which an intervention is 
deemed cost-effective (Cleemput et al. 2011). There are two approaches to determine 
cost-effectiveness thresholds. The first is based on the notion of opportunity cost, 
(Baker et al. 2011; Claxton et al. 2013), based on the principle that investing in a new 
health intervention could divert resources from another investment  (CE and C-L 
1995). Another group argues that willingness-to-pay (WTP) should be used as 
thresholds in cost-effectiveness studies. Given that health care services are financed 
through tax systems, the populations’ views should be considered with reference to 
the value they place on health care services (Baker et al. 2011; Claxton et al. 2013). 
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Currently, there is no common approach to determining cost-effectiveness thresholds 
(Cameron, Ubels, and Norström 2018). For example, the United Kingdom applies 
values of £20,000 to £30,000 (Claxton et al. 2015), and the United States uses  
$50,000 (Neumann, Cohen, and Weinstein 2014). The World Health Organization’s 
Commission on Macroeconomics in Health defines cost-effectiveness ratios as cost 
per DALY averted less than per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) or three-times 
the per capita GDP interventions in low and middle-income countries as “very cost-
effective” and “cost-effective”, respectively (World Health Organization 2001). 
Ochalec and colleagues (Ochalek, Lomas, and Claxton 2018) argue that the WHO 
method underestimates the impact of costs on health effects. Providing a framework 
to estimate country-level cost per DALY averted thresholds, they recommend that low 
and middle-income countries can generate their own data or they can use cross-
country data to produce country-level estimates on the degree of health opportunity 
cost (Ochalek, Lomas, and Claxton 2018).  Woods and colleagues (Woods et al. 
2016) estimated cost-effectiveness thresholds for a large number of low and middle-
income countries based on opportunity costs, empirical data of GDP per capita of 
countries, the cost-effectiveness threshold used in the UK English National Health 
System, relationship between GDP per capita and the elasticity of value of statistical 
life  (value of benefiting from a death aversion) on income, and the assumptions that 
the values used for opportunity costs of health care spending and elasticity of value 
of statistical life are suitable estimations, and that the income elasticity of the value of 
statistical life is equivalent to the income elasticity of the consumption value of a 
DALY. They concluded that the WHO recommended estimations have been too high. 
They recommend a cost-effectiveness threshold of between 1-52 per cent GDP per 
capita for low middle-income countries and 18-71 per cent for middle/high-income 
countries (Woods et al. 2016).  
In this study, based on Wood et al. estimation (Woods et al. 2016), we considered 
349 US$ per capita as the cost-effectiveness threshold for Afghanistan. Given 
Afghanistan’s GDP (570 US$) and an annual total health expenditure per capita of 71 
US$ (Ministry of Public Health 2016), this is a realistic estimation.  
3.2.3.6 Discounting 
The concept of “discounting” is a process of adjusting future costs or health effects to 
‘present value’, or adjusting for the timing of costs relative to health benefits. It is 
based on the general belief that societies prefer benefits earlier rather than later, and 
prefer incurring costs later than sooner (World Health Organization 2003) (Nair et al. 
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2017). It is thus important to undertake discounting of costs and benefits within 
economic evaluation using the discount rate (Nair et al. 2017). Although there is 
unanimity among researchers that discounting costs is crucial, controversies loom 
towards discounting benefits, whether they should be discounted, and whether the 
discount rate should remain constant or not (Evans et al. 2005; Weinstein et al. 1996; 
Drummond et al. 2005; Goldie, Goldhaber-Fiebert, and Garnett 2006).  
Even though it has been challenged (Brouwer et al. 2005), using a constant 
discounting rate is the common phenomenon as witnessed a similar rate for both cost 
and effect. The Panel on Cost-Effectiveness in Health and Medicine (Karlsson and 
Johannesson 1996) as well as WHO (World Health Organization 2003) do endorse 
discounting of ‘costs’ and ‘effects’ at the same rate. The guidelines suggest a 3 per 
cent discount rate although suggestions were put to also evaluate the study results 
without any discount rate as well as 7 per cent to ensure that the result of the study 
is useful in future (Muenning 2008). The UK National Institute for Health and Clinical 
Excellence (NICE) too put the guidelines through endorsing 3.5 per cent discount for 
costs and effects alike (Brouwer et al. 2005). Some studies on the global sphere have 
suggested a 5 per cent discount rate (Drummond et al. 2005).  
In this study, we considered a 3 per cent discount on cost and effects. 
3.2.3.7 Sensitivity Analysis  
The trustworthiness of the results relies on the degree of confidence or uncertainty in 
parameters. In some cases, values are based on assumptions, or there is a lack of 
data. The study methodology and the actual values that feed the model play a vital 
role in defining the degree of confidence.  As an example, if one parameter seems 
very low in a model, the researcher may wish to examine the sensitivity of the model’s 
results by applying a five or ten per cent higher value. Health economists apply 
different ways of sensitivity analysis (Briggs and Gray 1999; Taylor 2009):  
- One-Way Sensitivity Analysis: This is the simplest type of sensitivity analysis in 
which the change in which one examines how the study results vary with variation 
in the value of one uncertain parameter. This can be exercised with all uncertain 
parameters one by one.  
- Multiway Sensitivity Analysis: In a multiway sensitivity analysis, simultaneous 
changes are brought in the values of more than one uncertain parameter against 
the model’s results. This is a complicated exercise; the more parameters are 
involved, the more becomes difficult the presentation and interpretation. In order 
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to make sure that the confidence around the parameters is considered carefully, 
the highest and the lowest values or the confidence intervals of the concerned 
parameters are chosen (Taylor 2009).  A subsection of multi-way sensitivity 
analysis is scenario analysis in which the base case scenario, as well as the best-
case scenario and the worst-case scenarios, are used against the model’s results. 
Alternatively, the researcher can apply the scenarios that he or she might feel 
appropriate (Briggs and Gray 1999).  
- Threshold Analysis: This is a special case of the one-way sensitivity analysis that 
examines the value a parameter would need to take to make the ICER fall below 
or above the cost-effectiveness threshold. In this type of analysis, the researcher 
considers an increase in, say, ICER to the extent to which the intervention would 
become unacceptable. In this case, the researcher could assess the situation to 
identify what combination of values surpassed the threshold (Drummond et al. 
2005).   
- Probabilistic Sensitivity Analysis: This is the most common form of sensitivity 
analysis (Drummond et al. 2005) in which probability distributions to key model’s 
parameters are assigned to draw random samples, using computer software, to 
generate an empirical distribution of the ICER including ICER’s confidence interval 
(Hatswell et al. 2017).  
In our study, we used a one-way sensitivity test for all parametres, multiway sensitivity 
analysis for incremental cost and incremental DALYS, as well as a probabilistic 
sensitivity analysis for incremental cost and incremental DALYS.  
3.2.4 Ethical Considerations for objective 1, 2, and 3 
Ethical approval was obtained for all objectives from the Institutional Review Board of 
the Ministry of Public Health of Afghanistan and Ethics Committee of the London 
School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine. In addition, the World Health Organisation 
Ethical Review Committee approved the study for objective 1.  
Voluntary informed consent was sought from the participants of the studies and 
confidentiality was assured. Participation in interviews was voluntary, and all 
information was provided anonymously. All interviews were assigned codes to ensure 
anonymity when citing quotations. Data were accessed only by the research team.  
The candidate had full access to the data of qualitative studies and cost-effectiveness 
analysis. He is accountable for data integrity and the accuracy of data analyses.  
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4.1.1 Abstract  
Background: In 2002, Afghanistan’s Ministry of Public Health (MoPH) and its 
development partners initiated a new paradigm for the health sector by adopting 
performance-based contracting (PBC) of the Basic Package of Health Services 
(BPHS) to non-state providers (NSPs). This model is generally regarded as 
successful, but literature is scarce that examines the motivations underlying 
implementation and factors influencing program success. This paper uses relevant 
theories and qualitative data to describe how and why contracting out delivery of 
primary health care services to NSPs has been effective.  
The main aim of this study was to assess the contextual, institutional, and contractual 
factors that influenced the performance of NSPs delivering the BPHS in Afghanistan 
Methods: The qualitative study design involved individual in-depth interviews and 
focus group discussions conducted in six provinces of Afghanistan. The framework 
for assessing key factors of the contracting mechanism proposed by Liu et al. was 
utilised in the design, data collection and data analysis. 
Results: While some contextual factors facilitated the contracting out (e.g. MoPH 
leadership, NSP innovation and community participation), harsh geography, political 
interference and insecurity in some provinces had negative effects. Contractual 
factors, such as effective input and output management, guided health service 
delivery. Institutional factors were important; management capacity of contracted 
NSPs affects their ability to deliver outcomes. Effective human resources and 
pharmaceutical management were notable elements that contributed to the 
successful delivery of the BPHS.  
Conclusion: Three sets of factors influenced the implementation of the BPHS: 
contextual, contractual and institutional. The MoPH should consider all of these 
factors when contracting out the BPHS and other functions to NSPs. Other fragile 
states and countries emerging from a period of conflict could learn from Afghanistan’s 
example in contracting out primary health care services, keeping in mind that generic 
or universal contracting policies might not work in all geographical areas within a 
country or between countries. 
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4.1.2 Introduction 
Afghanistan has experienced profound difficulties over the past decades, especially 
since the 1978 invasion by the former Soviet Union which led to political instability, 
pervasive conflict and, at times, outright war. In 1992, the Mujahedeen (groups of 
religiously driven warriors) took power, initiating a new period of civil war and inter-
Mujahedeen conflicts. From 1996 until November 2001, the Taliban emerged as the 
ruling group in the country with a limited interest in the development of health systems 
(Sondorp 2004).  
In December 2001, a new democratic government was established in Afghanistan 
with international support. The new government inherited extreme disorder in the 
health sector. No policies were in place to guide the delivery of services, and there 
was a notable lack of coordination among the many actors working on health. The 
health sector was characterized by the absence of infrastructure, lack of capacity in 
the public sector, the shortage of health human resources, and inconsistency in the 
quality of services being delivered (Waldman and Newbrander 2014). Health 
outcomes were poor as a result of  the  disarray:  the  maternal  mortality  rate was  
one  of  the  highest  in the world (1600 per 100,000 live births) and the under-five 
mortality rate was one of the worst in the region (257 per1000 live births) (Bartlett et 
al. 2005).  Given these challenges, the development of a functioning health care 
system, which included a programme that prioritized maternal and child health, was 
deemed by the new government to be critically important.  
Six months after the new government took power, in May 2002, the Ministry of Public 
Health (MoPH) established a Basic Package of Health Services (BPHS) with technical 
support from donors and international organisations. The BPHS was designed to 
ensure equitable access to a core set of health services in remote and underserved 
populations. In recognition of the extent of its problems, the Afghan health sector 
adopted a new paradigm for operations. While health care services were regarded 
previously as a state responsibility, in 2002 the MoPH and its development partners 
decided to contract-out delivery of vital health care services to non-state providers 
(NSPs) (Hansen et al. 2008). This paradigm shift from input-based financing to 
results-based financing (RBF) was critically important given that, after decades of war, 
the newly-established government did not have sufficient capacity to deliver health 
care to the most underserved in the population. To rapidly scale up country-wide 
delivery of the BPHS, the MoPH needed NSPs (Loevinsohn and Sayed 2008). NSPs 
(both formal and informal) already provided a wide range of health care services and 
had extensive geographic reach. Formal NSPs such as non-governmental 
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organisations (NGOs) had extensive local networks, roots and experience providing 
health services in districts not controlled by the central government. NGOs - most of 
which had headquarters in Peshawar, Pakistan - had trained and supported Afghan 
health providers in many provinces and had gained the trust of communities. These 
NGOs were well-placed to assume more responsibility for delivering health care 
services (Newbrander et al. 2014). The MoPH launched BPHS implementation in 
2003 with financial support from the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID), the World Bank (WB), the European Union (EU) and others in 
the international community. 31 of 34 provinces were contracted with NSPs and were 
supported by different donors. As a result, different contracting mechanisms were 
established to implement standardized and unified BPHS across the country. The 
MoPH served as the steward and owner of the programme. 
Several years later, the reform’s impact was evident in increased health services 
coverage (defined in terms of having a health facility within walking distance), from 
9% in 2002 to 91.6% in 2018 (Ministry of Public Health and KIT Royal Tropical Institute 
2018). The country has also made improvements in health systems performance 
indicators, including maternal and child health (Akseer et al. 2016). Under-five and 
infant mortality rates have fallen from 257 and 165 in 2000 (Ministry of Public Health 
2006) to 55 and 45 live births in 2015 (Central Statistics Organization 2015), 
respectively, per 1,000 live births. Likewise, maternal mortality ratio (MMR) has 
witnessed a considerable decline (Ministry of Public Health, Central Statistics Office, 
ICF Macro 2011).   
Proponents of PBC in Afghanistan have regarded it as effective in rapidly scaling up 
health services throughout the country (Alfonso et al. 2015; Newbrander et al. 2014; 
Edward et al. 2011; Kim et al. 2016; Peters et al. 2007), but critics have expressed 
concerns about sustainability and cost-effectiveness (Trani et al. 2010; Mbaeyi et al. 
2017; Frost et al. 2016; Haidari, Zaidi, and Gul 2018). The factors that have promoted 
the success of contracting out to NSPs in Afghanistan are not yet well understood. 
Identifying these factors would provide important lessons for Afghanistan and, more 
generally, for comparative studies of health systems in fragile states. 
PBC of health services to NSPs is an increasingly prevalent trend in developing 
countries (Palmer 2000; Loevinsohn and Harding 2004). Liu et al. (Xingzhu Liu, 
Hotchkiss, and Bose 2008) systematically reviewed the effect of contracting out on 
primary health care services in low and middle-income settings. While they 
acknowledged that contracting out can help increase the use of services, they could 
not draw a conclusion on the effect of contracting on the other performance aspects 
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such as efficiency, quality and equity. They reported that contextual factors play a 
major role in the success and or failure of a PBC programme and it should be carefully 
examined when contracting programmes are assessed (Xingzhu Liu, Hotchkiss, and 
Bose 2008). In a similar effort, Lagarde and Palmer (Lagarde, Haines, and Palmer 
2009) reviewed the impact of PBC on the utilisation of health services in low and 
middle-income countries. The result of their review showed that PBC could increase 
the use of health services; however, in order to better understand the systematic 
differences in contracting mechanisms, assessing the processes of implementation is 
paramount important (Lagarde, Haines, and Palmer 2009). Loevinsohn and Harding 
conducted a comprehensive review of 10 contracting mechanisms in low-resource 
settings. They found that the systems for contracting needed to be adjusted to 
address specific needs in each country’s unique context. Moreover, the authors 
argue, optimal service delivery outcomes are likely to result under the following 
conditions: when the NGOs maintains autonomy from the state; when a focus is 
placed on outcomes, outputs and cost-effectiveness; and when rigorous evaluation 
of the contracted projects is planned for and conducted on a regular basis. They 
recommended examining PBC between different conditions and assessing cost-
effectiveness of PBC to learn about the sustainability of the model (Loevinsohn and 
Harding 2004). Odendall et al. (Odendaal et al. 2018), in a systematic review of 
contracting programmes, found no difference in contracting with the government-
provided services. They urged for conducting qualitative studies to assess the role of 
stakeholders in managing the contracts, the processes of implementation, and the 
mechanisms of effects of contracting out approach (Odendaal et al. 2018).  
A few studies have been conducted in Afghanistan on PBC. Only one review 
discussed contractual factors, such as how partners are selected and what payment 
mechanisms are used (Edward et al. 2011). Though this review focused on the level 
of quality of care provided by NGOs and identified some factors associated with 
variations in quality, it did not explore contextual or institutional factors related to the 
contracting structure.  
The present study aims to address this gap in the literature on health system 
development in Afghanistan with an in-depth evaluation of the factors underlying the 
successes and continuing challenges facing a health system in transition from post-
conflict development to long-term sustainability.  
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4.1.3 Methods 
Conceptual Framework 
Taking a political economy approach, our evaluation of Afghanistan’s PBC for BPHS 
used a conceptual framework developed by Liu et al. as a foundation and a guide 
for designing the study, developing data collection tools, and analysing data 
(Xingzhu Liu et al. 2004). Using the Liu et al. framework provided guidance on 
methodology. Further, it enables comparisons of the situation in Afghanistan with 
that of other contracting schemes in other contexts that have also been assessed 
using the same framework. While the specifics of the geographical and historical 
situation in Afghanistan are unique, adopting a tested and proven framework 
contributes to the validity of the findings and makes the findings comparable with 
other situations. 
As the Liu et al. framework suggests, this study seeks to develop an overview of the 
contextual, institutional and contractual arrangements that have influenced NSP 
performance (Figure 7) (Xingzhu Liu et al. 2004). The study identifies various factors 
and reviews programme performance measures, including “contractual factors”, 
“contextual factors” (or the external environment) and “institutional factors” such as 
hiring and retention of staff, and interactions between providers and purchaser. It 
seeks to capture both intended and unintended effects. 
In order to represent the varying contexts in Afghanistan, the research was 
conducted in six provinces: Balkh, Bamyan, Herat, Kabul, Kandahar, and Ningarhar. 
Aspects of the context included the level of security, geographical features, ethnic 
variations, the donors involved, and implementing NSP organisation. 
Data sources 
Three main data collection methods were used: desk review, individual interviews 
and focus group discussions.  
Desk Review 
Our literature review explored a range of documents pertaining to the research 
objectives, including addressing critical issues and major policy arguments related 
to the role of NSPs in Afghanistan. The desk review incorporated academic papers, 
gray literature, reports, and official policy documents. 
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Figure 7. Conceptual Framework (Xingzhu Liu et al. 2004) 
 
Qualitative data collection methods: KI interviews and FGDs 
Liu et al. noted that qualitative data provides rich insights on factors influencing 
programme effectiveness (Xingzhu Liu et al. 2004). In line with this comment, this 
study involves two qualitative data collection methods: in-depth interviews with key 
national and provincial stakeholders and focus group discussions with local-level 
stakeholders. We used a purposeful sampling technique to ensure diversity among 
our respondents (Patton 2002). The sampling plan was stratified according to 
different categories of stakeholders: representatives of the MoPH at both the central 
and provincial levels, donors, NSPs, health care workers, and health professional 
associations. The variety allowed the team to explore perceptions and ideas from a 
diverse group, identifying similarities and divergences across the respondent 
categories. The stakeholder and focus group interview guides were developed and 
translated into both Dari and Pashto local languages and then cross-translated, 
piloted, and corrected in order to finalize the study instrument. All interviews and 
discussions were conducted in either the Dari or Pashto language based on 
participant preference.  
Transcriptions were generally made on the same day or as soon as possible. In total, 
40 in-depth interviews and 6 FGDs across all categories of study participants were 
carried out. By design, we focused on health workers’ experiences with the results-
based contracting mechanism.  Table 7 lists all types of interviewees and their 
affiliations.   
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Table 7. Sampling frame for in-depth key informant interview 
Institution Interviewee Number Reason for Selection 
Central MoPH Deputy Minister of 
Policy and planning  
1 One of four people at MoPH who initiated the 
PBC and continues to oversee the provision of 
health services by NSPs 
 General Director 
Policy and Planning  
1 Has essential information on contextual, 
contractual and institutional standards and 
variations 
 Head of Health 
Management and 
Information System 
1 HMIS manages self-reported data from the 
NSPs on a monthly basis; the department has 
been involved since the start of the BPHS 
 Head of Monitoring 
& Evaluation 
1 The department works with the third-party 
evaluator to develop and oversee the 
Balanced Scorecard (BSC) 
 Head of Grant and 
Contract 
Management Unit 
(GCMU) 
1 GCMU was created specifically for the purpose 
of facilitating the contracting process; manages 
procurement, contract management and 
compliance evaluation of the NSPs for 
implementation of BPHS 
Provincial 
MoPH 
Provincial Liaison 
Director  
1 Responsible for coordinating provincial-level 
activities; can provide detail on provinces 
 Provincial Health 
Directors 
6 (one per 
province, 6 
provinces) 
Provide key information about the context, type 
of contract and institutional factors for the 
respective provinces 
Third Party 
Evaluator  
Evaluator 1 Assessed the performance of BPHS across 
the country from 2004 to 2013, applying BSC 
and conducting household surveys 
Donors (EU, 
USAID, WB) 
Health Team 
Leaders 
3 (3 main 
donors) 
Represent the interests and opinions of three 
main donors supporting the PBC 
NSPs NSP Managers, 
Kabul 
6 (one per 
province, 6 
provinces) 
Understand the type of contract in their 
province; provide key information about 
contractual arrangements, context and 
institutional factors 
 Provincial NSP 
Managers  
6 (one per 
province, 6 
provinces) 
Province-specific input to contextualize 
information and get field-level knowledge 
about each contracted NSP 
 Heads of health 
facilities  
12 (two per 
province, 6 
provinces)  
Views of frontline health workers on PBC and 
the contractual, institutional and contextual 
variations 
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The interviewees for in-depth interviews were selected using purposeful sampling 
that considered institutional affiliation (i.e. government or NSP), geographical 
distribution (representing all the provinces where the study was conducted), and 
function in the system (policy maker, manager or field level worker).  
Interviews were conducted at the respondents’ workplaces or other locations where 
the participants felt comfortable. The participants for the FGDs were also selected 
through a purposeful sampling process that sought to keep the composition of the 
FGDs constant across provinces. The members of each FGD were recruited based 
on pre-defined criteria and in collaboration with local health authorities. The FGDs 
were conducted in neutral settings where the participants could freely express 
themselves. Only the research team had access to the data collected and all 
interviews and FGDs were assigned codes to preserve anonymity when citing 
quotations. Characteristics of FGD participants are summarized in Table 8. 
Data analysis 
Interview transcriptions and field and diary notes were included in the data 
analysis. We used ‘content analysis’ to consider the key issues, elements and 
outcomes (Basit and Lwis 2003). Topics and concepts were identified, 
highlighted and placed in categories of association. Themes and statements 
were coded according to the conceptual framework. Representative quotes were 
selected and allocated to the relevant classifications. Common viewpoints 
were described, and particularly important responses were elucidated. Finally, 
each category was studied and discussed to develop interpretations of the 
data that addressed the aims and objectives of the study. 
Findings from the interviews and FGDs were triangulated with other data 
sources in three ways. First, we assessed the consistency of the findings 
generated using different data collection methods. Second, we examined the 
consistency of different data from the same method. For instance, we 
compared multiple sources’ perspectives about the procurement of medical 
supplies; a topic we discussed with donors, MoPH policy-makers and NSPs. 
Third, we used various perspectives and theoretical frameworks when 
interpreting the data. In all cases, we made sure that the personal opinions of 
the research team members were not reported as part of the results. 
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Table 8. Sampling frame for focus group discussions 
Institution Participant Numbe
r 
Reason for Selection 
MoPH Preventive 
Health Care 
(PHC) Officer 
1 Is aware of all the contractual and 
service delivery programmes in the 
province  
 HMIS Officer 1 Responsible for collection of data 
from all health facilities at the 
provincial level and relaying it to 
central HMIS in Kabul; collects all 
indicators of BPHS on a monthly 
basis 
 Reproductive 
Health Officer 
1 Provides technical perspective on 
components of BPHS related to 
maternal and child health services 
 Expanded 
Programme of 
Immunization 
(EPI) Officer 
1 EPI is the largest health programme 
in the country; officers are 
experienced and familiar with NSP 
service provision 
 
 
NSPs Deputy Project 
Manager 
1 Oversees monitoring and evaluation 
of all programmes under contract  
 Finance 
Manager  
1 Manages inputs and financial 
mechanisms of NSPs; understands 
provider payment mechanisms 
 Community 
Supervisor  
1 Provides views from community and 
frontline health workers 
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4.1.4 Results  
The results of the study are presented in line with the study’s main objective: to 
understand the key contextual, contractual and institutional factors that have 
influenced contracted NSPs’ performance in delivering the BPHS in Afghanistan. 
These factors are presented in briefly in Table 9. Each factor is discussed in 
detail in the following sections. 
Table 9. Factors assessed in this study 
Contextual Contractual Institutional 
Sociocultural 
environment 
Contractor selection External 
Political environment Contract duration Performance 
monitoring 
Legal and policy 
environment 
Contractual requirements  
 
Geography 
 
Type, formality and duration of 
services to be provided 
Payment mechanism 
 
Internal:  
Inputs, outputs 
and outcomes 
The Liu et al. framework proposes that creating an impact on the health status 
of a population through PBC depends on the interplay among three types of 
factors: contractual, contextual and institutional (X Liu, Hotchkiss, and Bose 
2007). When these three sets of factors interact effectively, the health system 
produces better outcomes, namely: quality, access and coverage of health 
services. These, in turn, combine to produce the final goals: improved and equitable 
health status of the population. For example, favorable contextual factors pave the 
way for a better contractual mechanism to function, which in turn smooths potential 
pitfalls faced by the institutions involved. The interactions among the three types of 
factors are therefore as centrally important as identifying and categorizing the 
factors. These interactions are depicted in Figure 8. 
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Figure 8. The interaction of various factors and their relationship with outcomes 
 
In the following sections, we describe how each factor contributes to 
improving the performance of the contracting mechanism for NSPs. We then 
discuss how their interaction produces impact. 
Contextual factors 
Contextual factors include any conditions that create either a conducive or an 
unfavourable environment for an effective programme of PBC. In 
Afghanistan, the sociocultural and geographic factors were long-standing 
conditions. On the other hand, the political changes that followed the fall of 
the Taliban created a new legal and policy foundation for PBC. Table 10 
summarises the contextual factors that emerged from the study data. 
Socio-cultural norms 
Socio-cultural norms at provincial level were identified by all categories of 
participants, from policy makers at the MoPH to donors to provincial and field-
level health workers, as a key factor influencing the delivery of health services. For 
example, in some provinces it is culturally unacceptable for a male health worker 
to examine a female patient. Coupled with a relative lack of women with higher 
education, leading to a shortage of local female health workers, this situation 
compromises health care access for women. In other provinces, different 
sociocultural rules about female modesty and gender apply. In these provinces, 
socio-cultural norms allow women to be examined by male health workers and 
as a result, women have better access to health care regardless of educational 
level. For instance, in Bamyan, women actively participate in the health care 
system, which is functioning. Women provide some health services, and female 
and male health workers working together is the norm. In other parts of the country, 
•Sociocultural
•Political
•Legal Framework
•Geographical
Contextual Factors
•Contract Formality
•Contract Duration
•Type of Services
•Contractee Selection
Contractual Factors
•Provider’s Response
•Purchaser Response
•Market Response
•Market Response 
Institutional Factors 
•Quality 
•Equity
•Access
Improved Outcomes
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such as Nooristan, this would not be considered culturally acceptable, requiring a 
different health system structure [MoPH-01]. 
Table 10. Summary of contextual factor findings 
Contextual factor Features (positive (+) or negative (−) impact) 
 
Contextual factor features 
affecting PBC sociocultural 
environment  
 
- Ethnic and religious traditions and cultures (+/-)                                       
- Traditional gender constructs (−) 
- Social capital and culture of community 
participation (+) 
 
Political, policy and legal 
environment 
- Capacity and structure of provincial health 
departments (+/-) 
- Influence of political leadership on hiring of staff 
and implementation of services (−) 
- Conflict and insecurity (−) 
- MoPH and central government’s enabling legal 
and policy environment (+) 
Geography (+/-) - Accessibility of health services to the population  
- Willingness of health professionals to serve in 
remote/insecure areas (+/-) 
- Ease of access for supplies (+/-) 
- Ease of access for monitoring (+/-) 
Political and security factors 
Successful leaders are marked by their ability to maintain close relationships with 
local people and agencies (Mukhopadhyay 2016). The level of, capacity at, and 
structure of, the provincial health department was mentioned by participants as a 
key element affecting the delivery of health services in general, and PBC in 
particular. Participants’ views were similar at the central and provincial levels. For 
instance, policymakers in Kabul felt that a provincial health director could facilitate 
better provision of health services by NSPs by making resources available and 
promoting the success of health service delivery efforts [MoPH-02]. The capacity 
and structure of the provincial health department is linked to other provincial 
leaders such as political figures, influential local residents and the provincial 
governor. However, all participants described unwanted political interference in 
decisions related to the delivery of health services, such as choosing where to 
deliver services, pushing for the hiring and firing of certain health workers or 
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contracting with specific companies for logistical support. One respondent stated:  
“Sometimes, the politicians interfere [with the implementation of 
the health services]. They recommend to the NGO an irrational 
establishment of a health centre. [As a result] underutilised clinics 
are created due to political reasons. The CHC [Comprehensive 
Health Centre] is established but population around it is not 
sufficient” [to reach the targeted number of clients]. [DPR-01] 
“Political interference has proven a key challenge to the programme, 
as NSPs have to work with local officials, warlords, members of 
Parliament and other influential members of the community on a 
regular basis.” [MGR-03]. 
Provision of services by NSPs was also considered a challenge to government 
authority. Several provincial government officials interviewed reported that the PBC 
had undermined the role of the government in service provision, consequently 
calling into question the legitimacy of the government. Government officials 
expressed concern that the population only perceives that the services are 
provided by NSPs and does not understand the government’s role in 
providing health care services [PPHD-06] [PPHD-04]. 
Respondents in all categories unanimously stressed that security is an essential 
factor in creating an enabling environment for the effective provision of health 
services by NSPs. Respondents from Ningarhar and Kandahar expressed the 
most concern about security. Insecurity is debilitating to the delivery of health 
care. Several interviewees described the impact of worsening security in some 
provinces after 2007. Increasing insecurity in these areas affected both the delivery 
of services and reduced the ability of the MoPH to conduct monitoring and 
supervision [MoPH-02]. Those NSPs with long-established relationships with 
local communities had generally managed to continue delivering services 
even in areas controlled by anti-government groups, although many incidents 
were mentioned when clinics had to close or were even attacked, during a local 
conflict. A respondent from one of the least secure areas summarized the problem: 
“War, and the local situation, have a huge impact on health 
services. If somewhere there is war and the situation is not 
normal, then an NGO can’t find qualified staff and can’t provide 
health services”. [PPHD-06] 
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Geography 
Geographical features also have a significant impact on the reach and 
effectiveness of health services. Each province of Afghanistan has distinct 
geographic characteristics that affect the distribution of health facilities and 
provision of health services. It is particularly difficult to guarantee regular 
supplies of medicines and medical equipment in hard-to-reach areas in 
mountainous regions. The difficult geography is compounded by challenges 
created by the climate. NSPs have to plan ahead to maintain services during 
often long periods of road closures in winter. 
Many NSPs, therefore, prefer to provide services in regions that are easier to 
access. NSPs with contracts to deliver health services in regions with harsh 
geography need to develop innovative strategies, in particular, to incentivize 
recruitment and retention of health professionals willing to work in difficult 
conditions. Several participants from NSPs mentioned instances when they had 
to offer more benefits to get staff to accept positions in hard-to-reach areas. This 
was particularly the case for female doctors, whose packages might include also 
hiring the doctor’s husband, providing hardship payments and offering special 
vacation opportunities [PMGR-03]. One participant described: 
NGOs’ salary rates are according to geographical grading. It’s 
different in different provinces. The hard-to-reach areas and 
conflict-affected areas have more salary. [HW-303] 
Contextual factors lay the foundation on which institutional responses are 
built and in terms of which the contractual factors are defined. 
Contractual factors 
The category of contractual factors includes various aspects of the 
contracting mechanism: types of services covered, contract formality, 
contract duration, contractor selection, specifications of requirements, 
processes of contract implementation, output and outcome indicators and 
finally the contract payment mechanism. 
Types of services 
Respondents were generally able to describe the main types of services 
contracted out by the government to NSPs and those provided directly such as 
provincial hospital services. One focus group agreed: 
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“The Basic Package of Health Services provided in [our] province 
includes all the BPHS components, such as maternal and 
neonatal health services, immunisation and child health services, 
public nutrition, control of communicable diseases services, 
mental health and disability health services, and pharmaceutical 
services. There is also EPHS, which provides secondary health 
services through the regional hospital in [a neighboring] 
province.” [FGD-02] 
Some respondents also mentioned contracting of capacity building programmes 
and research projects. 
Contract formality 
MoPH policymakers expressed generally favourable perspectives on the PBC. 
Several respondents mentioned that the selection process established for PBC 
and the creation of the Grants and Contracts Management Unit (GCMU) had 
become examples that other national sectors seek to follow [MoPH-02] [PPHD-
02]. From the outset, the BPHS programme has emphasized formality in its 
contracts. They require NSPs to abide by all governmental laws (after 
undergoing a rigorous selection process). These structures enabled the NSPs 
and the government alike to trust each other and fostered reliability of the 
services. 
Contract duration 
Both NSP managers and MoPH officials interviewed noted that contract 
durations differed by donor and that contracts were commonly extended beyond 
the original contractual agreement. While the initial contract durations ranged 
from 18 to 36 months (with an average of   26 months), extensions lengthened 
them. One MoPH official explained: 
“The durations are different, normally between two and three 
years. But these [contracts] were extended. Even if it is for three 
years, it is subject to the evaluation by the [third party] 
organisations. Performance review is a condition for the 
extension. There were extensions up to five years. The small 
project [non-BPHS] did not last more than six or seven months.” 
[MOPH-02] 
Respondents had mixed reactions towards the extensions. Some argued that the 
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extensions of contracts had a positive effect on service delivery by preventing 
disruptions that would occur with another long tendering process.  This view was 
supported by NSPs, who stressed that the longer an NSP worked in a given 
location, the stronger their relationship with the community [PMGR-02]. 
However, others presented a different viewpoint. This view was widely 
expressed by provincial MoPH authorities, who reported that following an 
extension the NSPs tended to relax, undertaking fewer quality improvement 
efforts or innovations [PPHD-05]. Another concern raised about contract 
extensions was that they reduce competition, undermining its benefits. 
Contractor selection and parties to the contracts  
Funding for the contracts comes from multiple donors with the MoPH now 
serving as the purchaser; in the earlier stages of the PBC programme, donors 
interacted directly with NSPs believing that the government lacked the requisite 
capacity for financial management and procurement. Indeed, some donors 
temporarily used their own mechanisms for procurement of NSPs until the 
government’s procurement capacity was ready to manage a large programme 
like the BPHS [PPHD-01]. Once the MoPH had developed the capacity to handle 
procurement for large scale programmes, a unified system was developed with 
the leadership of the MoPH. This transition occurred gradually, beginning with 
the 2003 transfer to GCMU of contract management for all the World Bank 
funded provinces. In 2010, USAID delegated its contract management to the 
MoPH, as did the EU in 2013 (Newbrander et al. 2014). 
The study reviewed the contract specifications from the MoPH. According to 
these documents, the process for contracting to NSPs is well-designed and clear. 
The process is governed by the MoPH with active participation from relevant 
stakeholders, including provincial health directors. A selection committee (GCMU 
officers, provincial health director, UN agency representative and MoF 
representative) reviews and awards contracts, while the administrative aspects 
are managed by GCMU. 
While the process seemed clear on paper, interviewees expressed concerns. Some 
respondents suggested that there was little real competition. Some felt that the 
participation of provincial health directors were merely symbolic; moreover, MoPH 
officials at both central and provincial levels expressed concern that a small number 
of Provincial Public Health Directors (PPHDs) were unable to be impartial. 
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Specification of contract requirements 
BPHS documents specify the services to be provided by NSPs. They detail the 
requirements for all processes, inputs and monitoring, as well as targets for outputs 
and outcomes. Among our respondents, MoPH managers, donors and central NSP 
managers had more precise knowledge of these details than health workers and 
provincial managers. 
Implementation of contracted services 
The process for implementing health services is specified by the BPHS 
implementation guidelines. Each contract includes a log frame and approved and 
agreed-on indicators that help guide implementation and monitoring and evaluation 
of the performance of NSPs. Thus, there is a common understanding between the 
government purchaser (MoPH) and the NSP contractors about what types of 
services are to be provided and how they should be implemented [MoPH-03]. 
In this study, all groups of respondents demonstrated high levels of awareness of 
performance specifications and most discussed performance indicators. The 
responses from NSP employees in particular showed that these indicators play a 
meaningful role in ensuring that services are delivered per the plans and 
expectations of the contracts [PMGR-01], [PMGR-02], [PMGR-03], [PMGR-04], 
[PMGR-05], [PMGR-06]. 
Output and outcome indicators 
Each contract includes specific and clear target output and outcome indicators. 
These contribute to transparency and clarity on how to measure activities and 
facilitate quantification of the services provided by NSPs. Output indicators may 
include number of health workers trained, number of health education sessions 
conducted or number of institutional deliveries. Output targets are based on the 
population of a clinic catchment area. Provincial targets are set using provincial 
population data. Outcome indicators are captured and measured separately by third 
party evaluators using the Balanced Score Card (BSC). The BSC has six domains 
(Rowe et al. 2014).  
Outputs are the primary focus for USAID-funded contracts, which reimburse NSPs 
for services delivered. This payment system facilitates evaluation, as data are 
reported. The World Bank funded contracts, on the other hand, are based on lump-
sum contracts and emphasize outcome indicators. One Ministry official 
explained: 
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“The three donors have had different performance indicators. 
For USAID, input process and output and outcome indicators 
were used. We had a datasheet that contained both output and 
outcome indicators. The World Bank had more focus on 
outcome indicators and did not emphasize process or inputs. EU 
was in between, with a tendency towards outcomes.” [MOPH-
02] 
Contract payment mechanism 
As noted, two mechanisms have been used to pay contracted NSPs: lump-sum 
payment and cost-reimbursable payment. The World Bank funded projects were 
contracts with a lump-sum payment mechanism, as one respondent described: 
“The contract was lump-sum, with some flexibility in movement 
across the budget lines. The staff is provided with salary and 
money for some other items, such as running cost, maintenance 
and emergency medicine.” [PMGR-04] 
The cost-reimbursable payment mechanism, on the other hand, is the main 
model under USAID. In USAID-supported provinces, payments were made 
based on reported outputs. 
The EU contracts fell between the two distinct models. They were cost-
reimbursable, but with a greater focus on performance outcomes rather than 
inputs and outputs. 
NSPs managers we interviewed expressed preferences for the lump-sum 
mechanism, which they see as offering more flexibility and less rigorous reporting 
and monitoring [PMGR-02, FGD-01]. However, this mechanism risks making 
evaluation using reported data more difficult. Respondents from the government, 
therefore, generally preferred a reimbursable mechanism, which entails more 
scrutiny and closer supervision of the NSPs [MOPH-02, PPHD-05]. 
The choice of payment mechanism can affect performance. With lump-sum 
payments, NSPs have more freedom in terms of their implementation processes. 
They have latitude to initiate innovative approaches to attain the contractually 
agreed upon outcomes. However, it also creates more opportunities to diverge 
from the contract. 
With the launch of the SEHAT programme (2013), however, all payment 
mechanisms are lump sum. However, “lump-sum” may mean different things to 
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different partners. One respondent highlighted this conundrum: 
“Everyone talks about lump-sum mechanism but still there is not 
enough clarity about it. NGOs have their own definition where they 
want more freedom and flexibility, while MoPH has its own 
definition trying to make NGOs more accountable. Both parties 
should come together and decide what they mean.” [MoPH-02] 
Frontline health workers understood “payment mechanism” in reference to their 
salaries, regardless of the contract model used to support the payroll. One 
provincial manger described: 
“The payment mechanism for the employees is working in such a 
way that first the reports from the health facilities are collected by 
the NGO. Then, the reports are analyzed and the financial report 
is prepared and finally, the employee payment is deposited into 
their bank accounts on a monthly basis. In the past, this payment 
mechanism was different. The staff payments were processed in 
the form of a cash transfer.” [PMGR-03]. 
The payment systems for employees have evolved. In the first few years, NSPs 
determined salaries based on their budgets. In 2005, a national salary scale was 
established by the MoPH that standardized payments across the provinces and 
organisations. Most health workers interviewed thought that a Results-Based 
Financing (RBF) approach would be more appealing than a fixed salary, because 
they would get both a basic standard salary and extra payment based on 
performance [HW-05]. 
The contractual factors establish parameters for how contractors respond to 
contextual factors and set limits within which the institutional factors operate. 
Institutional factors 
We classified institutional factors in two categories: internal responses (created 
by either the  purchaser  or  the contractor) and external responses (X Liu, 
Hotchkiss, and Bose 2007). Internal responses are further divided into three sub-
categories: 1) managing inputs, 2) managing outputs and outcomes, 3) 
performance monitoring. External response sub-categories are: 1) provider market 
and 2) public service. 
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Internal institutional factors 
Managing inputs, outputs and outcomes 
These factors address NSPs’ various approaches to using the inputs they 
receive under the contract to implement health services. Human resources 
management, our respondents reported, is a pivotal and highly challenging 
aspect of contract management for NSPs [MoPH-02, MoPH-03, PMGR-01, 
PMGR-02]. While national regulations and contract specifications exist to 
regulate hiring (and firing) of staff employed under the contract, some flexibility 
exists and further exceptions can be made. This enables NSPs to avoid lengthy 
government human resource management procedures, resulting in more 
efficient provision of quality health services. The contracts oblige NSPs to 
provide a list of key staff to the MoPH in advance; field officers and health 
workers must be recruited as soon as possible once the project starts. NSPs are 
responsible for filling vacancies and planning coverage for staff vacations 
[PMGR-01]. 
Health workers’ commitment to the project has been a persistent challenge. 
Despite the fact that the number of health workers trained has increased 
exponentially in all categories (doctors, nurses, midwives and others) since 
2003, the country continues to face a shortage of health human resources. 
NSPs are authorized under their contracts to offer relatively high salaries 
based on the National Salary Policy; however, the rate of staff turnover was high 
in some provinces. As mentioned, finding women to fill key field positions proved 
particularly challenging for NSPs [FGD-01]. 
NSPs described effective and innovative responses to human resource 
management issues. One effective strategy was to hire staff from neighbouring 
countries to be deployed in Afghanistan. On other occasions, NSPs consulted with 
the MoPH to create attractive payment packages for serving in difficult to reach 
areas [PMGR-04, HW-10]. 
Equipment and medical supplies are also critical inputs. However, these were 
less frequently discussed in our interviews. The importance of on-time and 
regular supply was noted, as was the key challenge with equipment: 
maintenance. Although biomedical engineers and companies with post-
purchase services are present in Kabul, they generally unavailable outside the 
capital city. Instruments that break down are not repaired in a timely way, leaving 
health care providers without important tools. As mentioned in the geography 
 148 
 
factors, health centres located in hard-to-reach terrains also face seasonal 
challenges, as NSPs must receive sufficient medical and pharmaceutical 
supplies to last through the winter [HW-201] [MGR-01]. 
Pharmaceuticals are vital inputs to health services. The availability of medicines in 
a health facility is one key indicator of functionality; stock-outs limit effectiveness of 
health services and undermine patient satisfaction. Respondents reported that the 
purchase of medicines is a critical issue in the provision of inputs for NSPs. Two 
mechanisms were used for purchasing medicines. One is the centralized 
purchasing system recommended under USAID grants. In USAID-funded 
provinces, medicines were procured from internationally accredited companies by 
Management Sciences for Health (MSH) or another organisation and distributed to 
provinces in response to requests from NSPs. This model emphasizes ensuring 
quality of medicines. The alternative model is a decentralized mechanism that 
provides NSPs with funds to purchase medicines directly from certified 
pharmaceutical companies according to criteria provided by the MoPH. This model 
provides more flexibility for NSPs and reduces the risk of stock-outs [MoPH-02]. 
Since all provinces were brought under the SEHAT project, all medicines 
purchases are now decentralized. One respondent, however, felt that the most 
efficacious mechanism still needs to be determined. While the various donors 
had different preferences regarding purchasing, representatives of NSPs 
indicated that they prefer the decentralized system because it allows them to 
procure pharmaceuticals from the local market on a regular basis [PMGR-09]. 
Infrastructure is another input that affects the effective provision of services. 
Because the construction of new health centers is expensive, it is generally 
not included in NSPs’ proposals. This situation originates from two flaws in 
the contracts’ legal framework. First and foremost, NSPs seek to minimize 
costs to reduce the total budget of their proposals to make them more 
attractive bids. Second, the procurement policies of both the government and 
donors discourage infrastructure development. However, in 2003, the USAID 
provided funding to construct a large number of health facilities across the 
country. Where government facilities are not available to serve as health 
centers, some NSPs rent local houses or other buildings and convert them 
into health facilities. This, according to some respondents, is the most 
common practice for a swift startup. 
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Performance monitoring 
Our interviews found that most stakeholders have a positive impression of 
performance monitoring for PBC. A national HMIS system and third-party 
evaluations are included in the contracts to track input, output and outcome 
measures, as well as to assess overall impact. 
The HMIS is based on a set of indicators gathered at the health facility level by 
frontline health workers, such as the number of deliveries that occurred in the 
health centres or were assisted by skilled birth attendants and the number of 
children vaccinated through routine immunisations. However, since the HMIS 
data are based on self-reports from providers, their quality and accuracy were 
called into question by some respondents. The new system for HMIS data 
verification, which involves a third party, received positive feedback from some 
respondents, who indicated that it is helping to improve the reliability of HMIS 
data [DPR-02, FGD-01]. 
A second concern with HMIS data is its usefulness for decision-making. Some 
respondents mentioned that HMIS data are indeed informing decision making at 
different levels, from the individual health facility to the ministerial level. One policy 
area in which HMIS data is considered highly valuable is in the rationalisation of 
distribution of health facilities. HMIS data provide information to help assess 
whether, considering both the investment costs and the needs of communities, 
proposed locations or functionality levels of new health centres are rational. 
Respondents reported that NSPs have also created systems to utilize collected 
data in improving the delivery of health services at different levels. Data collected 
from clinics are analyzed and presented back to health facility managers on 
monthly and quarterly basis. Any indicators that have not been achieved are 
highlighted and corrective measures discussed. For instance, if the number of 
deliveries in a facility is low, the NSP conducts a follow-up assessment to 
understand why. This informs decision making on how to address problems so 
corrective measures can be integrated into the plans for the next cycle. 
In summary, the MoPH in collaboration with donors and its development partners 
has established a comprehensive, intensive and responsive HMIS to measure and 
provide timely feedback on the contracted NSPs’ performance on indicators. Some 
concerns remain about the quality of the data and the efficiency of M&E processes. 
However, on the whole, the system covers all aspects of the project and is well 
integrated, thus constituting the backbone of PBC for health services. 
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External (provider market) responses to the scheme 
The contracting approach to health service delivery has affected three provider 
types: not-for-profit NSPs, for-profit NSPs and the government. Because health 
services have been contracted only to not-for-profit organisations thus far, the 
first category is discussed in more detail than the other two. 
Non-profit NSPs 
Most of the interviewees agreed that PBC has improved competition and quality 
among NSPs delivering health services in Afghanistan. Previously, each NSP 
had its own donors and catchment areas, and they paid little attention to 
competing with each other. The advent of the PBC process revolutionised the 
provider market and drastically changed the context. NSPs now had the 
opportunity to apply for BPHS contracts for specific locations and periods of time, 
while the funding from all donors was aggregated in one basket fund and 
channeled through one bidding mechanism. 
One positive outcome of the shift to PBC has been the provision of growth 
opportunities to new and local NSPs. Local NSPs are increasingly winning bids, 
as one respondent described: 
“For example, in the beginning [before the start of outsourcing 
health services], there were few organisations in the health sector 
[with the capacity] to manage health facilities, but now by 
contracting there are many local NSPs who could properly manage 
around 90 health facilities at a time.” [PMGR-06] 
Our study revealed two perspectives on the roles of NSPs in Afghanistan. One 
perspective expressed by NSP managers and some MoPH officials focused on 
the positive outcomes and impact of health services delivered. In contrast, 
however, some MoPH provincial staff expressed antagonism towards NSPs, 
referring to cases when NSPs did not fulfil their requirements effectively or 
efficiently [PPHD-05]. 
Thus, while some see the increase in the number of NSPs as a positive 
outcome, others remain skeptical and concerned about having too many NSPs 
in the market. The debate is currently of paramount significance, as local public 
health departments have begun arguing that the government should contract 
with the public health directorates at the sub-national level, instead of NSPs, for 
service delivery. At the same time, debate is occurring at the cabinet-level 
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regarding the merits of the contracting the NSPs and the option to switch to a 
contract-in mechanism [FGD-01]. One interviewee expressed reservations 
about the motivations of some involved in the debate: 
“I have a concern about PPHDs. Although PPHDs are the owners of 
the projects, they have a negative competition with NGOs [and] they 
are dissatisfied all the time and show jealousy towards NSPs 
because they [PPHDs] could not implement such projects.” [PMGR-
09] 
Other respondents expressed their opinion that provincial-level teams should 
focus on their roles as regulatory and enforcement bodies, providing leadership 
and monitoring for BPHS programmes rather than implementation. 
For-profit NSPs 
BPHS has so far never been contracted to a for-profit company or organisation, 
although there is no regulation against it. The for-profit private sector market has 
been affected nevertheless by contracting of NSPs. Some respondents 
suggested that for-profit companies have been restricted to providing secondary 
and tertiary health services in urban settings because they cannot compete with 
government-supported primary health centres in rural areas: 
“In my province, the for-profit organisations could not grow 
because most of the services are provided by health centers 
supported by the government and as a result, there is no place 
for them.” [PPHD-5] 
As a result, for-profit health centers remain weak in provision of primary 
health services. Other respondents felt, however, that the private sector has 
grown stronger where NSPs failed to provide quality health services. In 
these areas, patients seek services from the for-profit private sector when 
they are not well cared for or not satisfied at primary health centres [PPHD-
06]. 
Government’s response 
The impact of the PBC programme on the Afghan government’s capacity and 
service delivery arrangements were evaluated positively by respondents. 
Interviewees highlighted two aspects. First, they stated that the programme 
helped the MoPH prove itself to be a public agency capable of managing large 
projects at the national level. Second, respondents pointed to improvements 
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made in government capacity to conduct procurement and financial 
management [FGD-01]. These capacities will enable the government to continue 
implementing services into the future, as one respondent described: 
“Contracting mechanism had its positive impact at the level of 
MoPH: its capacity improved in contract management. This 
system encourages the government to improve its capacity to 
implement [something] such [as] this project.” [PMGR-04] 
Some respondents also described how PBC had boosted the economy by 
providing capacity-building opportunities to health workers, creating jobs, 
supporting local pharmaceutical and medical supply markets, and encouraging 
competition among providers. Whether the government can and should itself 
become a competitor, providing health services is still under evaluation. It could 
be a good option in the long run, but for now, the MoPH is successfully 
supporting NSPs to provide health services [MoPH-03]. 
4.1.5 Discussion 
The present study offers a theoretically sound and in-depth qualitative exploration 
of the contextual, contractual and institutional factors that affect the 
implementation of contracting out health services to NSPs. These factors form 
the key elements of a framework used frequently for evaluating contracting of 
health services (X Liu, Hotchkiss, and Bose 2007). The framework suggests that 
interactions among the many factors in the framework can result in better health 
care delivery, which in turn improves health impact. This study also did not look 
at health impact directly; however, it projects that the collective impact of these 
and possibly other factors have had positive impacts on health in the regions of 
Afghanistan receiving the services. Maternal mortality and child mortality rates 
improved considerably. The Afghanistan Mortality Survey (AMS), conducted in 
2010, also showed improvements in the overall health of the population 
compared to the data from a survey in 2002 (Ministry of Public Health, Central 
Statistics Organization, ICF Macro, Indian Institute of Health Management 
Research 2010; Bartlett et al. 2005). 
Our findings on how contextual factors affect the PBC process are aligned with 
others’ findings. Mills proposed that the social, economic and political 
environment can facilitate or restrict a successful PBC programme (Mills 1988). 
For example, if the legal system, banking system and government procedures 
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are weak, contracting will be difficult (Mills 1988). Another study proposed that 
the state and private sectors can play an important role in creating a conducive 
environment for the smooth implementation of PBC services (Kadaï et al. 2006). 
Our study followed Liu et al. by categorizing contextual factors into political, 
geographical, and economic and sociocultural factors in the external environment 
(Xingzhu Liu et al. 2004). We expanded the external environment also to include 
climate and security concerns; we recommend that other researchers applying 
the Liu et al. framework in a fragile and conflict-affect setting also expand their 
focus to include these or other relevant contextual determinants. 
The health care delivery programme in Afghanistan was designed to promote 
equity, focusing on reaching poor people and individuals living in remote areas 
with health services. However, we found that insecurity (including risk and fear of 
violence, being killed or kidnapped, and the presence of armed conflict in general) 
was one of the main factors adversely affecting the PBC health services. Similar 
trends are reported elsewhere. For example, a study of post-conflict health reform 
in Uganda enumerated insecurity and lack of institutional capacity as 
predominant factors affecting the process of building up the health system (Kadaï 
et al. 2006). Newbrander, Waldman and Sheperd-Banigan (2011) emphasized 
security as a critical determinant for a successful PBC programme. These 
authors also point out that conflict areas may require different types of health 
services from peaceful areas. Our study supports this: the full package of health 
services has been provided in more secure provinces in Afghanistan, while 
insecure areas may only receive emergency services. 
In Afghanistan, NSPs were needed to support the urgent delivery of health 
services that the government was not in a position to provide. The legal 
framework in Afghanistan, paired with support from the government, enabled the 
initiation and implementation of contracting NSPs (Batley and Mcloughlin 2010), 
although resistance and tension at the outset of the PBC programmes were 
reported. Newbrander et al. reported that some NSPs were concerned about 
maintaining their independence (Batley and Mcloughlin 2010); another tension 
comes from the concern that there is a dichotomy between state-building and 
delivery of services through NSPs (Batley and Mcloughlin 2010). 
Institutional factors, such as management of human resources, also influence 
the success of PBC. Newbrander et al. described human resource management 
as a central aspect of contracting out (Hansen et al. 2008; Newbrander et al. 
2014; Arur et al. 2010). They suggested that to improve human resources 
 154 
 
requires establishing collaborations with training institutions and transitioning 
towards certification/accreditation programmes (Edward et al. 2011). The 
shortage of health workers in all categories was reported as a key challenge in 
our study; however, contracted NSPs have coordinated with the MoPH to identify 
innovative solutions. Some proved more successful than others, finding female 
health workers willing to serve in hardship posts remains a significant challenge, 
as is the supply of pharmaceuticals. The shortage of female health workers has 
also been described by the MoPH and others (Hansen et al. 2008; Newbrander 
et al. 2014; Arur et al. 2010; Peters et al. 2007).  
NSPs and the MoPH have also collaborated to address challenges with other 
institutional factors such as procurement mechanisms. Stock-outs and low-
quality medicines at facilities reduce patient satisfaction and can lead to declines 
in outpatient visits. Purchasing from local markets through a decentralized 
mechanism improves the availability of medicines but may undermine quality. 
Study participants extensively discussed the institutional approaches to 
performance monitoring, noting that a significant amount of energy and 
resources are invested in measuring progress of contracted programmes. M&E 
of the performance of NSPs contributes to accountability and the effective 
provision of services. The government emphasizes close monitoring of inputs, 
outputs and outcomes of health services contracted out to NSPs; NSPs have 
complied with these requirements. At central and provincial levels, the MoPH 
utilizes various monitoring mechanisms through its M&E department, the HMIS 
programme and GCMU administrative procedures. Independent evaluations 
conducted by external organisations and based on BSCs are another hallmark 
of the PBC programme. NSPs have developed their own M&E systems to 
comply with their contractual requirements (Kim et al. 2016). Edward et al. 
emphasized the pivotal role of BSCs in improving transparency, governance and 
NSP performance benchmarking (Edward et al. 2015). The important 
contributions of the HMIS in monitoring NSPs’ performance have also been 
emphasized by numerous authors over the past decade (Hansen et al. 2008; 
Newbrander et al. 2014; Arur et al. 2010; Peters et al. 2007). Outside the PBC 
programme, the health care provider market has been affected by contracting 
health services to NSPs. Contracting created new opportunities and competition 
on quality and cost of services among the not-for-profit NSPs bidding to provide 
BPHS and EPHS services. International NSPs have increasingly been under bid 
by local NSPs, whose administrative and overhead costs are lower. The impact 
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on for-profit health care providers seems mixed. Contracting reduced the market 
share of for-profit organisations providing primary health services, but private 
clinics and hospitals reportedly remain effective in providing specialized medical 
services. Contracting has, as yet, changed little for the government as a health 
care provider. Except in three provinces, the government is not competing with 
NSPs to provide primary care. 
Liu et al. proposed that contracting has an impact on contestability in the provider 
market, improving the environment for competition among providers (Liu, 
Hotchkiss, and Bose 2007). Our findings concur with this in the case of the not-
for-profit NSPs providing primary health care. For-profit organisations, on the 
other hand, focus on secondary and tertiary health services (Liu, Hotchkiss, and 
Bose 2007; Amare et al. 2009). We suggest further research be undertaken to 
understand how to better involve the private for-profit sector in the provision of 
primary health services. 
Key recommendations to policymakers for addressing all three sets of factors 
are presented in Table 11.  
Liu et al. (Liu, Hotchkiss, and Bose 2007) note that systematically 
understanding the interaction of factors requires comparators; this was 
beyond the scope of this individual country-level analysis. Other limitations 
related to three aspects of the research process. The study design focused 
on collecting and analysing qualitative data to generate an in-depth picture of 
the contracted health care delivery system in Afghanistan. However, the 
findings could also have been triangulated with quantitative data, in particular to 
understand the PBC programme’s outcomes. 
Execution was limited by insecurity, the geographic size of the catchment areas 
and difficulties posed by transportation. Further, given time and resource 
limitations, the qualitative research design used purposive sampling of provinces 
and participants in order to capture a breadth of experiences in terms of payment 
mechanisms, contracting processes and KIs’ roles. However, we cannot make 
claims about how common or widespread any of the perspectives were. During 
data collection, we faced particular challenges when interviewing PPHDs. In 
some cases, they lacked institutional memory about PBC, while others were not 
reachable. In an exceptional case, one director of health was interviewed while 
hospitalized and recovering from a roadside explosion. 
Finally, our main objective in this study was to present a description of the 
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factors influencing a specific intervention. However, analyzing interactions 
among the factors proved beyond of the scope of this study. Future studies are 
recommended to delve further into this. 
Our relatively narrow case study on the BPHS allowed us an in-depth view of 
the factors that affect PBC’s performance. We omitted discussion of the PBC of 
EPHS or other programmatic, training and research services. We sought to 
highlight this gap by mentioning them in the background section and recognize 
that they present areas for additional research. 
4.1.6 Conclusion 
PBC to provide the BPHS has been a successful strategy in Afghanistan that is 
influenced by many factors.  We recommend that the MoPH considers various 
factors beyond the BPHS specifications when developing contracts to deploy 
NSPs. In particular, a universal BPHS policy may not work equally well in all 
provinces. Province-specific criteria for selecting and contracting NSPs could 
strengthen BPHS implementation. In addition, awarding multiple contracts to a 
single NSP may lead to a monopoly, resulting in inefficiency. We recommend that 
the MoPH explores engaging with the private for-profit and government sectors 
for BPHS service provision in order to engage a wider range of stakeholders, with 
their own innovative and creative approaches, to reach all Afghan citizens with 
accessible quality primary health care services. 
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Table 11. Recommendations derived from the study findings 
Contract 
Specification  
 
- Hire a third party to conduct evaluation of the intended outcomes  
- Include clear selection criteria 
Contract Formality - Establish a unit/mechanism to ensure that the criteria are enforced 
Payment Mechanism - Install a unified and homogenous payment mechanism at the outset 
 
Political Context 
- Foster political will for initiating and enforcing contracting out - this is 
the single most important and appropriate legal framework exists 
- Ensure that appropriate legal framework exists 
- Develop mechanisms to limit inappropriate interference by local 
government leaders 
Geographical Context - Establish a contracting out system that acknowledges, respects and 
addresses geographical variations and relevant adaptations 
Security Context      For a country in a conflict or post-conflict situation: 
- Ensure that NSPs fully understand the risks of service provision in 
insecure areas and the difficulties likely to arise 
- Establish direct and clear communication with all partners and 
stakeholders on all sides of the conflict 
Internal Response: 
Input, output and 
outcome 
management 
- Explore innovative approaches to recruitment of female health 
workers to address access issues 
- Improve pharmaceutical procurement management and monitoring 
to avoid stock-out and low-quality medicines 
- Focus on making observable change in the health of communities. 
Enhance patient satisfaction by monitoring behaviour of health 
workers and managers 
Internal Response: 
Performance 
monitoring 
- Use multiple triangulation methods to assure quality of data 
- Establish a single department and system responsible for all 
performance monitoring 
- Align monitoring and evaluation mechanisms among NSPs, 
government and donors 
External Response: 
Provider market 
- Develop and implement policies that prevent a few large organisations 
from monopolizing health care delivery 
- Encourage economies of scale by coordinating multiple contracts to 
any individual NSP 
- Identify strategies to engage the for-profit sector in the provision of 
health services 
Overall - Consider multiple factors when contracting out to NSPs 
- Recognize that a universal BPHS policy might not be appropriate 
across the country; province-specific criteria could strengthen 
implementation 
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4.2.1 Abstract  
Performance-based financing (PBF) has attracted considerable attention in recent 
years in low and middle-income countries. Afghanistan implemented a PBF 
programme between 2010 and 2015 to strengthen the utilisation of maternal and child 
health services in primary health facilities. The programme had some effects on the 
utilisation and quality of maternal and child services. However, the impact of PBF on 
utilisation was minimal. In this study, we examined Afghanistan’s PBF programme 
using a political economy analysis (PEA). Thus far, despite the rapid expansion of 
PBF programmes globally, there have been few studies assessing the political 
economy dimension of PBF in low-income settings and fragile and conflict-affected 
states (FCASs). We used a PEA framework which aims to understand the main 
dynamics that influence the adoption and design of a policy and facilitates the 
exploration of policy processes and the roles played by key actors at various stages 
of implementation. Retrospective qualitative research methods were employed in this 
study. Stratified purposive sampling was used to recruit groups that were 
homogenous (PBF actors) but was likely to demonstrate variations in their 
perspectives, roles and positions. The data comprised transcripts of key informant 
interviews and a review of PBF related documents. This study highlighted a number 
of contextual factors including global and local forces supporting the introduction of 
PBF in Afghanistan. The process underlying the design and implementation of the 
PBF programme was a result of power and resource dynamics between PBF 
programme actors (e.g. MoPH, donor, NSPs, healthcare workers). Finally, the MoPH 
support for PBF adoption was partly linked to their past positive experience of 
performance-based contracting (path dependency). However, the health system 
lacked adequate capacity to manage the PBF programme on a large scale. This study 
makes an important contribution to the global literature through its focus on a low-
income setting and a fragile and conflict-affected state where numerous forces have 
combined to bring a programme into existence and have influenced its 
implementation and outcome. Future studies are required to focus on conducting 
empirical research to understand the main political economy dynamics that influence 
the policy cycle of such programmes. If PBF programmes are designed around a full 
understanding of political economy, PBF can potentially be a powerful tool to achieve 
better outcomes. We recommend utilising the potential of political economy analysis 
in such studies.     
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4.2.2 Introduction 
Performance-based financing (PBF) has become a popular financing mechanism in 
low and-middle income countries (LMICs) in the past 15 years (Shroff et al. 2017). 
PBF is defined as a cash payment issued after attaining and verifying predefined 
results (Eldridge and Palmer 2009). PBF in the health sector comprises direct 
payments to health professionals such as doctors, nurses, and community health 
workers (Ashir et al. 2013; Gavagan et al. 2010; Norton 1992), organisations such as 
health facilities or medical groups (Lindenauer et al. 2007), and government or non-
government entities, typically based on quality and/or utilisation outcomes (Basinga 
et al. 2010). Those paying can be governments, donors, or insurance programmes 
(Curtin et al. 2006). PBF is seen not only as a tool to increase the motivation of 
healthcare workers and improve health systems performance but also a strategic 
purchasing reform (Sophie Witter et al. 2013). PBF aims to improve outcomes by 
motivating healthcare workers through incentives (Shroff, Bigdeli, and Meessen 
2017), introducing a results-based culture where ‘doing business as usual’ is no 
longer the norm (OECD 2014).  
The concept of paying for results proved popular with international donors, and 
country governments saw PBF as a way of making progress towards the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) to improve maternal and child health (MCH) (Oxman 
and Fretheim 2009). PBF programmes have been implemented in more than 30 low 
and middle-income countries (LMICs) in Sub-Saharan Africa alone with the aim of 
improving maternal and child health services (Bonfrer, Van de Poel, and Van 
Doorslaer 2014). However, the international debate regarding the impact of PBF on 
healthcare service delivery is on-going. Some studies have demonstrated that PBF 
resulted in improvements in targeted services (Soeters, Havineza, and Peerenboom 
2006; Kane et al. 2019; Celhay et al. 2015; Janssen et al. 2015; Soeters et al. 2011; 
Powerll-Jackson, Yip, and Han 2015) while others found limited effects of PBF (Van 
Herck et al. 2010; S Witter et al. 2012; Ngo, Sherry, and Bauhoff 2017).  
PBF introduces different rules and arrangements for the sharing of resources and 
represents a risk or opportunity to actors as a result of changes to their roles and 
responsibilities and the modification of organisational processes  (Sparkes et al. 
2019). In many LMICs, donors contribute substantially to the health sector, which 
may increase their role in shaping and influencing health financing policy reforms 
together with other actors. Understanding the role and involvement of different actors 
in shaping the design of PBF programmes and its subsequent implementation, will 
therefore be key to shedding light on why PBF programmes succeed or fail in different 
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contexts. 
Political economy analysis, which studies power and resource distribution and 
contestation, the roles played by different actors and their interactions, and how this 
shapes programmes and policies (Poole 2011; Buse et al. 2008; Reich 2019), is well 
suited to the study of PBF. Experiences from health financing reforms in Turkey and 
Mexico have demonstrated the importance of political economy in shaping and 
adapting policies. Mexico in 2000 and Turkey in 2002 started unifying fragmented 
health insurance schemes under a single health insurance programme. However, 
both countries encountered substantial resistance by actors, especially social security 
institutions. Turkey had to delay legislative actions until trust was built between actors. 
Mexico could not combine formal employed sector health insurance schemes with 
other social security programmes, and instead they adapted their reform agenda 
(Sparkes et al. 2019).  
Though PBF is inherently political, so far, there has been a limited number of studies 
that assessed the political economy dimension of PBF programmes in LMICs 
(Chimhutu et al. 2015; Bertone and Witter 2015; Bertone et al. 2014; Bertone, Wurie, 
et al. 2018; Sophie Witter et al. 2019). These studies focused on the dynamic 
interaction of political economy factors such as context, policy process and actors on 
shaping and implementing PBF programmes. However, such an approach has not 
yet been adopted in an FCAS. In FACAs, contestation between formal and informal 
institutions is predominant and institutions are considerably prone to changes 
(Mcloughlin 2014).  
To strengthen maternal and child health services, the Ministry of Public Health of 
Afghanistan (MoPH) with financial support from the World Bank (WB)  implemented 
a PBF programme between 2010 and 2015 (Ministry of Public Health 2010). This 
programme provided incentives to healthcare workers to achieve improved coverage 
of essential maternal and child health services (Ministry of Public Health, Johns 
Hopkins University 2010). The programme had some effects on the utilisation and 
quality of health services; however, these changes were not statistically significant 
(Ministry of Public Health & KIT Royal Tropical Institute 2015), and the programme 
was not cost-effective (Salehi et al. 2020).  
We used a PEA approach to understand the factors (context, actors, processes) 
influencing the PBF adoption, design and implementation in Afghanistan, and 
examine why the PBF programme in Afghanistan did not have intended effects.   
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This study makes an important contribution to global literature through its focus on a 
low-income and FCAS where numerous forces have combined to bring the PBF 
programme into existence and influenced its design and implementation.  
4.2.3 Methods  
Study Setting  
In 2003, Afghanistan introduced the Basic Package of Health Services (BPHS) to 
ensure equitable access to a core set of health services in remote and underserved 
populations (Ministry of Public Health 2003). The BPHS has been contracted out by 
non-state providers (NSPs) in 31 of its 34 provinces while the BPHS was provided by 
the direct implementation of MoPH known as the “Ministry of Public Health 
Strengthening Mechanism” (MoPH-SM) in three provinces (Salehi et al. 2018). Under 
the MoPH-SM arrangement, provincial health offices were contracted by the central 
MoPH to provide BPHS services in those provinces (Cockcroft et al. 2011).   
The introduction of these reforms saw a substantial reduction in under-five and infant 
mortality rates from 257 and 165 per 1000 live births in 2001 to 97 and 76 per 1000 
live births in 2010, and maternal mortality also declined substantially from 16000 in 
2000 to 327 per 100,000 live births in 2010 (Ministry of Public Health, Central 
Statistics Office, ICF Macro 2011). However, maternal and child mortality remain high 
compared at the regional level.  
The PBF programme was initiated in 2010 in the context of BPHS to improve maternal 
and child health. In total, 463 health facilities in 11 out of 34 provinces were included 
in the programme. The PBF programme targeted the following maternal and child 
health services: antenatal care, delivery by skilled birth attendant, postnatal care, and 
pentavalent vaccination. Health workers were provided incentives based on extra 
production of outputs (targeted services) above the baseline reported by health 
information management system (HMIS) and verified by a third party (Figure 9). 
Verification of the HMIS data occurred on a regular basis on a random selection of 
PBF health facilities and households. The PBF programme was evaluated by means 
of two household surveys: a baseline survey in 2010 and an end-line survey in 2015. 
Households living within the catchment area of a facility exposed to PBF were 
interviewed together with those living in the catchment area of control health facilities 
(Ministry of Public Health 2010).   
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Figure 9. Afghanistan PBF programme arrangements 
 
 
Study Design and Sampling 
This study adopted retrospective qualitative research methods and conducted a 
review of documents related to Afghanistan’s PBF programme. We selected key 
informants, who have especially informed viewpoints on the PBF programme, 
purposively from each level of the health system. At the national level, we interviewed 
respondents from the MoPH who managed the PBF programme, the World Bank who 
funded the PBF programme, the third party who conducted the PBF programme 
monitoring and data verification, and non-state providers (NSPs) who implemented 
the PBF programme in the BPHS health facilities. At the province level, we 
interviewed health managers (HM) who were supervising the implementation of PBF 
programme. At the facility level, we interviewed healthcare workers (HW) who were 
providing healthcare services at health facilities. We selected two provinces (Takhar 
and Balkh) based on variations in population ethnicity and health facility geographical 
location. Four main ethnic groups – Pashtoon, Tajik, Hazara and Uzbek – make the 
population of Afghanistan, in addition to several other small ethnicities. The selected 
provinces comprise the indicated ethnicities. In total, we selected 15 public primary 
care health facilities according to the MoPH geographic classification that comprised 
urban (n=5), semi-urban (n=5), and rural health facilities (n=5). In total, we interviewed 
30 key informants, from national level (n=9), from province level (n=6) and facility level 
(n=15) (Table 12).  
  
Community 
Third Party 
MoPH 
Implementer 
Health Facility Healthcare 
Worker 
1- HMIS Report 
2- HMIS Data Verification 
3- HMIS Data Verification Report 
4- Incentive Payment 
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Table 12. Research participants 
Institution Interviewee Number Reason for Selection  
MoPH Deputy 
Minister of 
Policy and 
Planning    
1 Led the negotiation process between 
MoPH and the donor when deciding 
on implementing a PBF programme 
PM 
 GCMU Team 
Member 
2 Managed PBF procurement and 
financial management  
PM 
 HEFD Team 
Member  
2 Coordinated and supervised PBF 
implementation 
PM 
 Provincial 
Managers 
2 Provided key information about the 
context, content, and implementation 
of PBF for the respective provinces 
HM 
 PBF HMIS 
Team Member  
1 Managed PBF reported data from the 
NSPs on a quarterly basis.  
HM 
Donor Team Member  1 Represented the role and opinions of 
the donor supporting the PBF 
programme  
PM 
Third Party  Team Member  2 Verified the HMIS data and assessed 
the performance of PBF in BPHS 
health facilities by applying BSC and 
conducting household surveys 
HM 
Implementer 
(NSP) 
Provincial 
Managers 
4 Implemented the PBF, monitored 
implementation, understood the 
context and content of the programme 
HM 
 Heads of 
Health 
Facilities  
4 Views of frontline managers on PBF 
implementation, its strengths and 
challenges, their satisfaction with 
PBF, and contextual factors 
HW 
 Healthcare 
Workers  
11 Views of frontline workers on PBF 
implementation, its strengths and 
challenges, contextual factors, and 
their satisfaction with PBF.  
HW 
MoPH: Ministry of Public Health; GCMU: Grant and Contract Management Unit: HEFD: Health 
Economics and Financing Directorate; HMIS: Health Management and Information System; NSP: non-
state provider; PBF: Performance-Based Financing; PM: Policymaker; HM: Health Manager; HW: 
Healthcare Worker. 
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Conceptual Framework and Data Collection 
We adapted a conceptual framework based on Buse et al. (Buse et al. 2008) to guide 
our data collection and analysis. Our framework aimed to understand the fundamental 
dynamics that influenced the PBF programme adoption, design and implementation. 
Our framework characteristics are as follows:  
1. Context: Understanding the contextual factors such as social, economic and 
political setting as well as global factors which influence the adoption of PBF 
programme in Afghanistan.  
2. Actors: Identifying the role, power, interest, and ideas of actors in relation to PBF 
and the extent to which they were involved in and affected the adoption, design 
and implementation of PBF. Power is considered to be the capability of agents to 
accomplish results in social practices (Giddens 1984), whether they are 
competing against each other or acting collaboratively. However, this capacity is 
additionally determined by the structural power of the social institutions to which 
such agents belong. Power is acknowledged to be significantly influential on the 
process of developing and implementing policies (Arts and Tatenhove 2004). 
Interest is considered to be the desire to do a particularly thing. Those who are 
capable of influencing policy do this with the intention of enhancing their political 
and or economic interests. Actors who are not in government could have a specific 
interest in economic outcomes, whereas government actors’ interest might be 
driven not only by their personal economic interest but also their political interests, 
particularly in terms of sustaining their hold on power. Idea is consistently a key 
driver of policy, along with direct political or economic concerns. In situations 
where people can not rationally decide, idea provides directions in terms of the 
actions they should take to ensure consistency with their fundamental values and 
beliefs in life (DFID 2009). 
3. Process: The official PBF programme design and how it was implemented in 
practice, including nonconformities to the initial design and reasons for these.   
Figure 10 presents the conceptual framework components and the interactions 
between actors and context in the adoption stage, between actors and process in the 
design and implementation stage. The framework takes the position that the dynamics 
between actors and the context in which PBF came into existence (adoption) and the 
process through which PBF programme was designed and implemented had 
influenced the performance of the PBF programme and subsequently the results.  
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Figure 10. The study conceptual framework 
 
Qualitative interviews were designed with semi-structured questions and probes and 
were conducted in participants’ offices and health facilities over the phone by the 
principal investigator (PI). Interviews with the third-party evaluation organisation who 
conducted the PBF programme monitoring and data verification and donors were 
conducted in English and the rest were conducted in the local languages (Dari and 
Pashto). To ensure internal consistency, relevance, and clarity of the questions, two 
pilot-test interviews were conducted in each health facility (n=2) before commencing 
the interviews. Only minor changes were brought to the questions. Where 
respondents consented, we used a digital recording device to record interviews 
(n=24), while notes were taken in six out of 30 interviews. All recorded interviews were 
transcribed verbatim by the PI. The research framework guided the questions, which 
focused on three major areas – the PBF programme context, actors and 
implementation process. The questions examined the contextual factors that were of 
relevance to the adoption of the PBF programme, and the role of actors and their 
interactions and how this affected PBF adoption, design and implementation. 
Questions also examined the implementation process, including what was intended 
(programme design) and what actually happened (programme implementation), and 
reasons for any deviation from the original design. 
For the document review, the PI reviewed minutes of PBF coordination meetings and 
workshops, monitoring visit reports, PBF progress reports, donor mission reports 
(aide memoire), health facility and household survey reports from the impact 
evaluation, and published literature on Afghanistan’s PBF scheme.  
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Data Analysis 
The data analysis was deductive, and it was following the objective of the study and 
our conceptual framework. We used ‘content analysis’ to analyse the data (Snap and 
Spencer 2003). First, all transcriptions and notes were carefully reviewed. Key themes 
were highlighted from the conceptual framework. Based on their relationships, data 
were selected and accommodated under specific thematic classes. Information on 
the same opinion was combined, and quotes were copied under the relevant 
classifications. Finally, each classification was studied and interpreted carefully. 
Common viewpoints between key informants were then described and important 
responses elucidated. A similar approach was used to incorporate the concerned 
content of reviewed documents under the related thematic classes. We triangulated 
findings from interviews with other data sources (PBF document review, published 
literature review). 
Ethics Considerations 
Ethical approval was obtained from the Institutional Review Board of the Ministry of 
Public Health of Afghanistan and the Ethics Committee of London School of Hygiene 
and Tropical Medicine. Participation in interviews was voluntary and all information 
was provided anonymously. All interviews were assigned codes to ensure anonymity 
when citing quotations.  
4.2.4 Results 
PBF Programme Context  
There was a range of contextual factors contributing to the introduction of the PBF 
programme in Afghanistan. First, at the global level, focusing on ‘results’ is a 
fundamental ideological shift from input-based financing to outputs and outcomes. 
PBF was regarded as an innovative solution to help utilize limited resources 
effectively and efficiently (Loevinsohn and Harding 2005), and make progress towards 
global health goals: initially MDGs 4 and 5 (Oxman and Fretheim 2009),  and 
subsequently Universal Health Coverage (UHC) (RBFHealth 2017). Therefore, an 
increasing number of developing countries were adopting PBF schemes, and it was 
seen by local stakeholders to be desirable to join this global movement. 
“The funding trend at the global level was towards PBF programmes 
and Afghanistan could not miss this opportunity” [PM, National level).  
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Second, at the local level, maternal mortality ratio was considered one of the highest 
worldwide at 1600 per 100,000 live births (Bartlett et al. 2005), contraceptive use was 
at 15 per cent, ANC use was at 36 per cent, and full immunisation was only at 37 per 
cent (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and European Union 2008). The World Bank 
first advocated for the idea of a PBF programme in Afghanistan, based on the positive 
experience of improving maternal and child health outcomes in Rwanda using PBF.  
“PBF was not a recognized term in the Ministry [MoPH]. It was the 
World Bank who attracted the attention of the Ministry towards PBF” 
[HM, national level] 
The MoPH was also very receptive to the idea of PBF because of the experience of 
providing BPHS services through NSPs (Loevinsohn and Sayed 2008) using 
performance-based contracting (PBC) in which project payments to NSPs were 
subject to satisfactory performance of NSPs on a yearly basis (Arur et al. 2010). The 
MoPH found the idea of PBF in line with the MoPH position and idea to be the steward 
of the health sector in Afghanistan and allow NSPs to implement the basic health 
services on behalf of MoPH  (Ministry of Public Health 2005). Furthermore, PBF, 
involved the offer of additional financial resources to the health sector, just prior to 
presidential and parliamentary elections scheduled in August 2009 and December 
2010.  
In a meeting held in November 2008, the Minister of Health confirmed his decisive 
support for the adoption of PBF. The MoPH expected that the PBF could expand 
maternal and child services and strengthen health systems.  
“The introduction of PBF is in a critical time when the country is going 
through some political and security turmoil; therefore, the 
announcement of the new funding for improving mothers and children 
health is considered as good news for people.” (Ministry of Public 
Health 2008a) 
PBF Programme Actors 
The key actors associated with the PBF programme were the central MoPH, Ministry 
of Finance (MoF), the WB, other donors, Provincial Health Offices (PHOs), non-state 
providers (NSPs), third party, healthcare workers including community health 
workers, and patients/clients. In this section, we present the roles of actors and how 
they influenced the design and implementation of PBF programme. Table 13 presents 
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the roles of PBF programme actors, and Table 14 presents the PBF programme 
actors matrix.   
The MoPH showed interest in PBF and undertook numerous roles in adopting and 
managing the PBF programme. The major entities in the MoPH pertaining to the PBF 
programme were the Health Economics and Financing Directorate (HEFD) which was 
in charge of the overall management of the PBF programme; the Grant and Contract 
Management Unit (GCMU) which assumed responsibility for managing the PBF 
contracts and disbursing performance payments to implementers; the Health 
Information Management Information Unit (HMIS) which was responsible for the PBF 
programme technical reporting; the Monitoring and Evaluation Unit (M&E) which 
assumed responsibility for monitoring the PBF programme; and the PHOs which were 
in charge of routine monitoring and provincial level coordination of the PBF 
programme.  
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Table 13. PBF programme key actors’ role 
Actors  Roles    
MoPH HEFD The MoPH HEFD assumed responsibility for the daily implementation of the 
PBF programme including monitoring and preparing yearly reports to track 
progress on programme implementation. In addition, HEFD cooperated with 
HMIS in organising training sessions for managers involved in PBF. 
GCMU The MoPH GCMU assumed responsibility for processing and managing 
contracts for NSPs and for third-party organisations. The GCMU finance 
section assumed responsibility for conducting the financial management of the 
programme such as preparation of payment orders, fund disbursement, 
reports, and expenditure statements.  
HMIS The MoPH HMIS Unit introduced changes to the HMIS data capture forms to 
enable its use to monitor PBF. Furthermore, they led training sessions for the 
implementers and PHO staff on the new HMIS, NMC, and other PBF-related 
events. The HMIS also had to maintain and supply any PBF-related HMIS 
information and provide reports on the main PBF indicators.  
PHO The MoPH PHOs assumed responsibility for ensuring that oversight from the 
BPHS health facilities was conducted in coordination with the NSPs. 
Moreover, the PHOs were responsible for arranging provincial PHCC 
meetings.  
M&E The MoPH M&E Unit assumed responsibility for managing and processing 
NMC data. The staff of M&E assisted the HEFD with monitoring activities 
associated with the PBF.  
MoF   The MoF was the prime recipient of the PBF fund. The MoF role was to 
strengthen donor coordination, to ensure accountability and transparency, and 
to align donor funding in accordance with the country development objectives. 
The MoF delegated full authority in terms of technical decisions and project 
management to MoPH regarding PBF.  
The WB   The WB provided financing assistance to PBF programme and played an 
operational role in appraising and monitoring PBF programme activities. The 
WB provided the final approval on the PBF procurement and financial plan, 
process of contracting NSPs and third party, the release of funds to 
implementers, hiring of staff, and adaptation of the design of PBF programme.  
Third Party   The function of the third party was to verify HMIS data and conduct baseline 
and-end line surveys to evaluate the effect of the programme. Moreover, the 
third party had the responsibility for assessing the quality of PBF health 
facilities.  
NSP   The NSPs assumed responsibility for implementing the PBF programme in the 
BPHS health facilities. They were expected to ensure the availability of quality 
health services to the people whom they were serving in accordance with their 
PBF BPHS contracts, as well as make an accurate record of any unintended 
effect of PBF on the delivery of health services.  
HW   The healthcare workers provided health care services to people.  
Patient    Patients were the prime beneficiary of health care services provided by 
healthcare workers.  
MoPH: Ministry of Public Health; HEFD: Health Economics and Financing Directorate; GCMU: Grant and Contract Management Unit; 
HMIS: Health Management and Information System; HW: Health Worker; PHO: Provincial Health Office; M&E: Monitoring and 
Evaluation; MoF: Ministry of Finance; PHCC: Provincial Health Coordination Committee; WB: World Bank; NSP: Non-State Provider; 
PBF: Performance-Based Financing 
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Table 14. PBF programme actor matrix 
Actors Role Power  Interest  Idea 
Central 
MoPH 
Policymaker Powerful in terms of 
position & veto 
player 
Interested  Supportive   
World Bank Donor/ 
Policymaker  
Powerful in terms of 
having money and 
expertise  
Very much 
interested 
Supportive   
Ministry of 
Finance 
Policymaker Veto player  Interested  Supportive   
Third Party 
Organisation 
Evaluator Neutral  Neutral  Neutral  
Provincial 
MoPH 
Implementer Powerful at the 
provincial level in 
terms position.   
Publically 
interested, 
privately not 
interested  
Publically 
supportive, 
privately 
neutral  
Non-state 
providers  
Implementer Not powerful but 
can influence the 
implementation of 
services 
Publically 
interested, 
privately not 
interested  
Publically 
supportive, 
privately 
feeling burden  
Healthcare 
workers 
Service 
provider 
Not powerful but 
can influence the 
implementation of 
services 
Interested  Supportive   
In our study, the HEFD emerged as a key actor among the MoPH entities in the 
context of PBF programme. The HEFD had established a close relationship with the 
MoPH central entities, MoPH PHOs, MoF, the third party and NSPs, and it served as 
the first contact point for coordination with the WB. The PBF National Coordinator 
who was placed in the HEFD was managing the PBF contracts with NSPs and third 
party in close coordination with the GCMU. Meanwhile, the PBF project placed two 
M&E national consultants, one HMIS national consultant and one financial 
management national consultant in the HEFD. The M&E consultants were reporting 
to the Coordinator while the HMIS and financial management consultants were 
reporting not only to the Coordinator but also to HMIS and financial management units 
to ensure the main units of the MoPH were closely linked to the PBF programme. The 
MoPH M&E unit was expected to assist the PBF programme with monitoring activities. 
Nevertheless, the function of the M&E unit was generally limited because the HEFD 
M&E national consultants undertook monitoring visits to the PBF health facilities 
In principle, the function of the PHOs was to serve as an arm of MoPH in achieving 
its provincial stewardship role. However, the role of the PHOs was restricted in every 
facet of PBF, including monitoring. The PBF was managed on a central basis with 
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MoPH maintaining direct contact with the NSPs. PHOs were engaged with PBF only 
in two provinces where the implementation of BPHS was with the MoPH-SM. 
“The PHOs did not actively participate in the implementation of the 
PBF. It was obvious that they were not considered an essential actor 
in the design and management of the PBF” [HM, provincial level].  
The WB role in PBF programme design, financing and management was crucial. The 
PBF programme was designed by the WB experts given the MoPH did not have 
enough expertise in PBF programming during the design stage. Meanwhile, the WB 
maintained its crucial role in other areas. The WB was playing an operational role in 
appraising and supervising PBF programme activities. The PBF procurement and 
financial plan, the procurement process of contracting NSPs and third party, the 
release of funds to implementers, and hiring of staff for the PBF project all required 
the approval of the WB (Ministry of Finance 2013). Some national and provincial 
managers expressed the opinion that it was the donor who made the final decisions 
on PBF.  
“The role of the MoPH in project design and management did not seem 
to be as prominent as the donor was perceived to make all important 
decisions” [HM, provincial level].  
Nevertheless, policymakers at MoPH disagreed with this contention and emphasised 
their stewardship function regarding the management and coordination of every 
development projects, including the PBF. 
“Overall, the MoPH relationship with the donor was either to convince 
or to be convinced” [PM, national level]. 
The function of the third party was to verify HMIS data of the PBF programme and 
undertake baseline and end-line surveys to evaluate the effect of the PBF 
programme. Moreover, the third party had the responsibility of assessing the quality 
of PBF health facilities. Initially, the Johns Hopkins University (JHU) and subsequently 
the KIT Royal Tropical Institute assumed responsibility for this role in 2013 through a 
competitive process. To maintain independence, the third-party role was limited in the 
decision-making process, although health managers felt that this party could have 
taken a more active role in the design stage as well as in improving the programme 
implementation.   
The MoF was the prime recipient of PBF funds. The MoF role was to strengthen donor 
coordination, to ensure the accountability and transparency of aid assistance 
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including the PBF, and to align donor funding in accordance with the country 
development objectives. However, the MoF did not participate in the design and 
management of the PBF programme as the MoF delegated full authority to MoPH for 
financial management, programme choices and implementation.  
“The MoPH was regularly updating the MoF on the PBF progress. 
Also, the World Bank had regular meetings with the MoF. Overall, the 
MoF never interfered in the PBF issues” [HM, national level].   
The implementers (NSPs and MoPH-SM) assumed responsibility for implementing 
the PBF programme in the BPHS health facilities. Nevertheless, the NSPs function in 
the design of PBF was limited. On the other hand, the implementers perceived the 
PBF programme to be a burden because they gained no advantage while being under 
significant pressure to provide timely HMIS reports to MoPH and timely incentive 
payments to health facilities.  
“Trust me it [PBF] was a good programme but a nightmare for us 
(NSPs), a lot of work” [HM, provincial level].  
Healthcare workers were the principal service providers in the BPHS health facilities. 
Although their role in the design of PBF was limited, and they were not involved in the 
policy decision-making process, most of them were satisfied with the PBF 
programme. They gave two reasons for this. Firstly, the PBF performance incentive 
was simply an extra payment to support their current standard of living. Our finding 
elsewhere shows that performance payments amounted almost the same level of 
their monthly salaries (Salehi et al. 2020). Secondly, health workers regarded 
performance payments as a sign of appreciation from their supervisors and a reward 
for efficient work.  
“Life is very expensive nowadays. The incentive I receive has changed 
my life. I am really happy! [HW, health facility level]  
On the other hand, although healthcare workers knew of the PBF objectives and 
expected outcomes, they misinterpreted the notion of allocating the health facilities 
into intervention and control groups. The majority of staff at control facilities were of 
the opinion that if they improved their performance, they could be entitled to incentive 
payments in the near future. National-level health managers believed that the 
provincial managers intentionally disseminated such messages to control facility staff 
to encourage them to work harder to improve the overall performance of BPHS 
implementation.    
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“The provincial managers kept promising control health facilities to 
provide them incentives if they show better performance” [HM, national 
level]. 
The implementers (NSPs, MoPH-SM) had to prepare written agreements with each 
health facility and define the prices of indicators and the proportion of allocation of 
incentives among the health facility staff.  Initially, this was based on healthcare 
workers input and discussion. However, this was a matter of dispute in some health 
facilities. For instance, midwives attempted to justify the significance of their services. 
By contrast, other staff of health facilities, especially doctors, were of the opinion that 
midwives were dependent on their cooperation in order to provide services.  In other 
cases, auxiliary staff were excluded from incentive payments, with detrimental 
consequences for service utilisation in some instances.  
“We noticed that our OPD [outpatient department] visits were 
decreasing day by day. We discovered that the guards, who were the 
first point of contact in the clinic, were misleading the patients. As soon 
as the guards were included in the PBF incentive list, the number of 
OPD patients increased” [HW, health facility level]. 
Therefore, the managers (NSPs and MoPH-SM) subsequently defined incentive 
allocation schemes without the consent of healthcare workers and imposed it on some 
health facilities.  
Some key cadres were not considered for the incentive payments, such as community 
health workers (CHWs) who had responsibility for the provision of basic preventive 
and promotive services to between 100 and 150 households and referring patients 
from community to health facilities.  
“CHWs are the first point of contact for patients at the community level. 
Frankly, they have enough influence in the community. People usually 
listen to what they say” [HW, health facility level].  
PBF Programme Implementation Process 
To authorize the PBF programme, a memorandum of understanding (MoU) was 
signed in 2008 between the MoPH and the WB (Ministry of Public Health 2008b). A 
further financial agreement between the Ministry of Finance and the WB was signed 
in 2009 (Ministry of Finance 2009). To support PBF implementation, the WB pledged 
12 million US dollars grant which was utilised in six years. Negotiations between the 
MoPH and the WB on the management structure of PBF commenced in 2009. To 
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furnish MoPH officials with details of the PBF such as the design and management of 
the programme, the WB encouraged discussions with the WB experts who had 
experience from the PBF in Rwanda.  
In 2009, the MoPH initiated a working group to address the PBF requirement for 
health systems to be strengthened and to identify target provinces for the 
implementation of the PBF programme. The working group recognised the urgent 
need to strengthen the HMIS, monitoring and evaluation systems and financial 
management. Given that PBF required close monitoring; the working group 
recommended to implement PBF only in provinces where the level of security was 
good. Two provinces were selected as pilot sites for three months in early 2010 to 
identify potential administrative challenges prior to roll out (Ministry of Public Health 
2011). As no major challenges were encountered, the PBF programme was 
subsequently rolled out to the remaining 9 provinces by 2011. In the initial stage, 
orientation sessions were also offered to BPHS implementers and provincial health 
officers to acquaint them with the principal features of the PBF programme. 
Furthermore, the MoPH signed contracts with NSPs in nine provinces where they 
implemented the PBF programme in BPHS health facilities, and with the Johns 
Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health (JHU) as a third-party institution to verify 
the HMIS data and assess the PBF programme. Additionally, the MoPH assumed 
responsibility for implementing PBF in two MoPH-SM provinces. 
In order for incentives to be paid, reported activity had to be verified by a third party.  
To this end, health facility HMIS data on target indicators were provided quarterly to 
MoPH. The verification of HMIS data occurred on a three-monthly basis between 
2010 and 2013 and a six-monthly basis afterwards on a random selection of health 
facilities. Facility HMIS data were compared to data in facility registers. In addition, 
five households for each indicator were interviewed by the third party to verify that the 
services had been provided. In order to receive incentives, the facility validation rate 
had to exceed 90 per cent, and the community validation rate exceed 80 per cent. 
The incentive payments were weighted according to quality of care, which was 
assessed by a quarterly score on the national monitoring checklist. Figure 9 shows 
the arrangements for the PBF programme regarding HMIS reporting and incentive 
payments. 
In addition to facility-level incentive payments, PBF performance payments were also 
paid to NSPs and MoPH provincial health officers. It was anticipated that NSPs would 
receive 10 per cent of the performance payment paid to facilities for management 
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purposes: this would be paid at a provincial level. The objective of this allocation was 
to help implementers manage the operational activity associated with the PBF. 
Besides, it was anticipated that provincial health officers would receive performance 
payments to enhance the stewardship function of the provincial MoPH associated 
with the PBF. Provincial health officers were paid based on the number of health 
facilities in provinces they monitored PBF programme quarterly, number of recorded 
minutes from the Provincial Health Coordination Committee (PHCC) meetings and 
the proportion of activities implemented from the provincial quarterly work plan. 
However, the allocation of management funds to implementers as well as the 
payments to provincial health officers was discontinued in the second year of the PBF 
programme. This may have occurred due to difficulties managing payments to NSPs 
and assessing the performance of provincial health officers.   
The level of incentive to be paid for services at the facility-level was based on the 
respective burden of disease, the potential to increase coverage, the cost of service 
delivery in the private market, and the availability of funds. However, initially, 
incentives were low, but it was increased during the second year of the PBF 
implementation.  
“The data shows that the total amount of incentive earned by each 
health facility in the last three quarters is too small. Discussion with 
implementers has revealed that this is partly due to the unit price 
amount which is too small to motivate the health workers. It is agreed 
to revise the prices of the outputs” (The World Bank 2011b).   
The facility-level incentives were paid based on extra use of services above the 
baseline for the services. Therefore, the baselines for each indicator were fixed for 
each health facility according to the 2009 average HMIS data. It soon became 
apparent that the baseline had been set too high due to the inaccuracy of HMIS data 
in 2009. Consequently, this was amended in 2011 by applying the HMIS 2010 
average data.  
“Implementing organisations expressed concern that the baseline 
against which performance is assessed is set too high. It is agreed to 
revisit the baseline” (The World Bank 2011a) 
It was anticipated that PBF performance payments would be available to 
implementers every six months, whereas implementers were meant to incentivise 
healthcare workers every three months. However, lengthy delays occurred in making 
payments to both implementers and healthcare workers.  
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“We were told that we would receive incentives each quarter, but this 
was not the case. Sometimes the delays were so long that we could 
forget about the PBF incentives” [HW, health facility level].  
There were many reasons for the delays, including financial bureaucratic processes 
within the government and delaying the release of funds, implementers submitting 
HMIS reports late, and third-party submitting verification reports to MoPH late. In 
2011, the fund delay for PBF health facilities was for three quarters. As a result, the 
MoPH decided to make the incentive payments to health facilities without verification 
of HMIS data.   
“Last year’s findings regarding third party verification showed 95 per 
cent accuracy of data. Therefore, the incentives should be paid on the 
basis of the previous year’s report to avoid further delays in 
performance payments.” (Ministry of Public Health 2011)  
The verification process was found to be too resource-intensive and cumbersome. 
The third party faced challenges identifying households in the community from facility 
registers due to incorrect names and addresses. Furthermore, recall bias was a 
challenge with households.  
“When a monitor asked a woman whether she had visited the health 
facility, she was confused in her understanding of which services she 
had received during her visit from the health facility. In most cases, the 
patient cards were not available at the household level, or they 
contained incomplete information which made it impossible for 
community monitors to verify the services.” [HM, national level] 
Some of the managers and healthcare workers argued that PBF could have worked 
efficiently with fully functional health facilities. Consequently, they felt it would have 
been better to spend some of the funding of PBF on inputs such as medicine, staff 
training, equipment, and supplies, all of which were needed by the BPHS health 
facilities.  
“We found ourselves handcuffed by the insufficient availability of 
pharmaceuticals, dysfunctional [medical] equipment, and lack of, 
particularly female healthcare workers. I wish the PBF could have 
helped” [HM, provincial level].  
The managers also expressed a stronger preference for the demand side-financing 
programme. They argued that this would have brought greater benefits as they 
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believed that the key reason for the low utilisation of services was high transportation 
costs and poor road quality.  
“In extremely impoverished communities, where geographical and 
financial access is limited, a complementary strategy of cash vouchers 
allowing women to access antenatal care and facility deliveries would 
have resulted in a better outcome” [HM, national level].   
Table 15 presents the PBF programme lifetime timeline.   
4.2.5 Discussion 
PBF programmes are inherently political as they enforce distinct arrangements for the 
sharing of resources, and represents a risk or opportunity to actors as a result of 
changes to their roles and responsibilities and the modification of organisational 
processes (Sparkes et al. 2019). However, despite widespread implementation of 
PBF programmes in LMICs, there has been minimal use of political economy analysis 
to shed light on why PBF is adopted, and how it is designed and implemented, 
including why it may not work as planned.   
This study highlighted the main dynamics that influenced the adoption, design and 
implementation of PBF programme in Afghanistan from the lens of political economy. 
Firstly, we found that a number of contextual factors supported the adoption of PBF 
in Afghanistan. In general, PBF is seen as a means of achieving global policy goals, 
initially MDGs 4 and 5 and later UHC (Oxman and Fretheim 2009; RBFHealth 2017). 
A lot of countries, especially low-income and FCASs were implementing PBF (Gautier 
et al. 2018) which supported policy uptake in Afghanistan. Besides, Afghanistan 
embarked on PBF based on the successful implementation of PBF in Rwanda 
context. Likewise, PBF was seen as an opportunity to improve the provision of 
healthcare services rapidly. PBF thus aligned well with donors and the Afghan 
government’s wish to produce fast results. Meanwhile, the strategic importance of 
promoting policy ideas that go with financial support is quite aligned with the interest 
and idea of donors in PBF. Donors are mostly concerned about achieving their 
results-oriented programme. Therefore, they see PBF as a suitable programme given 
it involves the establishment of organised, accountable, and traceable reporting 
system (Gautier et al. 2018). In Afghanistan, the promise of PBF financial resources 
came at a time when Afghanistan was encountering not only poor health indicators 
but also a lack of financial resources to upgrade the country’s health system. This 
finding is in line with other health systems performance studies that the availability of 
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funding was a key factor influencing health policy uptake in LMICs (Sridhar and 
Gómez 2011; Khan et al. 2018).  
Secondly, the policy process underlying the design and implementation of the PBF 
programme in Afghanistan was a result of power dynamics and interactions between 
PBF programme actors. The exercise of power occurs not only between actors 
usually considered powerful, such as donors and central MoPH, but also actors who 
were influential in specific local settings such as PHOs, NSPs and health facility 
workers. The MoPH established a centralised management structure to have more 
control on resources. Though this arrangement posed the MoPH in a strong position 
to manage the PBF programme through a ‘single-window system’, it compromised 
the notion of institutional embedding which required the engagement of all relevant 
units in managing the programme to prevent any drawbacks. For example, in Uganda, 
inattention to the role of some key actors partially led to the failure of the programme 
(Ssengooba, McPake, and Palmer 2012). In addition, having inadequate knowledge 
of PBF programming, the MoPH allowed extensive external assistance in the design 
stage of the PBF programme which led to a flawed design such as focusing only on 
supply-side financing without assessing the need for a demand-side financing 
programme. Furthermore, the donor maintained control over the PBF programme 
procurement and financial decisions during the implementation stage that 
compromised the notion of local ownership.  In this context, the PHOs and NSPs were 
publicly showing their interest in PBF while privately they assumed it as a burden 
without gaining an advantage. In Tanzania, like Afghanistan, the PBF policy process 
was significantly politicised with outside actors having considerable influence on the 
agenda, thus allowing minimal flexibility for the Tanzanian authorities to effectively 
lead the process (Chimhutu et al. 2015). PBF can be successful if all actors assume 
joint responsibility for the programme and the feeling of ownership to value and 
conform to the programme (Kiendrébéogo and Meessen 2019). The processes of 
interaction with actors and the implementation approach should retain flexibility, thus 
providing time for the development of local capacity and ownership, and to enable 
integration within the health system (Bertone, Wurie, et al. 2018).  
Finally, the MoPH support for PBF adoption was partly linked to their past positive 
experience of performance-based contracting. In political economy, this is called path 
dependency, the notion that a new policy is shaped by the policy choices of the past 
(Pearson 1996). However, while path dependency can influence policy choice, the 
capacity of an organisation in implementing a new policy is equally vital. In Thailand 
where the population enjoy universal health coverage, in addition to path dependency, 
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it was the management capacity that facilitated the process of implementing related 
health financing reforms (Tangcharoensathien et al. 2019). In Afghanistan, the health 
system lacked an adequate capacity to manage the PBF programme on a large scale. 
Thus, the PBF programme encountered implementation challenges such as delays in 
payments, challenges in data verification, disagreement about the distribution of 
incentives among health facility staff, and misunderstanding of the concept of PBF in 
control health facilities. As demonstrated in Burundi and Rwanda, national level 
management capacity, especially in human resources for health, was an essential 
enabler to scaling up PBF programmes at the national level, whereas Kenya’s 
insufficient management capacity significantly affected the expansion of the PBF 
programme (Shroff, Bigdeli, and Meessen 2017).  
Specific methodological weaknesses in our study also need to be acknowledged. 
Firstly, the interviews were conducted retrospectively. Thus, participants were asked 
to recollect events that happened in the past and this may have led to recall bias. To 
mitigate the risk of recall bias, we considered some methodological approaches such 
as selecting informed participants, giving the study participants enough time to think 
before answering the questions and using a standardised and well-structured 
questionnaire. Secondly, data analysis was done only by the PI. Though this could 
have introduced bias, the findings were triangulated with PBF documents to the extent 
possible. Thirdly, the study PI was working for the Ministry of Public Health in a senior 
position during the lifetime of the PBF programme and his opinion might have biased 
the study findings. On the other hand, his in-depth understanding from the local 
context, familiarity with the local languages, and having smooth access to senior level 
actors benefited this study. Fourthly, this study did not include service users 
(patients). Future studies could consider the inclusion of service users to understand 
to what extent PBF is in line with their needs. Finally, our case study was limited to 
the BPHS; the discussion on PBF could have been expanded to the Essential 
Package of Hospital Services (EPHS) in Afghanistan. Future PEAs could therefore 
include EPHS within the scope of their research to portray the picture of PBF in 
secondary healthcare services in Afghanistan, which may differ from primary care. 
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Table 15. PBF programme timeline 
Date Main Feature  
July 2008 Afghanistan National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment report 
2007/2008 released. The report highlighted that only 37% of children 
received full immunisation, CPR was 15%, 36% ANC use, and 24% 
SBA use. The cost of transportation was indicated as the main barrier 
to access health facilities by women and children.  
September 2008 A preliminary MoU signed between MoPH and WB to adopt PBF. 
April 2009 Health financing and sustainability policy and strategy developed and 
highlighted the need for supply and demand-side financing   
October 2009 Financial agreement on PBF signed between the WB and Afghan 
MoF. The WB pledged 12 million $US grant to be used by the PBF 
programme. 
Early 2010 PBF programme pilot started in two provinces (Panjshir and 
Samangan)   
September 2010 PBF programme expanded to additional nine provinces (Badakhshan, 
Balkh, Bamyan, Jawzjan, Kandahar, Kunduz, Takhar, Parwan, 
Saripul) 
December 2010 PBF workshop conducted to orient the PHOs and NSPs on the PBF 
objectives, mechanism of implementation, expected outputs and 
outcomes. The participants were managers from the MoPH and 
NSPs.  
June 2011 PBF baseline survey submitted to MoPH 
July 2011 PBF national workshop conducted to share the HMIS findings, 
discuss the unit costs of services, and find out challenges and way 
forward.  
November 2011 PBF unit cost of services modified. PBF national workshop conducted 
to present HMIS updates. 
 
February 2013 
PBF workshop conducted to discuss about monitoring findings, 
implementation challenges, 3rd party verification results, 
implementation challenges and way forward. The participants were 
managers from the MoPH and NSPs.  
Early 2016 PBF end line survey 2015 submitted to MoPH 
CPR: Contraceptive Prevalence Rate; ANC: Antenatal Care; SBA: Skilled Birth Attendance; MoU: Memorandum of 
Understanding; PBF: Performance-Based Financing; WB: World Bank; PHOs: Provincial Health Offices; HMIS: Health 
Management Information System; MoPH: Ministry of Public Health; NSPs: Non-State Providers  
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4.2.6 Conclusion 
Political economy factors played a critical role in the introduction, design and 
implementation of PBF programme in Afghanistan. Future studies should focus on 
conducting empirical research to not only understand the multiple effects of PBF 
programmes on the performance of health systems but also the main political 
economy dynamics that influence the PBF programmes in different stages of the 
policy process. This will facilitate the design and implementation of an effective and 
flexible PBF model, adapted to the local context and owned by the country. If PBF 
programmes are designed around a full understanding of political economy, PBF can 
potentially be a powerful tool to achieve better outcomes. We recommend further use 
of political economy analysis in such studies.  
“It is the politics, stupid!”  
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4.3.1 Abstract   
Performance-based financing (PBF) is a mechanism to improve the quality and 
utilisation of health benefit packages. There is a dearth of economic evaluations of 
PBF in the ‘real world’. Afghanistan implemented PBF between 2010-2015 and 
evaluated the programme using a pragmatic cluster-randomised control trial 
We conducted an incremental cost-effectiveness analysis of the PBF programme in 
Afghanistan, compared to the standard of care, from provider payer’s perspective. 
We examined the cost of the PBF programme together with the cost of providing 
core maternal and child health services that were incentivised by the PBF 
programme in intervention and comparison areas. 
The total financial and economic provider cost of implementing the PBF programme 
were 10,677,465 US$ and 11,896,380 US$ respectively during the six-year life of 
the scheme. Incentive payments were the main contributor to economic costs (63%) 
followed by HMIS data verification (21%), programme administration (10%), and 
staff time (6%). The PBF programme had an incremental cost-effectiveness ratio of 
US$ 1,242 per disability-adjusted life year (DALY) averted compared to the standard 
care. The programme was not cost-effective when compared to an opportunity cost 
threshold of US$ 349. Incentive payments were the main contributor to the costs of 
the PBF programme (70% of the total) followed by performance data verification 
(23%), staff time (6%), and programme administration (2%). The unit cost per case 
of antenatal care (ANC), skilled birth attendance (SBA) and postnatal care (PNC) 
services in the standard of care was US$ 0·96, US$ 4·8 and US$ 1·3, respectively, 
while the cost of ANC, SBA and PNC services per case in PBF areas were US$ 
4·72, US$ 48·5, and US$ 5·4, respectively.  
Our study found that PBF, as implemented in the Afghan context, was not the best 
use of funds to strengthen the delivery of MCH services. It is likely that the incentive 
amounts provided were too low for some services, there was insufficient flexibility in 
using those resources to address service performance constraints, and data 
verification was not economically efficient. Further research into the efficiency and 
cost-effectiveness of PBF schemes with different designs in different settings is 
important to ensure that PBF improves performance and inform how best to 
strategically purchase health benefit packages in LMICS in order to make progress 
towards universal health coverage.   
 202 
 
4.3.2 Introduction  
Performance-based financing (PBF) has received considerable policy attention in 
recent years in low and middle-income countries (LMICs) as a means to improve 
health system performance as part of Universal Health Coverage (UHC) (Shroff et 
al. 2017). PBF provides incentives to service providers (facilities and workers) when 
they achieve pre-defined performance targets (Bertone et al. 2018). A critical 
concern is whether the overall costs of PBF, including the transaction costs of setting 
up the payment and information systems required to support PBF, has a greater 
impact than direct forms of funding health services (such as budgets). To date, there 
are two cost-effectiveness analysis studies from the PBF programmes implemented 
in LMICs (Borghi et al. 2015; Zeng et al. 2018). Borghi et al. (2015) found that the 
PBF programme in Tanzania was not cost-effective, while Zeng et al. (2018) 
concluded that PBF was a cost-effective intervention in Zambia.  
Research in context  
Evidence before this study 
LMICs have implemented PBF in the health sector in the past two decades. 
However, to date, the effect of PBF on improving health service performance in 
LMICs has produced mixed results, with few studies using rigorous ex-post 
evaluation designs. To date, there has only been two studies reporting on the cost-
effectiveness of PBF interventions, despite the fact that PBF is extensively 
implemented to improve maternal and child health services.  
Added value of this study 
To our knowledge, this is the first cost-effectiveness study of PBF informed by a 
pragmatic controlled randomised trial in a fragile conflict-affected state. This is the 
first study to combine ‘real world’ micro-costing with evidence from a pragmatic trial, 
using a decision analytic model, that estimates cost per disability-adjusted life year 
(DALYs) averted.  
Implications of all available evidence  
This study found that PBF, as implemented in the Afghan context, was not the most 
effective use of funds within the health sector budget constraint. The study highlights 
the importance of the design of incentive structures within PBF programmes. The 
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varying level of incentive payments across service types did not reflect their 
importance for health outcomes nor the difficulty of the underlying behaviour 
targeted by the incentive payment. This study also suggests that PBF requires 
corresponding flexibility in financial management at the health facility level to ensure 
that the health facility has autonomy in financial management to address service 
delivery constraints at the facility level. The lessons learned from the PBF 
programme in Afghanistan highlight the importance of designing incentives that are 
sufficient to offset the effort required by health workers to deliver services, the 
relative importance of services in terms of improving health outcomes, and the 
current patterns of resource availability with the health system, to ensure the 
sustainability of these programmes. 
The Ministry of Public Health (MoPH) of Afghanistan implemented a PBF 
programme to fund their Basic Package of Health Services (BPHS) between 2010 
to 2015 aiming to strengthen the performance of maternal and child health services 
(MCH) in the country (Zeng, Shepard, et al. 2018). This study examines cost-
effectiveness of PBF in Afghanistan ex-post, using data from a pragmatic 
randomised control trial. We aim to contribute to the broad evidence base informing 
LMICs on whether PBF can extend and improve the performance of health benefit 
packages in a cost-effective way.   
4.3.3 Methods  
4.3.3.1 Study setting 
Over the past four decades, Afghanistan has experienced political instability, civil 
war and pervasive conflict (Sondorp 2004). A new democratic government was 
established in December 2001. In 2003, the BPHS was introduced to provide 
primary healthcare services, specifically MCH services, to the population. BPHS 
services were contracted to non-state providers (NSPs) in 31 provinces while the 
MoPH managed the BPHS in the remaining three provinces through direct 
implementation called the Ministry of Public Health Strengthening Mechanism 
(MoPH-SM). PBF was implemented to support the BPHS in 11 provinces; covering 
463 health facilities out of 1892 nationally in 2010.  
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4.3.3.2 Intervention Description 
The PBF programme in Afghanistan provided financial incentives to health workers 
based on the increased production of MCH services (e.g. antenatal care, skilled birth 
attendance, postnatal care) above the baseline for each BPHS health facility and 
the quality of care provided. These incentives were paid in addition to routine 
salaries and funding of the health facility.  The level of performance payments for 
each service type is provided in Table 16. Services were monitored using data from 
the Health Management Information System (HMIS) and verified through household 
visits, comparing reported visits to those noted in the health facility registers. If the 
community validation rate exceeded 80 per cent, the health facility was entitled to a 
performance payment. The payments were weighted according to quality of care 
assessed by a quarterly score on the national monitoring checklist (NMC). Nor 
funding neither autonomy was provided to health facilities in control and treatment 
groups (Ministry of Public Health 2010).  
Table 16. Level of performance payment 
 Indicator Payment 
1 Visit of antenatal care  US$ 2·8  
2 Skilled birth attendance  US$ 37  
3 Visit of postnatal care  US$ 2·8  
4 Pentavalent3 vaccination US$ 3  
PBF was evaluated through a large-scale pragmatic cluster-randomized trial, details 
of which are reported elsewhere (Engineer et al. 2016). All facilities within each 
province were stratified by type of facility and then pair-matched based on outpatient 
utilisation rate. Within each matched pair, health facilities were randomly assigned 
to control and treatment groups. The treatment group received PBF in addition to 
routine funding, while the control group received only routine funding (Ministry of 
Public Health 2010). The evaluation of PBF involved two household surveys 
conducted at baseline in 2010 and end-line in 2015 in the catchment area of a 
sample of total 140 health facilities (70 health facilities in the treatment area and 70 
health facility in the control area). The impact evaluation found that, on average, 
PBF improved all the payment triggering indicators; however, no statistically 
significant differences were found between study arms. In addition, facilities exposed 
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to PBF achieved a statistically higher quality of care index score compared to the 
control group (Ministry of Public Health & KIT Royal Tropical Institute 2015).  
4.3.3.3 Economic evaluation framework  
We compared the PBF ‘treatment’ to the standard of care ‘control’ for the population 
of Afghanistan, assessing cost-effectiveness using incremental cost per disability-
adjusted life years (DALYs) averted. We used a time horizon of one year from the 
start of pregnancy for a hypothetical cohort of women attending BPHS services in 
Afghanistan between 2010 and 2015. We employed a decision tree model to 
estimate DALYs averted by PBF for both mothers and neonates as the trial did not 
report final health outcomes. We parameterised the model with primary cost data, 
service data from the trial and secondary data. We assessed cost-effectiveness from 
a provider perspective (MoPH, donor), as decision makers, that are faced with 
allocating resources from a fixed annual budget, are interested in those costs that 
are accrued to the health sector. 
4.3.3.4 Model design 
We adapted a validated model called “Maternal Health Policy Model” to evaluate the 
costs and health outcomes of the PBF intervention in Afghanistan (Figure 11). This 
model simulates the natural history, events and service utilisation related to 
pregnancy and childbirth, including antenatal care, delivery, abortion, complications, 
and postnatal care (Carvalho, Salehi, and Goldie 2012). Adapting this model, we 
developed two decision trees, one for pregnant mothers and one for newborns, to 
predict incremental costs and health outcomes. The decision trees were 
parameterised with data on the probability of care-seeking and health events 
occurring and associated costs collected during the trial. Within the maternal 
decision tree, pregnant women have the option to use or not use antenatal care 
(ANC) services, to proceed to delivery with or without a skilled birth attendant or 
have an abortion, to incur potential complications of pregnancy (i.e. haemorrhage, 
obstructed labour, sepsis, hypertensive disorders, fistula, anaemia, infertility), and 
to use or not use PNC services. In the neonatal decision tree, newborns may receive 
postnatal care (PNC) and may develop complications (i.e. low birth weight, neonatal 
sepsis, birth asphyxia).   
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Figure 11.  Schematic of (original) Maternal Health Model 
 
Source: Carvalho, Salehi, and Goldie (2012)  
4.3.3.5 Cost parameter estimation 
a. Estimating the cost of implementing the PBF intervention 
We estimated the financial and economic costs of implementing PBF, using primary 
cost data from Afghanistan. Financial costs comprised those payments made to 
support the implementation of the PBF programme, including the PBF managers’ 
salary, the costs of performance data verification, and PBF project administration 
cost. Financial cost data were obtained from PBF project accounts and financial 
reports. Economic costs reflected the opportunity costs of all resources (e.g. space 
and equipment used) used within the PBF programme including resources which 
were not directly paid for by the PBF scheme, or where the price paid did not reflect 
the true opportunity cost of the input. Where PBF costs were shared with other 
interventions and activities, we allocated costs to PBF using a variety of allocation 
factors. Further details can be found in the supplementary appendix. For example, 
the cost of personnel whose salaries were not solely funded by the PBF project was 
allocated based on the proportion of their time spent on PBF related activities. For 
shared building space, we allocated according to the percentage of floor space used 
for the PBF intervention. The cost of transportation was estimated based on the 
consumption of fuel used for the PBF compared to other activities. Since the MoPH 
owned buildings, we used estimates of rent of equivalent building spaces to 
determine building prices. All (non-building) capital costs were annuitized using a 
 207 
 
three-per cent discount rate and life span of five years.  
The cost centres at the central and provincial levels included salaries, data 
verification, and administration. The administration costs were further divided into 
office equipment, building (space), transport, monitoring, communication, training, 
workshop, and tax. At the health facility level, in addition to the above costs, the cost 
centres included the incentive cost and drug cost. The incentive cost was not 
reflected at the programme level as the incentives aimed only for the health facilities. 
The PBF paid a small amount of incentive to provincial managers at the beginning 
of the programme, but it was stopped soon. 
b. Estimating the unit cost of providing services incentivised by PBF 
We also estimated the financial costs of delivering the services supported by PBF 
and those in the standard of care. The costs of PBF services were arrived at by 
adding the costs found in the step-down allocation method and a bottom-up cost 
allocation method. We estimated the unit cost of service delivery in terms of staff 
time, incentive, drugs, and administration cost. The administration costs included 
the cost of transportation, equipment and building (space). We conducted primary 
data collection, using micro-costing methods, in a random sample of 25 health 
facilities from the 463 BPHS health facilities where the PBF intervention was 
implemented to estimate the unit costs of services. Staff time spent on each service 
and equipment use was based on interviews with staff. The percentage of floor 
space used for each service was measured. The average costs of drugs and 
supplies used were calculated using the list of prescribed medicine for each service 
and the pharmacy register book at each of the health facilities. The unit costs, minus 
PBF incentives and support, were used to estimate service costs in the standard of 
care.  
c. Estimating the incremental cost of the PBF programme 
The incremental unit cost of services of PBF programme was then estimated in the 
decision analytical model by adding the unit cost for each of the services (in both 
PBF arm and standard of care arm) received by the cohort in the decision analytic 
model. Utilisation rates of maternal and newborn services at PBF and standard of 
care (control) facilities were derived from the PBF impact evaluation (Ministry of 
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Public Health & KIT Royal Tropical Institute 2015). We used secondary data from 
the literature for the unit costs of maternal and newborn related complications 
(Carvalho, Salehi, and Goldie 2012). Prices in local currency were converted to US 
dollars to allow comparisons between countries (1 US dollar to 58 Afghani in 2015). 
All costs were inflated and adjusted to 2015 US dollars. 
4.3.3.6 Service utilisation and outcomes 
We translated the impact of PBF on the utilisation of maternal and neonatal services 
and maternal and newborn complications into DALYs in the model. DALYs are the 
sum of years of life lost (change of mortality) and years of life lived with disability 
(change of morbidity) (Rushby et al. 2001). DALYs were estimated as the sum of 
lives saved from increased use of services and, lives saved and reduced morbidity 
from a reduction in the incidence of complications. 
For each complication, we estimated years of life lived with disability, using disability 
weights obtained from the Global Disease Burden study (World Health Organization 
2004) and duration based on local expert opinion. For the maternal and neonatal 
complications, we computed years of life lost based on the risk of mortality from 
obstructed labour, maternal sepsis, haemorrhage, hypertensive disorder, birth 
asphyxia, neonatal sepsis, and neonatal low birthweight from the literature. In the 
estimate of years of life gained from increased use of services and reduced 
incidence of complications, we used age-specific life expectancy of women and 
newborns obtained from Afghanistan Mortality Survey 2010 (Ministry of Public 
Health, Central Statistics Organization, ICF Macro, Indian Institute of Health 
Management Research 2010). We compared our prediction of mortality to current 
maternal mortality rates in Afghanistan. 
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Table 17. Model Parameters 
Parameter  Source  
Base Case 
Value  
 Lower  
Limit 
 Upper 
Limit  
Distribution 
in PSA 
Pregnant Population in PBF 
provinces  
Survey 
         
79,504  
         
77,388 
         
81,619  
 
ANC rate Survey 
             
0·60  
            
0·52  
            
0·68  
Beta 
SBA rate Carvalho et al. (2012)  
             
0·52  
            
0·50  
            
0·54  
Beta 
PNC rate Carvalho et al. (2012) 
             
0·55  
            
0·51  
            
0·60  
Beta 
Unit cost of ANC  Carvalho et al. (2012) 
             
4·72  
            
4·7 
 
5·7 
Gamma 
Unit cost of delivery with SBA  Carvalho et al. (2012) 
             
48·48  
            
48·0  
            
52·5 
Gamma 
Unit cost of PNC  Carvalho et al. (2012) 
             
5·38 
 
5.1  
 
5.9 
 
Gamma 
Management of maternal 
haemorrhage cost 
Carvalho et al. (2012) 
             
0·11  
            
0·05  
            
0·23  
Gamma 
Management of obstructed 
labour Cost 
Carvalho et al. (2012) 
           
69·33  
          
34·67  
         
173·33  
Gamma 
Treatment of Maternal Sepsis 
Cost 
Carvalho et al. (2012) 
           
37·46  
          
18·73  
          
93·64  
Gamma 
Management of hypertensive 
disorders Cost 
Carvalho et al. (2012) 
           
57·31  
          
28·65  
         
143·28  
Gamma 
Management of abortion cost Carvalho et al. (2012) 
           
45·98  
          
31·54  
          
79·42  
Gamma 
Safe abortion cost Carvalho et al. (2012) 
           
31·96  
          
15·98  
          
47·94  
Gamma 
Management of unsafe 
abortion cost 
Carvalho et al. (2012) 
           
60·00  
          
30·00  
          
90·00  
Gamma 
Management of low birth Cost JHU et al. (2018) 
             
8·91  
            
6·40  
            
8·67  
Gamma 
Management of Sepsis Cost Carvalho et al. (2012) 
           
21·31  
          
18·20  
          
22·83  
Gamma 
Management of birth asphyxia 
Cost 
Carvalho et al. (2012)               
6·34  
            
7·65  
            
5·57  
Gamma 
Haemorrhage incidence 
Carvalho et al. (2012)               
0·11  
            
0·05  
            
0·23  
Beta 
Hypertensive disorder 
incidence 
Carvalho et al. (2012)               
0·03  
            
0·01  
            
0·05  
Beta 
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Abortion incidence  
Carvalho et al. (2012)               
0·105  
            
0·084  
            
0·096 
Beta 
Unsafe abortion incidence  Carvalho et al. (2012) 
             
0·04  
            
0·02  
            
0·10  
Beta 
Obstructed labour incidence MoPH et al. (2010) 
             
0·06  
            
0·03  
            
0·07  
Beta 
Severe anaemia incidence  Ugwu et al. (2012)  
             
0·09  
            
0·08  
            
0·09  
Beta 
Maternal sepsis incidence   Ugwu et al. (2012) 
             
0·05  
            
0·04  
            
0·06  
Beta 
Fistula incidence  Carvalho et al. (2012) 
             
0·02  
            
0·02  
            
0·04  
Beta 
infertility incidence  Carvalho et al. (2012) 
             
0·09  
            
0·08  
            
0·09  
Beta 
Low birth weight incidence Carvalho et al. (2012) 
             
0·17  
            
0·12  
            
0·05  
Beta 
Neonatal Sepsis/Infection 
incidence  
Carvalho et al. (2012) 
             
0·02  
            
0·02  
            
0·01  
Beta 
Birth asphyxia incidence  Carvalho et al. (2012) 
             
0·03  
            
0·02  
            
0·01  
Beta 
Fistula duration Expert Opinion 32.0   28.0  36.0  
Severe anaemia duration Expert Opinion 
             
0·50  
            
0·50  
            
0·50  
 
Infertility duration 
Expert Opinion            
17·00  
          
17·00  
          
17·0  
 
Low birth weight duration 
Expert Opinion              
0.06  
            
0.04  
            
0.08  
 
Neonatal sepsis/all infection 
duration 
Expert Opinion              
0·04  
            
0·02  
            
0·06  
 
Birth asphyxia duration 
Expert Opinion              
0·19  
            
0·01  
            
0·04  
 
Severe anaemia disability 
weight 
Expert Opinion              
0·16  
            
0·16  
            
0·16  
 
 
ANC=Antenatal care; PNC=Postnatal care; SBA = Skilled birth attendance  
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4.3.4 Analysis  
We estimated the incremental cost-effectiveness ratio (ICER) defined as the 
incremental cost of PBF per DALY averted compared to the standard of care. The 
ICER was assessed against the US$ 349 per capita threshold estimated by Wood et 
al.’s (2015) for Afghanistan, as no more recent estimates were available. We used a 
three per cent discount rate on costs and DALYs averted in our primary analysis. We 
undertook a series of one-way sensitivity analyses across key model parameters 
varying each parameter at a time up to ±30 per cent of the base case value and two-
way sensitivity analysis on the model. In addition, we used probabilistic sensitivity 
analysis to assess parameter uncertainty and produce a 95%-confidence interval 
around the ICER.  
4.3.5 Results  
The total financial and economic provider cost of implementing the PBF programme 
were 10,677,465 US$ and 11,896,380 US$, respectively, during the six-year life of 
the scheme, as shown in Table 18. Incentive payments were the main contributor to 
economic costs (63%) followed by HMIS data verification (21%), programme 
administration (10%), and staff time (6%).  
Table 18. The total cost of implementing PBF over six years 
Cost Centre   Financial Cost Percentage   Economic Cost   Percentage  
Salary  522,957 5% 772,118 6% 
 Incentives   7,481,266 70% 7,481,266 63% 
 Verification   2,475,952 23% 2,475,952 21% 
 Administration   197,290 2% 1,167,043 10% 
 Total (US$)  10,677,465 100% 11,896,380 100% 
Incentive payments were the main contributor to economic costs (63%) followed by 
HMIS data verification (21%), programme administration (10%), and staff time (6%). 
Table 19 shows the PBF annual financial programme cost. See supplementary 
annexe 5 for more details. 
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Table 19. PBF financial programme cost breakdown (US$) 
 
Cost centre  
              
2010  
                 
2011  
                 
2012  
                 
2013  
                 
2014  
                 
2015  
  
Total   
 
Salary  
            
20,341  
              
84,074  
              
98,066  
              
98,592  
            
105,870  
            
116,014  
                   
522,957  
 
Incentive  
            
39,604  
            
428,397  
         
1,379,626  
         
1,875,394  
         
1,797,594  
         
1,960,651  
                
7,481,266  
 
Data verification 
                     
0 
         
591,022  
            
684,582  
            
712,818  
            
229,702  
            
257,828  
                
2,475,952  
 
Administration  
            
27,698  
              
40,822  
              
37,149  
              
36,755  
              
29,836  
              
37,104  
                   
197,290  
 
Total (US$)  
            
87,644  
         
1,144,316  
         
2,199,422  
         
2,723,558  
         
2,163,002  
         
2,371,597  
              
10,677,465  
The average annual costs for PBF facilities of providing ANC, SBA and PNC services 
were US$ 21,877 (CI 95%: 14,359-26,818) compared to US$ 2,167 (CI 95%: 2,073-
2,438) in control facilities (Table 20)  
Table 20. The average costs of PBF indicators in the control and treatment groups 
per health facility per year (US$ 2015) 
Cost Centre  ANC Cost  SBA Cost  PNC Cost  Cost per HF  
Cost Centres Control PBF Control PBF Control PBF Control PBF 
Salary 
            
607  
            
867  
      
460  
            
658  
      
419  
            
598  
     
1,486  
       
2,123  
Incentive 
               
-    
         
4,345            -    
      
10,170            -    
        
2,353              -    
     
16,868  
Data Verification 
               
-    
            
214            -    
            
214            -    
            
214              -    
          
642  
Drug 
              
22  
              
32  
        
15  
              
22  
         
12  
              
17  
           
49  
             
71  
Administration cost 
            
183  
            
261  
      
316  
            
452  
      
133  
            
190  
        
632  
       
2,167  
Cost per health facility  
            
812  
         
5,719  
      
791  
      
11,516  
      
564  
        
3,372  
     
2,167  
     
21,871  
ANC=Antenatal care; PNC=Postnatal care; SBA = Skilled birth attendance  
Table 21 shows the unit cost of services in the PBF and control groups. The estimated 
unit costs receiving ANC, SBA and PNC services in the control group were US$ 0·96 
(CI 95%: 0·92-1·0), US$ 4·76 (CI 95%: 4·1-6·3) and $US 1·3 (CI 95%: 1·2-1·4), 
respectively, while the costs of ANC, SBA and PNC services in the treatment group 
were US$ 4·72 (CI 95%: 3·6-5·8), US$ 48·5 (CI 95%: 48·0-52·5), and US$ 5·4 (CI 
95%: 5·1-5·9), respectively. The costs of incentives and data verification were the 
main driver for the higher unit costs in the PBF facilities.  
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Table 21. The unit cost of delivering selected maternal and neonatal health services 
for facilities in control and treatment groups 
Services  Control Treatment  
Antenatal care (US$) 0·96 (CI 95%: 0·6-1·5) 4·7 (CI 95%:3·6-5·8) 
Skilled birth Attendance (US$) 4·8 (CI 95%: 4·1-6·3) 48·0 (CI 95%: 31·0-67·8) 
Postnatal care (US$) 1·3 (CI 95%: 0·8-2·1) 5·4 (CI 95%: 4·3-6·5) 
CI = Confidence Interval 
In total, 13,028 incremental DALYs (5,658 incremental maternal DALYs and 7,370 
incremental neonatal DALYs) were averted by the PBF programme which 
corresponds to an incremental 253 deaths averted (138 maternal and 115 neonatal) 
between 2010 and 2015, across the 11 provinces of Afghanistan, with a total 
population of 4·06 million living in the coverage area of PBF facilities. The incremental 
cost of the PBF programme per DALY averted was 1,241 US$. The probabilistic 
sensitivity analysis (1228 US$) found that under zero per cent of simulations the ICER 
lay below Afghanistan’s opportunity cost threshold (not cost-effective). Figure 11 
presents the PBF cost-effectiveness acceptability curve, Figure 12 the cost-
effectiveness plane.   
Figure 11. PBF Cost-effectiveness acceptability curve 
WTP= Willingness to pay; GDP= Gross domestic product  
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Figure 12.  Cost-effectiveness plane of PBF treatment group compared to the control 
group 
 
DALY=Disability adjusted life years; ICER = Incremental cost-effectiveness ratio 
 
4.3.6 Discussion 
Afghanistan implemented a PBF intervention on a large scale aiming to improve MCH 
services. The PBF intervention was evaluated through a pragmatic cluster-
randomized trial. We developed a decision-analytic model of the care pathways, costs 
and outcomes for pregnant women and newborns to estimate the incremental cost-
effectiveness of the PBF scheme relative to the standard of care. Although the PBF 
intervention resulted in an improvement in the quality of MCH services in the PBF 
group, our study found this initiative was unlikely to be cost-effective from a provider’s 
perspective. The finding supports that of a study in Tanzania that also reported that 
the PBF intervention was not cost-effective, despite improvements in utilisation rates, 
although this study did not measure DALYs averted or the unit costs of service 
delivery under the PBF programme (Borghi, et al. 2015). However, our study is in 
contrast to the only previous study from Zambia in which the PBF intervention was 
found to be cost-effective (Zeng, Shepard, et al. 2018). However, this study was found 
inadequate in terms of the methods used (Paul et al. 2020). 
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Our study found that the costs of implementing the PBF programme in Afghanistan 
were substantial. PBF programme costs were primarily driven by the payment of 
incentives and data verification linked to incentive payments (together accounting for 
93% of the total financial cost and 84% of the total economic cost). The high proportion 
of the cost accounted for by incentives contrasts with Zambia and Tanzania. In 
Zambia, incentives and verification accounted for around 50% of the total cost (Zeng, 
Shepard, et al. 2018). Borghi et al. (2015) reported a high administration cost 
(financial 63% and economic 78%) in Tanzania when implementing the PBF 
intervention. Similarly, a systematic review of ten studies from the United States, two 
from the United Kingdom, one from Germany and one from China also reported high 
administration costs of PBF approaches (~60%) (Meacock, Kristensen, and Sutton 
2014).  
There are a number of possible explanations for the lack of cost-effectiveness of PBF 
to support the basic package for MCH services in Afghanistan. Firstly, the theory of 
change that supported the design of PBF in Afghanistan posited that high levels of 
financial incentives would motivate healthcare workers to improve quality of care and 
subsequently increase demand for MCH services (Engineer et al. 2016). While 
incentives may influence providers, availability of resources such as sufficient 
healthcare workers, equipment, essential drugs and supplies, and effective referral 
systems are essential to ensure quality provision of services (World Health 
Organization 2019). However, the PBF programme was unable to overcome these 
systemic resource constraints, and the health facilities did not have the financial 
autonomy to procure resources locally (Salehi et al. 2020). In Zambia, health workers 
had significant autonomy in addressing the shortage of essential inputs in health 
facilities (Zeng, Shepard, et al. 2018).  
Secondly, the level of incentive is critical to PBF efficiency (Oxman and Fretheim 
2009). Too low an incentive might fail to result in behaviour change while too high an 
incentive consumes resources unnecessarily. In Afghanistan’s PBF scheme, the 
incentive payment for delivery with SBA was set at US$ 37 per case. On the other 
hand, the incentives for ANC and PNC were set much lower, at US$ 2.8 per case. 
The SBA incentive made 72 per cent of the overall cost of the PBF incentives, and it 
consumed 51 per cent of the PBF total financial cost whereas the ANC and PNC 
incentives constituted only 17 per cent and 9 per cent of the PBF total financial cost. 
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While the substantial effect of SBA on proper management of delivery and prevention 
of pregnancy complications is critical, both ANC and PNC are also important. ANC 
has a positive effect on the identification of pre-eclampsia/eclampsia and prevention 
of anaemia (Oyerinde 2013), and PNC plays a crucial role in early identification and 
appropriate referral of maternal and newborn complications, family planning, and 
promotion of healthy behaviours for mother and newborn. Both are designed to 
encourage a sustained relationship between health services and the mother during 
pregnancy. It is also important to note that 66 per cent of global maternal mortality 
happens in the postpartum period, and the first 24 hours after delivery is crucial given 
45 per cent of deaths occur in this time (Strover et al. 2016). Therefore, while the 
incentives set may have reflected a level of workload, it is also essential to consider 
the value of services in terms of their contribution to health outcomes, and not 
comparatively disincentivise those services with low or no additional payments.  
Thirdly, even though HMIS data verification is a crucial element of PBF interventions, 
this ‘transaction cost’ can be relatively high (Zeng, Shepard, et al. 2018). In Benin, the 
data verification processes were found very costly (50 per cent of the PBF total 
financial cost) and very time consuming that negatively affected the feedback 
mechanism to health facilities to improve health service delivery, in addition to delays 
in performance payments (Antony, Bertone, and Barthes 2017). In Afghanistan, data 
verification was conducted at the health facility and community levels by the third party 
bi-annually. The verification cost was 23 per cent of the total financial cost and 21 per 
cent of the overall economic cost of the PBF intervention in Afghanistan. This cost 
could be reduced through more efficient modalities. For example, Zambia replaced 
monthly verification of all health facilities with a risk-based model in which health 
facilities were assessed based on the expected risk of misrepresenting data (Ma-Nitu 
et al. 2018). Borghi et al. (2015) estimation shows that if data verification is fully 
integrated into the systems, the cost of data verification could be reduced significantly.  
Our study has some limitations. The main limitation is that we had to estimate health 
service costs in the non-PBF sites, using micro-costing from the PBF sites. This was 
done based on the assumption that underlying service costs and expenditures from 
other sources would be balanced between intervention and control sites due to the 
randomised design, and similar funding to all sites from other funders (including 
government payment of staff salaries). While there may have been some fungibility at 
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the facility level away from MCH services in PBF sites, biasing our PBF site upwards, 
this will have been minimal, and only applicable to non-salary items. On the effect 
side, there may have been a spillover effect from the PBF group into the control group 
due to the location of both facilities in the same province, and the movement of staff 
and the population across facilities. Control health facilities were likely aware of PBF 
and tried to compete with treatment health facilities on performance.  
4.3.7 Conclusion  
To conclude, our study found that PBF, as implemented in the Afghanistan context, 
was not the best use of funds to strengthen the delivery of MCH services. It is likely 
that the incentive amounts for delivery services were very high that led to consume a 
large portion of the fund without increasing sufficient demand for the services. In 
contrast, incentive amounts were too low for ANC and PNC services that did not 
provide ground for improved motivation. Besides, there was neither financial 
resources nor autonomy at the health facility level to address service performance 
constraints, and data verification was not economically efficient. Further research into 
the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of PBF schemes with different designs in 
different settings is important to ensure that PBF improves performance and inform 
how best to strategically purchase health benefit packages in LMICS in order to make 
progress towards universal health coverage.  
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CONCLUSION 
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In the following chapter, the key findings of the research performed for this thesis are 
summarised and discussed. Next, the thesis policy and research implications are 
highlighted, and the limitations of the study are recognised. Lastly, a conclusion with 
methodological recommendations is presented. 
   DISCUSSION  
5.1.1 Summary of Findings  
We investigated factors that impacted the performance of PBC in Afghanistan. The 
study results indicate that PBC has been successfully implemented in the country. 
The evidence shows that three groups of factors impacted the process of designing 
and implementing the PBC, namely contextual, contractual and institutional factors. 
Some contextual factors such as political support, involvement of non-state providers, 
and community engagement assisted the implementation of PBC. However, factors 
such as the geographical complexities, political interference by provincial leaders and 
the lack of security were detrimental. Contractual factors, like the effectiveness of 
input and output management, facilitated the provision of health services. Institutional 
factors, including quality human resources and pharmaceutical management, were 
notable elements that contributed to the successful results of PBC.  
We further explored factors influencing the process of PBF adoption, design and 
implementation in Afghanistan. The findings indicate that global trends towards PBF 
as well as political considerations, in addition to local necessities for financial 
resources in order to improve maternal and child health in Afghanistan contributed to 
the adoption of PBF in Afghanistan. However, the inadequate PBF programme design 
led to certain challenges. Although the PBF programme concentrated on supply-side 
financing, the practical situation revealed the necessity for both supply-side and 
demand-financing interventions to strengthen the referral system. Besides, when 
deciding on the adoption of PBF, the MoPH relied on their past experience (path 
dependency) of the successful implementation of PBC, without assessing whether 
sufficient capacity existed in the health system to manage the PBF programme. Thus, 
due to a flawed design and insufficient management capacity, the programme 
encountered a number of implementation challenges such as delays in performance 
payments at different levels, challenges in implementing HMIS data verification, 
disputes among health facility staff in term of the distribution of incentives, and a 
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shortage of key inputs such as drugs and supplies in PBF health facilities. 
Furthermore, the PBF programme’s centralized management structure overlooked 
the MoPH provincial capacity in managing the programme. The PHOs and NSPs were 
publicly showing their interest in PBF while privately they assumed it as a burden 
without gaining an advantage. The programme also missed an important opportunity 
to engage CHWs in the performance payment scheme to increase referral cases of 
target services from the community to PBF health facilities. The WB maintained 
control over the PBF programme procurement and financial management at the cost 
of neglecting the role of the country as the owner of the PBF programme.   
Our systematic review of economic evaluations of RBF programmes found that a 
growing number of studies have examined the costs and outcomes of RBF 
programmes in a variety of settings. However, most of these studies were conducted 
in high-income countries (Emmert et al. 2012; Meacock, Kristensen, and Sutton 2014; 
Turcotte-Tremblay et al. 2016). Furthermore, previous reviews mainly relied on partial 
economic evaluations. We also found out that no economic evaluation of PBC has 
been done in FCAS where a growing number of RBF programmes have been 
implemented. All studies focused on PBF programmes. Our systematic review of the 
cost-effectiveness of RBF programmes aimed at synthesising economic evaluation 
studies of RBF programmes implemented in LMICs. The previous reviews suggested 
that weak methodological designs limited the conclusiveness of findings from 
economic evaluations of RBF programmes. Though our review found some strengths 
in the methodologies adopted in the studies, there were some methodologies 
limitations observed too. For example, three studies did not use a cost-effectiveness 
threshold, and two studies applied the WHO suggested cost-effectiveness threshold, 
which is debatable (Paul et al. 2020). Therefore, our findings do not allow us to reach 
to a conclusive decision whether results-based financing is the most effective option 
of the use of funds to improve health and strengthen health systems. To optimise RBF 
in terms of its value for money, an analysis of its cost-effectiveness with vigorous 
evaluation design, particularly in low-income countries and FCASs where a growing 
number of RBF programmes have been implemented is recommended. 
Our study of the cost-effectiveness analysis of the PBF programme in Afghanistan 
including the costs of implementing PBF and the unit cost of incentivised services 
found that the PBF programme in Afghanistan was not a cost-effective use of 
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resources for a variety of reasons.  While part of the problem was a flawed programme 
design, on the effect side, the PBF primarily concentrated on the provision of 
incentives to healthcare professionals, with insufficient attention to ensuring critical 
health system inputs were in place, including human resources, necessary 
pharmaceuticals and equipment. Though the PBF impact evaluation (Ministry of 
Public Health & KIT Royal Tropical Institute 2015) reported some improvement in 
input management of PBF health facilities, our findings elsewhere (Salehi, Blanchet, 
et al. 2020) confirms the shortage of key inputs in PBF health facilities. On the cost 
side, the level of incentive was too high for delivery services and too low for other 
services, with implications for programme inefficiency and its ability to motivate 
healthcare workers. Additionally, although the verification of HMIS data was a critical 
component of the PBF programme, its associated costs were excessive, accounting 
for 23 per cent of the overall PBF budget.  We concluded that PBF programme was 
not a cost-effective option for Afghanistan.   
5.1.2 The Thesis Synthesis  
Our findings show that the outcomes of the PBC and PBF programmes in Afghanistan 
were very different despite their implementation in the same setting. In relation to 
PBC, the context established suitable levels of support for the adoption of PBC both 
nationally and internationally. The strategy of following a PBC approach and 
transferring the delivery of healthcare services from the state to NSPs was 
implemented at a critical juncture after the establishment of a democratic regime 
within the country subsequent to an extended period of internal conflict, violence and 
war (Hansen et al. 2008). The Afghan government was not sufficiently capable of 
expanding primary healthcare services to rural areas. The quality of care was poor, 
while healthcare indicators were considered to be the lowest globally (Waldman and 
Newbrander 2014; Bartlett et al. 2005), resulting in support for the delivery of BPHS 
services to citizens through the NSPs on the basis of PBC. The level of political 
support that the new policy was shown was unparalleled. Moreover, the EC, USAID 
and WB provided considerable technical assistance to the MoPH and NSPs with 
activities on an ongoing basis.  
In contrast, similar conditions did not emerge in Afghanistan at the time of adopting 
and implementing the PBF programme. While the motivation underlying the decision 
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to implement PBF was based on the global trend and local needs towards PBF as a 
potential solution to improve maternal and child health, the level of support shown to 
PBF, especially by development partners was minimal during the process of designing 
and implementing the programme. Although donors (except the WB), UN agencies, 
NSPs, and PHOs were not opposed to PBF, they were not particularly enthusiastic to 
cooperate. This stemmed from the fact that the WB and MoPH failed to build 
consensus among key actors to adopt PBF as an essential tool to strengthen MCH 
services. Our findings are partially similar to those reported in Uganda (Ssengooba, 
McPake, and Palmer 2012), which claimed that insufficient comprehension of the 
contextual factors when designing the PBF for Uganda, underestimation of the 
required technical and institutional capacity to implement the PBF programme, and 
overlooking the role of some key actors inevitably led to the failure of the programme.  
Secondly, our findings indicate that in terms of both PBC and PBF, the World Bank 
had influence on the respective agendas. However, with regard to the PBC, the 
decision by numerous donors to fund PBC programme subsequently strengthened 
the position of the MoPH with regard to negotiating the programme terms with 
partners and maintaining a central role in the management and coordination of the 
programme throughout the implementation process. In contrast, the PBF programme 
did not appeal to a sufficient number of partners. The sole donor of the PBF 
programme was the WB, who consequently maintained a significant level of 
involvement in directing the agenda, shaping the PBF programme, and overseeing its 
implementation. Consequently, the PBF design was not adapted to the local context 
in the design phase and it was lacking responsiveness to the context during the 
implementation phase. The findings of the present study are similar to those of other 
researchers, which affirm the role of donors in numerous cases with regard to setting 
agendas (Crawford 2003) as well influencing the decision-making processes with 
regard to health financing policies in LMICs (Paul et al. 2018; Isidore et al. 2017). The 
overriding influence of donors could lead to frustration and mistrust between donors 
and recipient countries, as witnessed in the context of the PBF programme in 
Tanzania (Chimhutu et al. 2015).  
 
Thirdly, our findings show that PBF programme was not the best use of fund in 
Afghanistan. The PBF programme failed to address the essential resource 
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requirement of the BPHS health facilities in terms of inputs such as human resources 
(particularly female staff) and pharmaceuticals. In fact, the health facilities did not 
have the autonomy to procure resources locally (Salehi et al. 2020). In Zambia, health 
workers had significant autonomy in addressing the shortage of essential inputs in 
health facilities (Zeng, Shepard, et al. 2018). Besides, the level of incentive payment 
for the delivery of maternal services was set inefficiently without considering the value 
of services in terms of their contribution to health outcomes. As an example, the 
incentive payment for delivery with SBA was set at US$ 37 per case which made 72 
per cent of the overall cost of the PBF incentives, and 51 per cent of the PBF total 
financial cost. Obviously, too high an incentive consumes resources unnecessarily. 
Likewise, the cost of data verification was relatively high, consuming almost one-
quarter of the PBF total budget. This cost could be reduced through more efficient 
modalities such as a risk-based model in which health facilities are assessed based 
on the expected risk of misrepresenting data (Ma-Nitu et al. 2018) or full integration 
of data verification into the national system (Borghi, et al. 2015).  
Lastly, after being implemented, PBC developed into a national programme that has 
made a significant contribution to the health systems development in the country. 
Conversely, PBF was launched as a supplementary intervention under the umbrella 
of PBC and has never been considered as a countrywide programme, nor has it been 
integrated into the national systems. This viewpoint, specifically from the perspective 
of government employees and those implementing the BPHS reduced the feeling of 
ownership associated with the PBF programme. This could be explained by the 
insufficient participation of key actors during the process of designing and 
implementing the programme. Kiendrebeogo and Meesen (Kiendrébéogo and 
Meessen 2019) suggest that all actors should assume joint ownership of a new 
programme as each could possess knowledge that is essential. The feeling of 
ownership should be engendered nationally in order that all relevant actors can value 
and conform to the programme.  
 
 
5.1.3 Policy Implications 
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This thesis has several policy implications: Firstly, there are numerous factors 
influencing the adoption, design and implementation of RBF programmes. Contextual 
factors such as the potential impact of worldwide trends regarding RBF and the socio-
economic and political conditions have influence in shaping RBF programmes.  
Therefore, it is highly important to ensure adaptability and responsiveness of the RBF 
programme design to the local context, and the availability of the local capacity to 
manage the implementation of RBF (Paul et al. 2018).  
Secondly, actors have significant influence in shaping RBF programmes. Thus, the 
country where RBF is implemented make sure (i) to advocate for political support from 
political individuals and institutions for the RBF programme and ensure local actors 
are engaged in formulating and adapting design to the local context (Ridde and 
Yaméogo 2018); (ii) to engage frontline healthcare workers, especially in the design 
process of RBF. On the basis of the Street-Level Bureaucrats model developed by 
Michael Lipsky (Buse et al. 2007), as frontline public workers (so-called street 
bureaucrats) are responsible for implementing public policies, they are capable of 
reshaping the policies based on their own interests and principles; hence, it is critical 
that their ideas are incorporated into the policies to facilitate effective implementation. 
For example, the involvement of community health workers in the design and 
implementation of PBF in Afghanistan could have improved the overall performance 
of the PBF programme; and (iii) to balance the influence of donors. Donors bring 
money that generally affords them a dominant position within policymaking processes 
and implementation. Nevertheless, money is not the only vehicle through which 
decisions can be influenced. Holding a critical position and possessing technical 
expertise are the two other key factors that enable actors to assume a powerful 
position (Fischer and Strandberg-Larsen 2016). Hence, the country could augment its 
ability to amalgamate its key role with technical expertise to strengthen its level of 
influence, and ensure programme designs are adapted to the local context and the 
necessary pre-conditions are in place for effective programme implementation 
(Fischer and Strandberg-Larsen 2016).  
Thirdly, in order to ensure future support and sustainability of RBF programmes, local 
buy-in situation is essential. This can be achieved only if RBF programmes are owned 
by local technical and political interest groups and institutions from the very beginning 
(Bruno et al. 2017). Donors should allow and help to build national capacity and 
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ownership (Shroff, Bigdeli, and Meessen 2017).  
Fourthly, the country where the RBF is implemented should ensure that the RBF 
programme is cost-effective and financially sustainable. This requires attention not 
only to sound design of RBF programmes and the right choice of interventions but 
also to integrate RBF into the current processes and procedures and strengthen 
health systems including improving the management capacity of the government. 
(Bruno et al. 2017). To help make an RBF programme cost-effective, incentives need 
to be set at the right level to reflect workload and the value of services in terms of their 
contribution to health outcomes. Besides, the programmes should have sufficient 
flexibility in using the programme resources to address service performance 
constraints. The cost of data verification should be kept as low as possible by 
implementing some cost-effective mechanisms such as data verification conducted 
by government (Vergeer et al. 2016) or data verification of health facilities by a risk-
based model in which health facilities are assessed according to the expected risk of 
misrepresenting data (Ma-Nitu et al. 2018). 
Lastly "to be effective, public health advocates need to become better at politics, 
learning how to create political incentives for leaders and how to deal with political 
risk" (Reich 2002, p. 142).  
5.1.4 Thesis Limitations and Future Research  
There are certain limitations to this thesis. Firstly, both PBC and PBF interventions 
were not only applied in the context of the BPHS but additionally in the Essential 
Package of Hospital Services (EPHS) in Afghanistan. The current thesis studied the 
PBC and PBF programmes in the context of only the BPHS. Expansion of the same 
method to secondary healthcare (EPHS) was beyond the scope of this thesis. Future 
research could be directed towards the assessment of the EPHS. Secondly, this 
thesis performed separate investigations on the PBC and PBF programmes, although 
PBF was implemented in the context of PBC. We did not examine the relationship 
between PBC and PBF and its implications on the outcome of PBC and PBF 
programmes. This is an important area for future studies. Thirdly, we only carried out 
a cost-effectiveness analysis of the PBF programme in Afghanistan and were not able 
to assess the cost-effectiveness of PBC due to the absence of a comparison group 
as PBC is a national programme since 2003. In addition, future studies should 
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compare the cost-effectiveness of PBF relative to improved input management of 
health facilities, improved monitoring and supportive supervision, capacity building of 
health care workers, and interventions to promote health worker trust and intrinsic 
motivation. Evidence shows that RBF programmes could have unintended 
consequences. Future studies could consider the integration of unintended effects 
(both positive and negative) within economic evaluation. Finally, we acknowledge that 
the PhD candidate was previously a high-ranking official at the MoPH at the time of 
implementing the PBC and PBF programmes within Afghanistan and his personal 
opinion might have introduced bias. On the other hand, his role in this study was highly 
beneficial. His in-depth understanding from the local context, familiarity with the local 
languages, and having smooth access to senior level actors benefited this study.  
 CONCLUSION  
This thesis investigated RBF programmes related to the BPHS in Afghanistan from 
the lens of cost-effectiveness as well as political economy. The findings show the role 
and interaction of political economy factors in shaping RBF programmes and a lack 
of cost-effectiveness of the PBF programme. The thesis provides support for the 
assertion that not only value for money, but also political economy factors are critical 
in the adoption, design and implementation of RBF programmes. This is in fact a 
methodological addition in the form of conducting a political economy analysis next to 
an economic evaluation to explain not only political factors but also the costs and 
underlying economic values of an RBF programme.  
RBF enforces different arrangements for the distribution of resources and provides 
opportunities or threats for actors through changing their functions and modifying 
institutional processes. Subsequently, a new economic and political situation comes 
into existence. Therefore, policymakers require careful consideration when adopting 
and implementing RBF programmes.  
Researchers should increasingly focus on the political economy aspect of RBF 
programmes in conjunction with economic evaluations, particularly in the context of 
FCSs to ensure that the technical outcomes of economic evaluations are suitably 
received in the context of highly political situations. Failing to consider the political 
economy aspect of the RBF programmes could lead to methodological bias, 
subsequently to mispresentation of the success or failure of RBF programmes. If RBF 
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programmes are designed around a full understanding of political economy and value 
for money, RBF can potentially be a powerful tool to achieve better outcomes.  
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Supplementary materials of the introduction section 
 
Annexe 1. Antenatal care services in BPHS 
 
Antenatal Care Services by Type of Facility 
Interventions and Services Provided Health Facility Level 
 HP HSC BHC MHT CHC DH 
Information, education, and communication (IEC) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Diagnosis of pregnancy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Antenatal visits—weight, height measurement No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Tetanus immunisation Outreach Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Iron and folic acid supplementation to pregnant women Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Multi-micronutrient supplementation Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Blood pressure measurement No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Treatment of intestinal worms Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Treatment of malaria Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Screening for and management of sexually transmitted diseases No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Treatment of hypertensive disorders of pregnancy No Yes, refer Yes, refer Yes Yes Yes 
Treatment of pre-eclampsia/eclampsia No Yes, refer Yes, refer Yes Yes, refer Yes 
Treatment of incomplete miscarriage/abortion No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Treatment of ectopic pregnancy No Stabilize, refer Stabilize, refer Stabilize, refer Stabilize, refer Yes 
Infection control, safe injection practices, and proper waste disposal Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      Source:  Ministry of Public Health of Afghanistan, BPHS 2010 
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Annexe 2. Delivery care in BPHS 
Delivery Care Services by Type of Facility 
 
Interventions and Services Provided 
Health Facility Level 
HP HSC BHC MHT CHC DH 
Information, education, and communication Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Monitor progression of labour No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Assist normal delivery  No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Vaginal delivery requiring additional procedures/equipment No Yes, refer Yes, refer Yes, refer Yes Yes 
Parenteral administration of oxytocin No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Parenteral administration of anticonvulsants No Yes, refer Yes, refer Yes, refer Yes, refer Yes 
Bimanual compression of the uterus No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Suturing tears and provision of intravenous fluids No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Safe blood transfusion No No No No Yes Yes 
Manual removal of placenta No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Curettage No No No No Yes Yes 
Hysterectomy No No No No No Yes 
Management of prolapsed cord No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Vacuum extraction (assisted vaginal delivery) No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Caesarean section No No No No No Yes 
Parenteral administration of antibiotics (first dose) No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Source:  Ministry of Public Health of Afghanistan, BPHS 2010 
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Annexe 3. Postnatal care in BPHS  
 
Postpartum Care Services by Type of Facility 
 
Interventions and Services Provided 
Health Facility Level 
HP HSC BHC MHT CHC DH 
Information, education, and communication Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Vitamin A supplementation to mother Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Treatment of anaemia Refer Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Treatment of puerperal infection Refer Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Antibiotics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Breast examination (if privacy is not an issue) Refer Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Counselling on birth spacing and exclusive 
breastfeeding 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Provide birth spacing methods Condom or injectable 
progesterone 
Condom/Oral or 
injectable 
progesterone 
Condom/Oral or 
injectable 
progesterone 
Condom/Oral or 
injectable 
progesterone 
Condom/Oral or 
injectable 
progesterone 
Condom/Oral or 
injectable 
progesterone 
Case definition and referral of infertility cases to 
provincial hospital 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
          Source:  Ministry of Public Health of Afghanistan, BPHS 2010 
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Annexe 4. Care of newborn in BPHS 
Care of the Newborn Services by Type of Facility 
 
Interventions and Services Provided 
Health Facility Level 
HP HSC BHC MHT CHC DH 
Information, education, and communication Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Stimulate, clean airway; clean, clamp, and cut 
cord; establish early breastfeeding 
Yes Yes Yes Emergency Yes Yes 
Prevention of ophthalmic of the newborn No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Resuscitation of the newborn No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Newborn immunizations No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Kangaroo care No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Incubator No No No No Yes Yes 
Manage neonatal infections Pre referral 
treatment, refer 
Pre referral 
treatment, refer 
Pre referral 
treatment, refer 
Pre referral 
treatment, refer 
Yes Yes 
Manage neonatal sepsis Pre referral 
treatment, refer 
Pre referral 
treatment, refer 
Pre referral 
treatment, refer 
Pre referral 
treatment, refer 
Yes Yes 
Manage neonatal jaundice Counselling Counselling Counselling Counselling Counselling Yes 
Manage neonatal tetanus Refer Refer Refer Refer Refer Yes 
         Source:  Ministry of Public Health of Afghanistan, BPHS 2010 
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Annexe 5. Supplementary material of paper 4 
 
Cost-Effectiveness Analysis for Performance-Based Financing for the Basic 
Package of Health Services in Afghanistan 
Supplementary Appendix (SA)  
Further Background to Model Parameterisation 
Antenatal care (ANC) 
The MoPH defines the ANC as the proportion of women who attend at least one ANC 
visit with a skilled provider of their most recent delivery (Ministry of Public Health of 
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 2011).  
The role of ANC in reducing maternal complications is insignificant given the ANC is 
unable to identify cases that will develop major complications such as postpartum 
haemorrhage, obstructed labour, sepsis, and complications of labour. However, ANC 
has effects on pre-eclampsia/eclampsia and prevention of anaemia. (McDonagh 
1996; Carroli, Rooney, and Villar 2001; Rooney 1992; Oyerinde 2013). In mid-
pregnancy, the haemoglobin concentration slightly falls that affects both mother and 
fetus (Rooney 1992). Pregnant women are advised iron supplements in their 
antenatal visits to prevent the fall in haemoglobin concentration.  
According to ADHS 2015, 59 per cent of women receive at least one antenatal care 
from a skilled provider. However, only 18 per cent of women have the recommended 
four round of ANC visits. Almost 79 per cent of women measure their blood pressure, 
42 per cent of women receive iron supplements, and 56 per cent receive information 
regarding pregnancy complications as part of antenatal care (Central Statistics 
Organization 2015).  
The impact evaluation of PBF provides utilisation data on ANC by comparing the PBF 
intervention group with the comparison group at baseline (2010) and endline (2015). 
Skilled Birth Attendance (SBA) 
The MoPH defines the SBA as care provided by a professional health care worker to 
a mother during delivery (Ministry of Public Health of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 
2011). A skilled birth attendant is “a midwife, physician, obstetrician, nurse or other 
health care professional who provides essential and emergency health care services 
to women and their newborn during pregnancy, childbirth and the postpartum period” 
(Jhpiego 2015). Evidence shows that SBA has a substantial effect not only on proper 
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management of normal labour/delivery but also on reducing maternal and newborn 
morbidities and mortality. SBA can prevent four crucial complications of pregnancy 
and delivery-related complications that are haemorrhage, obstructed labour, 
eclampsia, and puerperal sepsis (Graham, Bell, and Bullough 2001; Campbell and 
Graham 2006). ADHS 2015 reports that 48 per cent of births occur in a health facility 
in Afghanistan (Central Statistics Organization 2015). The impact evaluation of PBF 
provides information on the utilisation of SBA services in both intervention and 
comparison groups at baseline and endline points.  
Postnatal Care (PNC) 
The MoPH defines PNCs as the percentage of women who receive at least one PNC 
from a trained provider within 42 days of delivery (Ministry of Public Health of Islamic 
Republic of Afghanistan 2011). A PNC includes early identification and appropriate 
referral of complications, prevention of maternal to child transmission of HIV, family 
planning, and promotion of healthy behaviours for mother and newborn.  
A literature review conducted in 1996 reported that 66 per cent of global maternal 
mortality happened in the postpartum period. The first 24 hours after the delivery was 
crucial, given 45 per cent of deaths occurred in this time. Similarly, 65 per cent and 
80 per cent of postpartum deaths happened in one week and two week times, 
respectively (Strover et al. 2016).  
According to ADHS 2015, 40 per cent of mothers receive the recommended postnatal 
health check within two days of delivery in Afghanistan. The impact evaluation of PBF 
provides information on the utilisation of PNC in PBF intervention and comparison 
groups at baseline and endline points.  
Pregnancy, Delivery and Birth Complications 
Afghanistan Mortality Survey 2010 presents data on the causes of pregnancy-related 
deaths (Ministry of Public Health, Central Statistics Office, ICF Macro 2011). 
Postpartum haemorrhage is the leading cause of deaths in Afghanistan (55·9 per 
cent) followed by preeclampsia/eclampsia (19·8 per cent), prolonged obstructed 
labour (10·7 per cent), and sepsis (5 per cent). The other cases of maternal death 
are due to pre-existing conditions and diseases aggravated by pregnancy and 
delivery (Ministry of Public Health, Central Statistics Office, ICF Macro 2011). Table 
S2 shows the causes of maternal death in Afghanistan. 
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Table S1. Causes of maternal death in Afghanistan 
Cause Percentage 
Haemorrhage  55·9% 
Pre-eclampsia/Eclampsia 19·8% 
Prolonged or obstructed labour 10·6% 
Sepsis/infection 5·0% 
Other direct causes 3·6% 
Indirect causes  5·1% 
 
Source: AMS 2010 (Ministry of Public Health, Central Statistics Office, ICF Macro 2011) 
 
Postpartum Haemorrhage (PPH) 
World Health Organisation defines postpartum haemorrhage (PPH) as “a blood loss 
of 500 ml or more within 24 hours after birth”. In low-income countries, PPH is the 
leading cause of maternal death, and it is the primary cause of maternal deaths in 
almost one-fourth of cases at the global level (Gulmezoglu, Souza, and Mathai 2012). 
Timely management and use of prophylactic uterotonics in the third stage of labour 
can prevent the majority of mortalities from PPH (Ngwenya 2016).  
According to a systematic review, the PPH prevalence rate is 6 per cent of all 
deliveries globally. However, there is a wide variation of PPH rates between regions, 
from 2·55 in Asia to10·45 in Africa. South Eastern Asia (4·88) has the highest rate 
among the Asian countries, followed by South-Central Asia (4·35), Eastern-Asia 
(3·96), and Western Asia (1·05) (Carroli et al. 2008). A study conducted recently in a 
tertiary referral hospital in Zimbabwe shows that the incidence rate of PPH was 1·6 
per cent. The essential risk factor for PPH was pregnancy-induced hypertension and 
prolonged labour.  Almost 94 per cent of the cases survived, and almost 6 per cent 
of case died (Ngwenya 2016).  
In Afghanistan, PPH is the leading cause of pregnancy-related deaths (55·9 per cent) 
(Ministry of Public Health, Central Statistics Office, ICF Macro 2011). Given that 
almost half of the births occur at home, any maternal survival strategy that can reduce 
PPH is essential (Sanghvi et al. 2010). The PPH incidence rate is estimated at 11·4 
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per cent with the probability of morbidity of 0·8 per cent and the case fatality rate of 
5·2 per cent (Carvalho, Salehi, and Goldie 2012).  
Obstructed Labour (OL) 
Despite the uterine contraction, if the fetus can not progress into the birth canal, it is 
called obstructed labour (OL). OL will result in several complications such as trauma 
to the bladder or rectum, rupture of uterus with massive haemorrhage, obstetric 
fistula, shock and even death. The estimated incidence of OL at the global level varies 
between 3 to 6 per cent. Likewise, the estimated incidence of OL per 100 live births 
at the Eastern Mediterranean Region (EMR) is from 3 to 6 per cent per 100 live births 
(Dolea and AbouZahr 2003). This is in line with the estimation presented by the cost-
effectiveness analysis of maternal health interventions in Afghanistan. This study 
reports the obstructed labour with an incidence rate of 6.0 per cent, probability of 
morbidity of 2·1 per cent and a case fatality rate of 2·1 per cent (Carvalho, Salehi, 
and Goldie 2012).  
Hypertensive Disorders 
Hypertensive disorders of pregnancy include chronic hypertension, gestational 
hypertension, and pre-eclampsia (Hutcheon, Lisonkova, and Joseph 2011). A 
systematic review estimated the global incidence rate of the hypertensive disorder as 
4·6 per cent (95% uncertainty range 2·7 – 8·2) for pre-eclampsia and 1·4 per cent 
(95% uncertainty range 1·0 – 2·0) for eclampsia with a wide variation across the 
regions (Abalos et al. 2013). In pre-eclampsia, maternal complications, include 
eclampsia, stroke, abruptio placenta, liver haemorrhage, respiratory distress and 
oedema, renal failure, and death. In eclampsia, maternal complications contain 
death, aspiration pneumonia, pulmonary oedema, abruptio placenta, renal failure, 
cardiopulmonary arrest, and stroke.  Hypertensive disorders occur when there is a 
lack of access to appropriate antenatal care, hospital care, skilled staff, and resources 
such as equipment and laboratory (Ghulmiyyah and Sibai 2012). According to Abalos 
et al., the incidence rate of eclampsia in Afghanistan is 1 per cent (Abalos et al. 2013). 
At the region level, the incidence rate of pre-eclampsia is reported 3 per cent and 
eclampsia 0·5 per cent.  
The study of cost-effectiveness analysis of maternal strategies in Afghanistan 
presents an incidence rate of 2·8 per cent, probability of morbidity of 0·1 per cent and 
a case fatality rate of 5·8 per cent (Carvalho, Salehi, and Goldie 2012).  
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Abortion 
Abortion is an act of ceasing pregnancy at any time before labour. According to WHO, 
210 million pregnancies are happening each year globally. Almost 80 million and 33 
million pregnancies are either unintended or due to improper use of contraceptive 
methods. Consequently, some of the pregnancies are lead to induced abortion and 
others result in unwanted births (World Health Organization 2012a). If an abortion 
takes place in a health facility with appropriate management of abortion, the risk of 
morbidity and mortality is limited. However, most of the abortions in countries where 
abortion is legally not allowed to occur in an unsafe condition.  According to WHO, 
abortion is defined “as a procedure for terminating an unintended pregnancy carried 
out either by persons lacking the necessary skills or in an environment that does not 
conform to minimal medical standards, or both” (World Health Organization 2012b).  
Abortion is considered an illegal act in Afghanistan; therefore, no information is 
available on the real picture of abortion. Abortion induced cases might not be reported 
or reported as spontaneous abortion or stillbirth cases. According to Sedgh et al., the 
incidence rate of abortion induced cases in south-central Asia is 10·5 (Sedgh et al. 
2012). The study of cost-effectiveness analysis of maternal strategies in Afghanistan 
reports an incidence rate of 3·9 per cent for unsafe abortion with a probability of 
morbidity of 12·0 per cent and case fatality rate of 2·7 per cent (Carvalho, Salehi, and 
Goldie 2012).  
Maternal and Neonatal Sepsis  
According to WHO, “Sepsis is a life-threatening condition defined as organ 
dysfunction resulting from infection during pregnancy, childbirth, post-abortion, or 
post-partum period. Sepsis in newborn babies is called neonatal sepsis.” (World 
Health Organization 2017).  Infection can occur at any time between labour and the 
42nd day postpartum. The patient suffers from two or more symptoms such as pelvic 
pain, fever, vaginal discharge and smell, and a delay in the reduction of uterus size 
(Dolea and Stein 2003).   
Globally, 11 per cent of maternal deaths are attributable to infections, yet there is 
limited information on the incidence rate of maternal sepsis in low-income countries 
(Bonet et al. 2017). One study reported an estimated incidence rate of 4·3 per cent 
per 100 live births for the Eastern Mediterranean region. Every day 7700 newborns 
die due to complications during childbirth and in the postnatal phase (Chou et al. 
2015). 
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The cost-effectiveness analysis study of maternal health strategies in Afghanistan 
reports an estimated incidence rate of 5·0 per cent, probability of morbidity of 40·0 
per cent, and case fatality rate of 5·5 per cent for Afghanistan in terms of maternal 
sepsis (Carvalho, Salehi, and Goldie 2012). We obtained data on the incidence of 
maternal sepsis from (Carvalho, Salehi, and Goldie 2012) and neonatal sepsis (2 per 
cent) from (Fleischmann-Struzek et al. 2018).  
Fistula 
If medical care is not provided, an obstructed or prolonged labour due to compression 
on women’s bladder, urethra, rectum, and vaginal wall between the fetal head and 
maternal pubis and obstruction of blood supply to the tissues of vagina, bladder, and 
or rectum result in necrosis of the compressed tissues and opening of a hole in the 
birth canal. This situation will lead to uncontrolled leakage of urine from the bladder 
through the vagina that is called vesico-vaginal fistula and leakage of stool from the 
vagina called rectovaginal fistula (United Nations Population Fund 2012).  
Data is limited to the global prevalence of obstetric fistula. WHO reports an estimated 
number of 50,000 to 100,000 fistula cases each year worldwide (World Health 
Organization 2018).  A review of data from 11 developing countries shows prevalence 
rates from 0·1 in Burkina Faso to 2·0 in Uganda (Tunçalp et al. 2015).  
A study interviewed 3040 ever-married women of reproductive age in six provinces 
(out of 34) in Afghanistan reports 4 cases of vesico-vaginal fistula per 1000 (0·4 per 
cent) women in the reproductive age (Mohmand, Sharifi, and Bahram 2011).  Another 
study in Afghanistan assessed 109 fistula cases operated in a hospital retrospectively 
reported that 9·2 per cent of cases had a recto-vaginal fistula and 90·8 per cent had 
a vesicovaginal fistula (Hail 2011).  The study of cost-effectiveness analysis of 
maternal strategies in Afghanistan presents an incidence rate of 0·021 (Carvalho, 
Salehi, and Goldie 2012).  
Anaemia  
According to WHO, “anaemia is a condition in which the number of red blood cells or 
their oxygen-carrying capacity is insufficient to meet physiologic needs” (World 
Health Organization 2015). An assessment of anaemia and pregnancy-related 
maternal mortality shows that the relative mortality risks associated with moderate 
(haemoglobin 40–80 g/L) and severe anaemia (haemoglobin <47 g/L) are 1·35 and 
3·51, respectively (Brabin, Hakimi, and Pelletier 2001). A systematic review of 
anaemia burden from 1990 to 2010 shows that the global prevalence rate of anaemia 
was 39·9 per cent that accounted for 8·8 per cent of total disability from all conditions 
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(Kassebaum et al. 2014). Another study reported a similar rate of  the global 
prevalence of anaemia associated with pregnancy at 38·2 per cent (World Health 
Organization 2015).  
The study of cost-effectiveness analysis of maternal strategies in Afghanistan reports 
an incidence rate of 0·09 (0·085-0·094) for severe anaemia (Carvalho, Salehi, and 
Goldie 2012). The probability of case fatality rate of severe anaemia (0·023) was 
derived from (Bailey et al. 2017).  
 Low Birth Weight (LBW) 
WHO defines LBW as the “weight at birth of less than 2·5 kg” (World Health 
Organization n.d.). It is due to small size for gestational age or Low birth weight pre-
term birth (before 37 completed weeks of gestation) (Edmond and Bahl 2006). LBW 
is a major public health challenge and one of the leading causes of neonatal mortality. 
Generally, 20 per cent births a year are low LBW worldwide (World Health 
Organization n.d.).  In the case of LBW, ANC can evaluate risk factors related to 
pregnancy, identify at-risk pregnancy and provide counselling and management 
(Ohlsson and Shah 2008). 
We obtained the incidence rate  (17 per cent) and case fatality rate of (11·8 per cent) 
of LBW from Afghanistan Mortality Survey (Ministry of Public Health, Central 
Statistics Organization, ICF Macro, Indian Institute of Health Management Research 
2010). 
Asphyxia 
Birth asphyxia is one of the leading causes of neonatal mortality in low and middle-
income countries within the first week of life, and it is defined as the “inability of the 
newborn to initiate and sustain adequate respiration after delivery” (Ezechukwu and 
Ugochukwu 2005). Every year around four million newborns die due to birth asphyxia. 
The role of skilled birth attendance at birth is significant in reducing and managing 
birth asphyxia cases (Aslam et al. 2014).  
According to the Afghanistan Mortality Survey 2010, the probability of neonatal death 
due to asphyxia is 0·031.  
Maternal and Neonatal Mortality 
According to the MoPH and Inter UN Agency Estimation, the pregnancy-related 
mortality ratio in Afghanistan is 396 per 100,000 live births (Ministry of Public Health 
2018).  
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Neonatal mortality is defined as the probability of dying within the first month of life. 
According to the Afghanistan Demographic Health Survey 2015, neonatal mortality 
is 22 per 1000 live births (Central Statistics Organization 2015).  
Further information on the study site 
To improve maternal and child health indicators, Afghanistan started implementing a 
PBF intervention between 2010 and 2015. PBF intervention was aligned with the 
BPHS and implemented in 11 provinces out of 34. PBF intervention was aligned with 
the BPHS and provided through NSPs in nine provinces and direct implementation 
of MoPH in two provinces. 
The objectives of the PBF intervention were to increase key utilisation of maternal 
and child health services, improve the quality of health care services, and ensure that 
patients and communities are increasingly involved and satisfied with the publicly 
financed health services they receive. The performance payments to healthcare 
workers were based on the HMIS data. Health workers were provided incentives 
based on extra production of outputs (targeted services) above the baseline set for 
each facility at the beginning of the programme. Monitoring and verification of the 
HMIS data occur on a three-monthly basis on a random selection of health facilities 
in both intervention and control groups. Both the quantity and the quality of services 
were monitored by using the national monitoring checklist (NMC). To ensure the 
programme was focusing on both quantity and quality of services, the payments were 
discounted by the quality of care as measured by a quarterly score on the NMC. For 
example, if the health facility received 1000 US$ per quarter based on quantity of 
services and it scored 80 percent on the NMC then it would receive an actual payment 
of 800 US$ (80%) for that quarter.  
The evaluation was designed based on two household surveys conducted as a 
baseline in 2010 and an endline in 2015 in the catchment area of a sample of 
intervention and control health facilities. The design of the evaluation of PBF 
intervention was a cluster randomised trial with two groups of control and intervention. 
Given the differences between the types of facilities, all facilities within each province 
were stratified by type of facility and then matched based on the utilisation rate. Within 
each matched pair, health facilities were randomly assigned to control and 
intervention groups. Totally, 463 health facilities were assigned to both groups. The 
only difference between the two groups was that the intervention group received 
performance-based incentives beside of their salaries while the control group 
receives only their routine salaries. The evaluation was based on three-stage 
 292 
 
sampling. In the first stage, within each province, the required number of matched 
health facilities was randomly selected. In the second stage, the required number of 
villages was randomly sampled from the list of all villages in the catchment area of 
the selected health facilities. In the third stage, using the household listing conducted 
prior to survey, the required number of households in the selected villages were 
sampled using simple random sampling. The PBF impact evaluation showed that 
some progress was made concerning the targeted indicators; however, the results 
were not statistically significant. In terms of the impact of the PBF programme on care 
quality, the intervention group performed better in comparison with the control group 
on 14 indicators, seven of which were found to be of statistical significant (Ministry of 
Public Health & KIT Royal Tropical Institute 2015). 
Table S2. Checklist for estimating the unit cost of PBF services in Afghanistan  
Reference Case Checklist Items Options 
STUDY DESIGN AND SCOPE 
Principle 1 - The purpose of the study, the population, and the intervention and/or service/output being costed should be clearly 
defined. 
Purpose 
Purpose type:  
Cost-effectiveness analysis of performance-based financing (PBF) for the Basic 
Package of Health Services (BPHS) in Afghanistan. A Cluster-Randomized Trial 
Relevance for health practice 
and/or policy decisions:  
A critical concern is whether the overall costs of PBF have a more significant impact than 
other direct forms of funding health services.  This study contributes to the broad 
evidence base informing LMICs on whether PBF can extend and improve the 
performance of health benefit packages in a cost-effective way. 
 
Aim of the cost analysis:  
This study aim was to examine the cost-effectiveness of PBF in Afghanistan ex-post, 
based on a pragmatic randomised control trial. 
Intended user(s) of the cost 
estimate:  
Policymakers 
Intervention 
Main activities involved: 
The PBF programme intended to increase key utilisation of maternal and child health 
services; improve the quality of health care services; and ensure that patients and 
communities are increasingly involved and satisfied with the publicly financed health 
services they receive. 
Target population: BPHS health facilities 
Coverage level: Two provinces out of 11. 
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Delivery mechanism (e.g., health 
system level, facility type, 
ownership, etc.): 
Basic Package of Health Services health facilities.  
Epidemiological context (i.e., 
incidence/prevalence of disease) 
According to Afghanistan Demographic Health Survey 2015, 59% of women receive at 
least one antenatal care from a skilled provider, only 48% of births occur in a health 
facility in Afghanistan, and only 40% of mothers receive the recommended postnatal 
health check within two days of delivery in Afghanistan. 
Intervention 
Health workers were provided incentives based on extra production of outputs (targeted 
services) above the baseline set for each facility at the beginning of the programme. The 
only difference between intervention group and control group was that the intervention 
group received performance-based incentives beside of their salaries while the control 
group receives only their routine salaries. 
Principle 2 - The perspective (extent of the resource use captured) of the cost estimation should be stated and justified relevant 
to purpose. 
Study perspective (e.g., provider, 
health system, societal, 
household): 
This study is implemented from payer’s perspective. The costs incurred on patients, such 
as transportation costs and opportunity costs of patients due to loss of productivity and 
opportunity costs of caretakers were not included due to unavailability of data.   
Principle 3 - The type of cost being estimated should be clearly defined, in terms of economic vs financial, real world vs guideline, 
and incremental vs full cost, and whether the cost is 'net of future cost', should be justified relevant to purpose. 
Defining the cost 
Economic vs. financial cost Both economic and financial costs of PBF programme was estimated  
‘Real world' vs guideline cost ‘Real world' cost was estimated  
Full vs incremental cost 
We compared the PBF ‘treatment’ to the standard of care ‘control’ for the population of 
Afghanistan, assessing cost-effectiveness using incremental cost per disability-adjusted 
life years (DALYs) averted. 
Net of future cost NA 
Principle 4 -  The ‘units’ in the unit costs for strategies, services and interventions should be defined, relevant for the costing 
purpose, and generalizable.   
List the unit costs used 
Antenatal care unit cost 
Delivery by skilled birth attendant cost 
Postnatal care cost 
Describe any adjustments made to 
reflect the quality of service output 
No adjustment was required as the cost of service in both control and treatment groups 
were with the same quality  
Principle 5 - The time horizon should be of sufficient length to capture all costs relevant to the purpose, and consideration should 
be given to disaggregating costs into separate time periods where appropriate. 
Time period 
Period type (start-up vs 
implementation): 
We used a time horizon of one year from the start of pregnancy for a hypothetical cohort 
of women attending BPHS services in Afghanistan  
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Time period: Between 2010 and 2015. 
SERVICE AND RESOURCE USE MEASUREMENT 
Principle 6 - The scope of the inputs to include in the cost estimation should be defined and justified relevant to purpose. 
Defining the scope 
Above service delivery costs 
included 
Yes  
Costs of supporting change 
included 
NA 
Research costs included NA 
Unrelated costs included No 
If incremental costs, assumptions 
made for existing capacity 
NA 
Any exclusions other to scope NA 
Principle 7 - The methods for estimating the quantity of inputs should be described, including data sources and criteria for 
allocating resources. 
Describe the measurement of each 
input as either top-down or bottom-
up 
Unit costs were estimated using a micro-costing method including the costs of salaries, 
drugs, equipment, and building.  
Describe method to allocate human 
resources inputs 
Interviews with staff were undertaken to determine the proportion of staff time spent on 
each service and the proportional use of equipment for each service.  
Describe methods to allocate 
above site/overhead inputs 
BPHS health facilities did not include overhead inputs.  
Describe the methods for excluding 
research costs 
NA 
Describe the methods for 
measuring other resources 
The percentage of floor space used for each service was measured. The average costs 
of drugs and supplies used were calculated using the list of prescribed medicine for each 
service and the pharmacy register book at each of the health facilities. 
Principle 8 - The sampling strategy used should be determined by the precision demanded by the costing purpose and designed 
to minimize bias. 
Site/client selection process/criteria 
Describe geographic sampling (if 
applicable) 
NA 
Describe site sampling (if 
applicable) 
A primary data collection was conducted from a random sample of the BPHS health 
facilities to measure the costs of PBF services at the facility level. The sample size was 
estimated based on the mean (2·58) and standard deviation (1·74) of cost per personnel 
in 463 PBF BPHS health facilities with an assumption that this allows error to be 40% of 
standard deviation in the health facility population. Provided that it was planned to apply 
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a sensitivity analysis around those parameters, the estimated number of health facilities 
was enough to generate sound estimates of parameters for the health facilities.   
Describe patient sampling (if 
applicable) 
NA  
Describe methods to calculate 
sample size 
The formula below presents the sample size calculation: 
Sample size = 
𝑍2∗𝜎2
𝑑2
  
Where: d= 0·4 *𝜎 
z= 1·96 for two-side test 
𝜎 = standard deviation of the continues outcome 
 
Principle 9 - The selection of the data source(s) and methods for estimating service use should be described, and potential 
biases reported in the study limitations.    
Identify the data source used to 
measure the units 
The key data were sourced from a sample of health facilities. Other data were derived 
from literature.  
Where relevant describe the 
sampling frame, method and size: 
NA 
Describe any method used to fill 
missing data 
NA 
Principle 10 - Consideration should be given to the timing of data collection to minimize recall bias and, where relevant, the 
impact of seasonality and other differences over time. 
The timing of data collection should be specified in the following ways: 
Timing of data collection (resource 
and service use) 
2014 
Prospective or retrospective Retrospective 
Longitudinal vs cross-sectional 
data 
Cross-sectional data 
Recall period, where relevant A month 
VALUATION AND PRICING 
Principle 11 - The sources for price data should be listed by input, and clear delineation should be made between local and 
international price data sources, and tradeable, non-tradeable goods. 
Report the sources of price data by 
input 
Ministry of Public Health 
Report inputs where local and 
international prices were used 
Local  
Principle 12 - Capital costs should be appropriately annuitized or depreciated to reflect the expected life of capital inputs. 
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Describe the depreciation 
approach  
The cost of equipment was annualised and estimated. 
Describe any discount rate used for 
capital goods 
To estimate the cost of health facility buildings, a corresponding rental cost of the building 
was considered. 
Report the expected life years of 
capital goods, and data sources 
5 years based on the Ministry of Finance practice  
Principle 13 - Where relevant an appropriate discount rate, inflation and exchange rates should be used, and clearly stated. 
Describe any discount rate used for 
future costs 
3%  
Describe the reported currency 
year 
US Dollars  
Describe any conversions made 1 USD = 54 Afghani  
Report the inflation type and rate 
used 
Percentage, GDP deflator/ CPI, Source 
Principle 14 - The use and source of shadow prices for goods and for the opportunity cost of time should be reported.  
Methods for valuing the following should be reported:  
Report methods for valuing 
volunteer time 
NA 
Report adjustments for input prices 
(donated or subsidized goods) 
NA 
ANALYSING AND PRESENTING RESULTS 
Principle 15 - Variation in the cost of the intervention by site size/ organisation, sub-populations, or by other drivers of 
heterogeneity should be explored and reported. 
Describe any sub-groups or 
populations analyzed 
AN 
Describe any statistical methods 
used to establish differences in unit 
costs by sub-group 
NA 
Describe any determinants of cost 
(model specification) 
Free text 
Describe any multivariate statistical 
methods used to analyze cost 
functions 
No used  
Principle 16 - The uncertainty associated with cost estimates should be appropriately characterized. 
Describe sensitivity analyses 
conducted 
A wide range (0 – ±30%) one-way sensitivity test, two-way sensitivity analysis as well as 
a probabilistic sensitivity analysis were applied  
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List possible sources of bias  We did not observe a major source of bias in this study.  
Principle 17 - Cost estimates should be communicated clearly and transparently to enable decision-maker(s) to interpret and 
use the results.  
Limitations 
Limitations in the design, analysis, 
and results 
The study has some limitations. On the effect side, there may have been a spillover effect 
from the treatment group into the control group due to the location of the control group 
and treatment group in the same province, and the movement of staff and the population 
across facilities. Control health facilities were likely aware of PBF and tried to compete 
with treatment health facilities on performance. We also had to source some data 
regarding maternal and neonatal related complications from outside the study. These 
parameter limitations were addressed by applying a wide-range sensitivity analysis. 
Aspects of the cost estimates that 
would limit generalizability of 
results to other constituencies 
Free text 
Conflicts of Interest 
All pecuniary and non-pecuniary 
interests of the study contributors 
No conflict of interest  
All sources of funding that 
supported conduct of the costing 
No conflict of interest 
Non-monetary sources of support 
for conduct of the costing 
No conflict of interest 
Open access 
Dataset available Yes  
 
Supplementary Table 1. An example of allocation of performance incentives to 
health facility staff per quarter  
Staff Number of 
staff 
Incentive allocation 
factor 
Total performance 
payment  
MD Doctor 1 20% $400 
Midwife  1 30% $600 
Community Health 
Supervisor  
1 15% $300 
Vaccinator  2 10%  $400 
Guard 2 7.5% $300 
Total  7 100% $2,000 
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Supplementary Table 2. Incentive payment per service 
Indicator Initial Unit Cost Revised Unit Cost 
Visit of antenatal care  1.5 $US 2.8 $US 
Skilled birth attendance  12 $US 37 $US 
Visit of postnatal care  1.5 $US 2.8 $US 
Pentavalent3 vaccination 3 $US 3 $US 
 
Supplementary Table 3. PBF project administration financial cost breakdown  
Cost sub-centre 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Total  
 
Office equipment  
              
1,055  
                 
4,004  
                 
2,390  
                    
339  
                    
607  
                 
1,147  
                        
9,541  
 
Tax 
              
1,967  
                 
9,563  
              
10,395  
              
11,024  
                 
8,571  
                 
9,962  
                      
51,482  
 
Monitoring 
              
5,178  
              
11,993  
              
12,196  
              
13,058  
                 
9,679  
              
12,962  
                      
65,067  
 
Communication 
      
0 
                 
1,595  
                 
1,270  
                 
1,467  
                 
1,370  
                 
2,448  
                        
8,150  
 
Other costs* 
            
17,489  
              
11,656  
                 
8,886  
                 
8,854  
                 
7,595  
                 
8,570  
                      
63,050  
 
Total (US$) 
            
27,698  
              
40,822  
              
37,149  
              
36,755  
              
29,836  
              
37,104  
                   
197,290  
*Office equipment, workshop, trainings, external audit payments 
 
Supplementary Table 4. PBF programme annual cost per capita (US$) 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Mean 
CI 95%  Lower 
bound 
CI 95% Upper 
bound 
Cost per capita (US$) 
               
0·02  
                           
0·3  
       
0·5  
                   
0·6  
                  
0·5  
            
0·5  
                     
0·4  
 
0·2 
 
0·6 
CI= Confidence interval  
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Supplementary Table 5. One-way sensitivity of key parametres  
Parameter 
Base-case 
value  
Sensitivity 
analysis 
range  
 Base-
case ICER 
($US)  
 ICER at 
low value  
ICER at high 
value 
ANC cost  $     4.72   ±30%    1,241·3  1,030·2   1,452·9  
SBA cost   $   48·48   ±30%   $1,241·3         57·4    1,625·7  
PNC cost   $     5·38   ±30%    1,241·3  1,003·7    1,549·3  
Management of maternal 
haemorrhage cost 
 $     0·11   ±30%   1,241·3   1,241·1    1,241·7  
Management of obstructed 
labour cost 
 $   69·33   ±30%    1,241·3   1,241·1   1,242·6  
Management of maternal 
sepsis cost 
 $   37·46   ±30%    1,241·3   1,241·1    1,241·7  
Management of hypertensive 
disorders cost 
 $   57·31   ±30%    1,241·3   1,241·3   1,241·8  
Management of abortion cost  $   45·98   ±30%    1,241·3   1,139·3    1,343·8  
Safe abortion cost  $   31·96   ±30%   1,241·3   1,108·8   1,154·3  
Management of unsafe 
abortion cost 
 $   60·00   ±30%   1,241·3   1,236·9   1,246·2 
Management of low birth cost  $     8·91   ±30%   1,241·3   1,235·8   1,249·2  
Management of neonatal 
sepsis cost 
 $   21·31   ±30%   1,241·3   1,240·5   1,241·6  
Management of birth asphyxia 
cost 
 $     6·34   ±30%   1,241·3   1,241·1   1,241·2  
ANC rate          0·60   ±30%  1,241·3  
        
1,192·6  
       1,276·7  
SBA rate          0·52   ±30%   1,241·3  
        
1,088·5  
       1,465·5  
PNC rate           0·55   ±30%    1,241·3  
        
1,197·0  
       1,286·5  
Haemorrhage incidence     0·11   ±30%   1,241·3  
        
1,240·4  
       1,242·2  
Hypertensive disorder 
incidence 
      0·03   ±30%   1,241·3  
        
1,227·7  
       1,246·3  
Abortion incidence        0·09   ±30%   1,241·3  
        
1,234·2  
       1,248·6  
Unsafe abortion incidence        0·04   ±30%   1,241·3  
        
1,142·5  
       1,359·1  
Obstructed labour incidence          0·06   ±30%   1,241·3  
        
1,228·2  
       1,303·1  
Severe anaemia incidence           0·09   ±30%    1,241·3  
        
1,241·3  
       1,241·3  
Maternal sepsis incidence           0·05   ±30%   1,241·3  
        
1,240·2  
       1,242·4  
Fistula incidence        0·02   ±30%   1,241·3  
        
1,226·1  
       1,257·1  
infertility incidence           0·09   ±30%   1,241·3  
        
1,239·3  
       1,243·3  
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Low birth weight incidence          0·17   ±30%   1,241·3  
        
1,145·9  
       1,422·2  
Neonatal sepsis incidence           0·02   ±30%   1,241·3  
        
1,239·3  
       1,244·4  
Birth asphyxia incidence           0·03   ±30%    1,241·3  
        
1,217·2  
       1,262·3  
Severe anaemia duration          0·50   ±30%    1,241·3  
        
1,241·3  
       1,241·3  
Fistula duration       41·90   ±30%    1,241·3  
        
1,241·3  
       1,241·3  
Infertility duration       17·00   ±30%    1,241·3  
        
1,241·3  
       1,241·3  
Low birth weight duration          0·06   ±30%    1,241·3  
        
1,241·3  
       1,241·3  
Neonatal sepsis duration          0·04   ±30%    1,241·3  
        
1,241·3  
       1,241·3  
Birth asphyxia duration          0·19   ±30%    1,241·3  
        
1,241·3  
       1,241·3  
Severe anaemia disability 
weight 
         0·16   ±30%  
 1,241·3          
1,241·3  
       1,241·3  
Fistula disability weight          0·43   ±30%  
 1,241·3          
1,241·3  
       1,241·3  
Infertility disability weight          0·01   ±30%  
 1,241·3          
1,241·3  
       1,241·3  
Low birth weight disability 
weight 
         0·11   ±30%  
   
1,241·3  
        
1,241·3  
       1,241·3  
Neonatal Sepsis weight 
          
0·62  
  
±30%  
 
1,241·3  
    
  1,241·3  
       1,241·3  
Birth asphyxia disability weight 
          
0·37  
 
 ±30%  
   
1,241·3  
        
1,241·3  
       1,241·3  
Discount rate  
          
0·03  
 
 0 - 0·1  
   
1,241·3  
        
1,186·2  
       1,377·6  
ANC=antenatal are, SBA= skilled birth attendance, PNC= postnatal care  
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Supplementary Table 5. Two-way sensitivity analysis showing ICER as results of combinations of different levels of incremental costs (US$) 
and incremental DALYs 
In
c
re
m
e
n
ta
l 
D
A
L
Y
s
 A
v
e
rt
e
d
 
 $21·00 $23·00 $25·00 $27·00 $29·00 $31·00 $33·00 $33·91 $35·00 $37·00 $39·00 $41·00 $43·00 $45·00 $47·00 $49·00 $51·00 
0·010 2,100 2,300 2,500 2,700 2,900 3,100 3,300 3,391 3,500 3,700 3,900 4,100 4,300 4,500 4,700 4,900 5,100 
0·011 1,909 2,091 2,273 2,455 2,636 2,818 3,000 3,083 3,182 3,364 3,545 3,727 3,909 4,091 4,273 4,455 4,636 
0·012 1,750 1,917 2,083 2,250 2,417 2,583 2,750 2,826 2,917 3,083 3,250 3,417 3,583 3,750 3,917 4,083 4,250 
0·013 1,615 1,769 1,923 2,077 2,231 2,385 2,538 2,608 2,692 2,846 3,000 3,154 3,308 3,462 3,615 3,769 3,923 
0·014 1,500 1,643 1,786 1,929 2,071 2,214 2,357 2,422 2,500 2,643 2,786 2,929 3,071 3,214 3,357 3,500 3,643 
0·015 1,400 1,533 1,667 1,800 1,933 2,067 2,200 2,261 2,333 2,467 2,600 2,733 2,867 3,000 3,133 3,267 3,400 
0·016 1,313 1,438 1,563 1,688 1,813 1,938 2,063 2,119 2,188 2,313 2,438 2,563 2,688 2,813 2,938 3,063 3,188 
0·017 1,235 1,353 1,471 1,588 1,706 1,824 1,941 1,995 2,059 2,176 2,294 2,412 2,529 2,647 2,765 2,882 3,000 
0·018 1,167 1,278 1,389 1,500 1,611 1,722 1,833 1,884 1,944 2,056 2,167 2,278 2,389 2,500 2,611 2,722 2,833 
0·019 1,105 1,211 1,316 1,421 1,526 1,632 1,737 1,785 1,842 1,947 2,053 2,158 2,263 2,368 2,474 2,579 2,684 
0·020 1,050 1,150 1,250 1,350 1,450 1,550 1,650 1,695 1,750 1,850 1,950 2,050 2,150 2,250 2,350 2,450 2,550 
0·021 1,000 1,095 1,190 1,286 1,381 1,476 1,571 1,615 1,667 1,762 1,857 1,952 2,048 2,143 2,238 2,333 2,429 
0·022 955 1,045 1,136 1,227 1,318 1,409 1,500 1,541 1,591 1,682 1,773 1,864 1,955 2,045 2,136 2,227 2,318 
0·023 913 1,000 1,087 1,174 1,261 1,348 1,435 1,474 1,522 1,609 1,696 1,783 1,870 1,957 2,043 2,130 2,217 
0·024 875 958 1,042 1,125 1,208 1,292 1,375 1,413 1,458 1,542 1,625 1,708 1,792 1,875 1,958 2,042 2,125 
0·025 840 920 1,000 1,080 1,160 1,240 1,320 1,356 1,400 1,480 1,560 1,640 1,720 1,800 1,880 1,960 2,040 
0·026 808 885 962 1,038 1,115 1,192 1,269 1,304 1,346 1,423 1,500 1,577 1,654 1,731 1,808 1,885 1,962 
0·027 769 842 915 989 1,062 1,135 1,208 1,242 1,282 1,355 1,428 1,501 1,574 1,648 1,721 1,794 1,867 
0·028 750 821 893 964 1,036 1,107 1,179 1,211 1,250 1,321 1,393 1,464 1,536 1,607 1,679 1,750 1,821 
0·029 724 793 862 931 1,000 1,069 1,138 1,169 1,207 1,276 1,345 1,414 1,483 1,552 1,621 1,690 1,759 
0·030 700 767 833 900 967 1,033 1,100 1,130 1,167 1,233 1,300 1,367 1,433 1,500 1,567 1,633 1,700 
0·031 677 742 806 871 935 1,000 1,065 1,094 1,129 1,194 1,258 1,323 1,387 1,452 1,516 1,581 1,645 
0·032 656 719 781 844 906 969 1,031 1,060 1,094 1,156 1,219 1,281 1,344 1,406 1,469 1,531 1,594 
0·033 636 697 758 818 879 939 1,000 1,028 1,061 1,121 1,182 1,242 1,303 1,364 1,424 1,485 1,545 
0·034 618 676 735 794 853 912 971 997 1,029 1,088 1,147 1,206 1,265 1,324 1,382 1,441 1,500 
0·035 600 657 714 771 829 886 943 969 1,000 1,057 1,114 1,171 1,229 1,286 1,343 1,400 1,457 
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0·036 583 639 694 750 806 861 917 942 972 1,028 1,083 1,139 1,194 1,250 1,306 1,361 1,417 
0·037 568 622 676 730 784 838 892 916 946 1,000 1,054 1,108 1,162 1,216 1,270 1,324 1,378 
0·038 553 605 658 711 763 816 868 892 921 974 1,026 1,079 1,132 1,184 1,237 1,289 1,342 
0·039 538 590 641 692 744 795 846 869 897 949 1,000 1,051 1,103 1,154 1,205 1,256 1,308 
0·040 525 575 625 675 725 775 825 848 875 925 975 1,025 1,075 1,125 1,175 1,225 1,275 
0·041 512 561 610 659 707 756 805 827 854 902 951 1,000 1,049 1,098 1,146 1,195 1,244 
0·042 500 548 595 643 690 738 786 807 833 881 929 976 1,024 1,071 1,119 1,167 1,214 
0·043 488 535 581 628 674 721 767 789 814 860 907 953 1,000 1,047 1,093 1,140 1,186 
0·044 477 523 568 614 659 705 750 771 795 841 886 932 977 1,023 1,068 1,114 1,159 
0·045 467 511 556 600 644 689 733 754 778 822 867 911 956 1,000 1,044 1,089 1,133 
0·046 457 500 543 587 630 674 717 737 761 804 848 891 935 978 1,022 1,065 1,109 
0·047 447 489 532 574 617 660 702 721 745 787 830 872 915 957 1,000 1,043 1,085 
0·048 438 479 521 563 604 646 688 706 729 771 813 854 896 938 979 1,021 1,063 
0·049 429 469 510 551 592 633 673 692 714 755 796 837 878 918 959 1,000 1,041 
0·050 420 460 500 540 580 620 660 678 700 740 780 820 860 900 940 980 1,020 
 Incremental Costs (US$) 
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Supplementary Figure 1. Maternal Decision Analytical Model  
 
ANC= antenatal are, SBA= skilled birth attendance, PNC= postnatal care 
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Supplementary Figure 2. Maternal Decision Analytical Model 
 
ANC= antenatal are, SBA= skilled birth attendance, PNC= postnatal care 
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